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INTRODUCTION
In the First World War, Imperial Germany and Ottoman 
Turkey were associated with the Central Powers„ From 
Berlin's point of view, Turkey's participation was a. 
definite advantage because it crea.ted a new front for 
Russia in the Caucasus and affected the security of Great 
Britain's life line through the Suez* To further Germany's 
policies, Berlin requested that Turkey carry out several 
tasks„ These were to close the Turkish Straits to coun~ 
tries other than those aligned with the Central Powers; to 
close the supply route through the Suez Canal; to invade 
Russia through the Caucasus; and, finally, to declare a 
holy war against the Triple Entente,
During the following four years of the war, Turkey 
was able to close the Straits and successfully attack the 
Russians„ However, the Suez Canal remained open and the 
holy war was largely disregarded by the Moslems, Germany
1
2
willingly supplied the Turks with officers to run the army 
which was able to defeat the Allied attack on Gallipoli 
and keep the Russians out of Asia Minor, However, the 
Germans were reluctant to support Turkey’s ambitions among 
the Turkish minorities in Russia, because Berlin felt 
that it was diverting attention from prosecuting the war 
on other fronts in the Near Eas t,
By March 1918, Turkey's value to Germany was becoming 
questionable, Berlin felt the Turks were more a burden 
than an asset, Turkey's closing of the Straits - once an 
important act - had lost much of its significance because 
of Rumania's defeat and Russia's withdrawal from the war. 
Further, the entry of the United States into the conflict 
and the resulting pressure on Germany caused many of the 
German troops in Turkey to be recalled to the Fatherland, 
And the Turks were left largely to their own means in con­
tinuing the war.
In spite of Germany’s and Turkey's differences over 
political objectives during the war, there was very little 
animosity after defeat in 1918, Whatever vindictiveness 
either country held against the other was undoubtedly 
directed towards the victorious Allies who, in the eyes of 
Berlin and Ankara, had Imposed outrageous peace terms on 
the defeated nations. Thus, it was not difficult for the 
Weimar Republic to regain the friendship of the Turks,
And throughout the 1920’s, numerous German technicians, 
teachers, and construction firms were invited into the 
new Kemalist Turkey,
3
The birth of the Third Reich did not alienate Turkey 
from its old ally. Many people in Turkey viewed the re­
juvenation of Germany with a deep admiration. There was 
little concern expressed in Turkey for the revisionists’ 
ideas and the totalitarian methods of the Nazi regime, as 
long as Germany kept its hands off southeastern Europe.
Hitler's foreign policy did not call for a close 
association with the Turkish Republic. While speaking of 
his policy against allying with weak powers, the Ftlhrer 
stated with reference to Turkey:
Even in peacetime it was bad enough that the 
German alliance policy, for want of any aggres­
sive intentions of our own, ended in a, defensive 
union of ancient states, pensioned by world his­
tory. The alliance with Austria as well as 
Turkey had little to be said for them. While 
the greatest military and industrial states on 
earth banded into an active aggressive union, we 
collected a few antique, impotent state formations 
and with this decaying rubbish attempted to face 
an active world coalition. Germany received a.  ̂
bitter accounting for this error in foreign policy.
This was the view that Nazi Germany took toward the Turkish 
Republic during the twelve years of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. Germany had a deep economic 
Interest in Turkey, However, it did not overshadow Hitler’s 
basic premise that to be drawn too closely in that direc­
tion at the expense of forming a strong alliance with Great 
Britain or Italy could be disastrous if another world con­
flict exploded.
Adolph Hitler, Hein Kampf, (Boston, 19^3), 657.
k
In the following chapters a. study is made of the 
relations "between the Third Reich and the Turkish Repub­
lic* The subject is approached topically in an effort to 
isolate what the author believes are the most important 
events of the twelve years from the standpoint of Berlin* 
Running throughout the pages is the question: Did the
Reich use Turkey to the utmost advantage? I believe it 
did*
CHAPTER I
GERMAN AND TURKISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BALKANS
1933 - 194-1
Prior to the advent of the Third Reich in 1933. the 
Balkan countries were searching for a way to guarantee
1their 'boundaries against encroachment by an outside power.
The initial step in reaching this goal was to effect a
suitable rapprochement between the states„ Throughout
the 1920’s and the early part of the 1930’s numerous
2treaties, generally bilateral, were concluded., Turkey 
had signed, by 1933. friendship or commercial treaties
1 Since the First World War, the Balkans have con­
sisted of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Rumania, 
and Bulgaria,
2 For a.list of the various treaties, see Robert J, 
Kerner and Harry N„ Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the 
Balkan Entente: 1930-1935. (BerkeIey7~193^T. 21-20 [Here- 
after cited as Kerner, Balkan Conferences,j
5
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3with Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, However, 
these and the various other treaties did not remove the 
noticeable measure of distrust existing between the various 
Balkan powers.
On February 9. 193^* the Balkan Entente, or Pact, 
was signed by Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia,
The precise aim of the Entente was to guarantee Balkan 
frontiers against invasion by a Balkan state, specifically 
Bulgaria, either acting by itself or in combination with 
an outside power. The weakness of the Entente was evident 
from the start, A protocol, signed along with the Entente 
but kept secret, stipulated that if a. signatory were attac­
ked by a non-Balkan power and later assisted by a Balkan 
power, the Entente members would be obliged to go to war 
against the aggressors. However, Russia and Italy, the 
two countries most interested in the Balkans, were assured
by Turkey and Greece respectively that this section would
L\.not operate against them if they invaded a Balkan state.
The Wilhelmstrasse viewed the formation of the Balkan 
Entente with considerable suspicion. Although Berlin was 
not in a position to influence directly the Entente, it 
did not favor the principle of Balkan cooperation,-* South-
3 Kerner, Balkan Conferences, 22,
Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World, (Washington, 
1959) * 52-3« [Hereafter cited a.s Kilic, Turkey,!
-5 Theodore I, Geshkoff, Balkan Union: A Road to
Peace in Eastern Europe. (New York, 19^l), 212, ["Here- 
after cited as Geshkoff, Balkan Union,]
7
eastern Europe was an important trade area, which the Nazis
did not wish to lose, and as Germany grew stronger it took
6a more negative view of the Entente„
In an attempt to quiet Germany's doubts about the
Entente, Tewfik Aras? called on German Foreign Minister
8Konstantin von Neurath in Berlin,, Aras told Neurath that, 
contrary to what certain "channels" were saying, the Tur­
kish government was not pursuing an anti-German policy in 
adhering to the Balkan Entente, Turkey supported the al­
liance of the Balkan States because it believed peace in
the Balkans would be best guaranteed by this pact, and with
9it the peace of the European continent.
On March 7, 1936, Hitler addressed the Reichstag and 
announced the decision to remilitarize the Rhineland, The 
shock of his speech was felt throughout Europe, In commen­
ting on Turkey's reaction to the announcement, the Foreign
loSecretary, Numan Menemencioglu, said that though his 
^ Kilic, Turkey, 51®
? Tewfik Rtlsttl Aras, (1883- )» Turkish Foreign
Minister 1925-1938; twice President of the League of Nations 
Assembly; resigned as Foreign Minister after the election cf 
Ismet InSntl as President; Turkish Ambassador to Great Britain 
1938-19^2„
8 Baron Konstantin von Neurath, (1873-19 )® German
Foreign Minister 1932-1938,
9 U, S, Department of State, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918-19^-5, Series c"7Til’ "766-02„ ["Here­
after cited as D aG,F0P 0, Series C„]
^6 Numan Menemencioglu, General Secretary of the 
Turkish Foreign Office, 1937-mid-19^2; Foreign Minister 
19^2-19^,
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government sympathized with Germany’s action, the question 
of utmost importance to Turkey was whether or not it con­
stituted a threat to world peace. In this respect, the
Turks were interested in the effect, if any, remilitariza-
11tion would have on the Locarno Pact, Menemencioglu re­
fused to take a definite stand in advance of the League's
decision, saying that as a non-Locarno power, Turkey should
12let the directly concerned countries decide.
During this period, the basis of Turkish policy in
the Balkans was friendship with Greece, followed by good
relations with Yugoslavia, In 1937» diplomatic relations
existed between these countries, but they were not extremely
close because of Turkish and Greek fear of an expansionist 
13Yugoslavia, This feeling of uneasiness on the part of
Turkey and Greece developed after the signing of the
Belgrade Pact between Italy and Yugoslavia on March 25,
1937s and both the Italian and Yugoslavian governments were
1̂well aware of the fact,
11 The Locarno Pact was a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 
between Germany, Belgium, France, Grea.t Britain and Italy 
signed October 16, 1925o Its primary object was to safe­
guard the status quo in Europe, For the text of the treaty, 
see Alexander Baltzly (ed,), Readings in Twentieth-Century 
European History, (New York, 1950),172-7^, [Baltzly, Readings,]
12 P*G°FoP,. Series C, V, 135, The Locarno powers 
did not act against the Germans,
Galeazzo Clano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. 1936- 
19^2, (London, 19^8), 102-03, LHereafter cited as Ciano, 
Diplomatic Papers,]
l k  Ibld°. 152-53,
9
15In November 1937» German Foreign Minister Rlbbentrop
16held talks with Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister 
17Ciano over Italy's aims toward Turkey,, Rlbbentrop des­
cribed Turkish concern over the Italian attitude, adding 
that Turkey would be a, good card in Italy's hand, Mussolini 
denied that his government held any hard feelings towards
the Turks and referred the German Foreign Minister to the
1RTurkish-Italian Treaty of 1928,. Further, Mussolini re­
quested Rlbbentrop to inform Ankara that under the right
conditions, the Italian government would be willing to
19strengthen the treaty.
On March 12, 1938, the German army occupied Vienna
in the Nazis' first move in the direction of the Balkans
and Turkey, The reaction in Ankara, came during the first
20week in April when the Turkish President, Kemal Ataturk,
Joachim von Ribbentrop, (1893~1946), Made com­
missioner for disarmament affairs 1934; appointed Ambas­
sador to London 193&; called back to Berlin and made 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 1938; hanged at Ntlrnberg 1946,
1 6 Benito Mussolini, (1883-1945), Chief of the 
Italian government 1922-194-5; executed by partisans 194\5o
^  Count Ga.lea.zzo Ciano, (1903-1944), Mussolini's 
son-in-law; Italian Foreign Minister 1936-1943; Ambassador 
to the Vatican 1943; executed in January 1944,
1 R Ciano, Diplomatic Pa,pers, 145-46, According to 
Ciano, the treaty of neutrality and conciliation between 
Italy and Turkey, signed in Rome May 30, 1928, was auto­
matically renewed every five years, unless denounced after 
six months notice had been given,
19 18id,, 145-46,
2 A Kemal Ataturk, (1881-1938), Also known as Mustafa 
Kemal, Military Commander during World War I, Elected 
President of the Turkish National Assembly 1920j served as 
Turkey's first President 1923-1938,
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21instructed the Turkish Ambassador in Germany, Hamdi Arpag, 
to inform Berlin of Turkey's political position. The Am­
bassador explained to Ribbentrop that his country's policies 
rested on a three-fold basis; the Peace of Lausanne, pre­
servation of national security, and the Turkish National
22Pact of Ankara, Accordingly, Turkey followed a policy of 
neutrality toward all sides. The Ambassador mentioned his 
government's friendly ties with the Balkan Pact and other 
surrounding countries. But most emphatically, Turkey con­
sidered as her friends - first, Germany, then England,
Russia, the United States and Italy, Arpag carefully poin­
ted out that Turkey was trying to keep out of all coalitions 
and, most importantly, to refrain from any harmful act
against a. friendly country, Ribbentrop answered that Ger-
23many also desired good relations with Turkey,
About one year later, Germany made another military
stride toward the Balkan peninsula. On March 1̂ , 1939,
Germany occupied Czechoslovakia causing the collapse of
2^the Little Entente, Turkey became deeply concerned now 
21 The Turkish Ambassador to Germany,
Op U0 S0 Department of State, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy. 1918-1945. Series D, V, 719-20. [Here- 
after cited as D,G.F,P., Series P.] The Turkish National 
Pact was a statement of the principles of the National 
Turkish Revolution, such as self-determination, the open­
ing of the Straits, etc. It was adopted on January 28, 1920,
23 I M d ,. 719-20,
2 A Originally, a triangular set of agreements signed 
in 1920-1921 between the three major states of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
11
with the future of the Balkan Entente., The protective zone 
Interposed between Turkey and the major European powers by 
the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact had received a fatal 
blow, and the Turks began looking for a way to strengthen 
their Balkan defenses.
With talk of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia 
still on the lips of Europe’s diplomats, the Italians, on 
April 7, invaded Albania, In a. matter of days, Mussolini's 
forces occupied that mountainous country providing them 
with a springboard to Yugoslavia, Greece, and perhaps Tur­
key, The Turkish government viewed the situation with con­
siderable alarm. It was regarded in some circles, not as 
an isolated action, but as the beginning of a major 
Italian offensive directed toward a break-through to the 
Aegean, Rumors and reports circulated that the Italians 
were reinforcing their garrisons in the Dodecanese. Later
these reports were proven false, but this did not lessen
2 *5Turkey's watchfulness of Italian movements, ■
When the new German Ambassador to Turkey, Franz von 
2 6Papen, arrived in April, 1939, he was Immediately
Rumania. On February 16, 1933 > it was formalized with a 
pact of organization signed at Geneva., See J. B„ Hoptner, 
Yugoslavia in Crisis: 193^-19^1, (New York, 1962), 11, 
[Hereafter cited as Hoptner, Yugoslavia.]
2-5 Franz von Papen, Memoirs, (New York, 1953), ^ 5 -  
if-6. [Hereafter cited as Papen, Memoirs,]
^  Franz von Papen, (18?9~ )« German Chancellor
1932; Vice-Chancellor under Hitler 1933; Ambassador to 
Austria 1936-1938; Ambassador to Turkey 1939-19^; imprisoned 
at Nttrnberg but freed in 19^6 by International Tribunal; 
later imprisoned by German denazification court; released
19^9.
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confronted with questions by the Turkish Foreign Ministry
as to the intentions of the Germans, Papen denied German
support of the Italian invasion and promised to ask Hitler
2 7to influence Italian policy in the Balkans, The Am­
bassador immediately sent a telegram to Hitler and 
Ribbentrop in which he stated the fear and apprehension 
of the Turkish government. The German Foreign Office took 
immediate note of the situation and informed the Italian 
government that a statement of its intentions in the 
Balkans should be relayed to Turkey. Thus, on May 3»
Ciano gave the Turkish Ambassador assurances that Italy
had "neither economic, political, nor territorial aims
28with respect to his country."
The Germans now considered other Implications of the 
Albanian invasion, that is, the distinct possibility that 
Turkey might be driven into the camp of the Allies, This 
was particularly dangerous if one viewed Turkey's geo­
graphical worth as Papen did when he stated In a tele­
graph to Berlin:
Turkey is the key to the military situation 
in the Near East. Whichever side is denied 
the use of her territory as a base for oper­
ations can rule out the idea of domination 
of the Middle East.^9
27 Papen, Memoirs. 445-46. For an opposing opinion, 
see Bullock, Hitler, 507«
^  Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-194-3,
(New York, 1946), 77“9« Thereafter cited as Ciano, Diaries.]
^9 Papen, Memoirs. 447. The possibility of this 
happening is also stated in D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 228.
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In his initial meetings with the Turkish president, Ismet 
30IniSntt, Papen warned the Turks that the German government
might change its friendly attitude toward their country if
they associated themselves with the Western Powers. The
Ambassador added that Germany expected strict neutrality
31from Turkey in the event of war in the Balkans, InSntl
assured Papen that the Turks did not have a. hostile
attitude toward Germany but added that Turkey must look
to its own security.
In June 1939, during a. conversation with Papen,
Menemencioglu explained the Turkish position in the event
of an outbreak of hostilities. The Turks would take an
active role in any conflict involving the Mediterranean,
because it was in their best interests that neither Great
Britain nor Italy gain hegemony. An invasion of Yugoslavia
would not concern Turkey as long as Bulgaria did not take
part. However, this would not be the case if Rumania were
invaded and its Blaek Sea. coast occupied, for then Turkey's
sphere of interest would be infringed. Overall, the Turks
desired the complete neutrality of the Balkans in the event
of a war in northern Europe. Turkey firmly hoped that the
Balkan Pact would not be used as a means for the great
32powers to bring the member states into a war,
Ismet In8n$, (188*1— )« Turkish Prime Minister
1923-1937; President 1938-1950.
31 D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI,
32 Ifrid. . 76^ -65.
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23,
1939* followed closely by the German invasion of Poland on 
September 1, 1939s was a bombshell on Turkey’s illusions 
that it might Insure its boundaries by utilization of the 
natural animosity between the Nazis and the Communists,,
Now, however, the Turks had good reason to fear that the 
next move of either power might be at the expense of Tur­
key,, The inadequacy and uselessness of the various 
treaties with the Balkan countries also became evident.
As a result, the Turkish government continued to stress
33neutrality which was in line with Berlin’s views,
There was some talk in Berlin that Turkey might back
the action of Great Britain in declaring war on Germany in
view of their mutual interests expressed in the Anglo-
TuTkish Declaration of May 12, 1 9 3 9 ° But it soon became
evident that popular Turkish feeling was to avoid war at
all costs. The Turks would not even say if they would
oppose Italy should the Italians enter the war. All that
the Turkish Foreign Office stated on this question wa,s:
"if Italy entered the war, Turkey would act according to
35her own interests,"
33 P.G.F.P., Series D, VIII, 27-8,
34 The Declaration provided that negotiations should 
take place between the two countries with the aim of reach­
ing a reciprocal security pact. Moreover, while the nego­
tiation was taking place, the two powers would co-operate 
"in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediter­
ranean," See Sir Hughe Kna.tchbul'l-Hugessen, Diplomat in 
Peace and War, (London, 19̂ +9) * 147, [Hereafter cited as 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat,]
35 D°G,F,P,. Series D, VI, 440,
15
During the German campaign in Poland., Berlin adopted 
a policy favoring the sta.tus quo in the Balkans , In a con­
versation with Ciano in Berlin, Hitler stated that, at 
least in the present situation, the neutral position taken 
by the Balkan countries was useful. He did not believe 
anything serious was going to happen in that a.rea in the 
near future, but should a state, sdch as Rumania, alter its 
present position, he would advocate an attack with the aid 
of Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria,^ Actually, Hitler’s 
opinion of the power of the small countries wa.s summed 
up in his statement to a group of German military commanders 
prior to the war:
The small countries do not frighten me. After 
Kemal’s death, Turkey will be ruled by morons 
and half Idiots, Carol of Rumania is a thor­
oughly corrupt slave of his sexual desires.
The King of Belgium and the Northern kings are 
weak puppets, depending on the good digestion 
of their over-fed and tired peoples,?’
As the period of the "Phony War" drew to a close
and Germany readied its armed forces for the invasion of
France, a question arose concerning Turkey’s position if
Italy came into the war, Menemencioglu stated that above
all Turkey hoped Italy would stay out of the war. However,
36 Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 31^-15® Hitler was 
especially interested in the attitude of Rumania because 
of reported attempts by the Allies to enlist her support.
See Ibid,, 308,
?? U, S, Department of War, Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, (Washington, 19^6-19^877 VII, 735® [Hereafter 
cited as N,C„A,]
16
should Italy enter the conflict, Turkey would not disavow
qO
its obligations' under the Tripartite Pact, If Italy did 
not attack the Balkans, the Turks would not take an active 
part, but would allow Allied warships to use some ports.
This non-action, Turkey hoped, would spare the Balkans 
from the ravages of war, Germany was in accord with this 
attitude and emphasized to Papen that it be supported with
39the hope of effectively resisting further Allied pressure.
After the German invasion of France, May 10, 19^0,
the Allies increased the pressure to draw Turkey into the
war, thereby diverting any possible Italian operations in
southern France, Papen and the German Ambassador to Rome, 
knMackensen, considered bringing joint German-Italian
pressure on Turkey to insure its neutrality. But this
idea was abandoned after Ribbentrop telegramed that such
an action would be neither "expedient nor necessary in
41the present situation," Evidently, this decision was 
based on the stunning German successes in northern France, 
With German victory in France imminent, Italy, on 
June 10, declared war on the Allies, Turkey was now faced
3® Signed in Ankara on October 19, 1939, between 
England, France, and Turkey, this was the result of nego­
tiations following the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12, 
1939, and is discussed in Chapter VI,
39 P.G.F.P.. Series D, IX, 200,
Ĵ0 Hans-Georg von Mackensen, (1883-194?) <» German 
Minister in Hungary 1933-1938; Ambassador in Italy 194*3 *
^  P.G.F.P.. Series D, IX, 443-44,
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with the choice of declaring war on Italy in accordance 
with the Tripartite Pact, or.maintaining neutrality„ In 
view of its ill-equipped armed forces, the Turkish govern­
ment chose the side of neutrality. Great Britain, realiz­
ing it could do little to aid the Turkish cause, accepted
42the decision to r&main neutral.
The Axis was now virtually supreme in Europe with the 
exception of the Iberian peninsula, the Balkan states and 
Bussia,, It was natural, therefore, that Germany develop 
a. stronger line towards the Balkan peninsula, Papen re­
iterated to IntSntJ the Importance of Germany’s position as 
the paramount European military power. And in expectation 
of an early German victory in Great Britain, the German
Ambassador stated Berlin’s bafflement that Turkey %as still
43playing the English game,”
On October 28, 1940, Italy invaded Greece, The Greeks 
reacted by calling on Great Britain to honor its commitment 
of April 1939 to defend the sovereignty of Greece, With­
out hesitation, the British government sent four squadrons
44of aircraft and a military mission to Greece, According 
to the terms of the Balkan Pact, Turkey was under no obliga­
tion to enter the conflict unless Italy was aided by a
42 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, 167«
D.G.F.P.. Series D, X, 488-89,
44 Hastings.L, Ismay, Memoirs, (New York, I960),
198,
18
45power within the Balkans.  ̂ Nevertheless, the Turks were 
in an embarrassing position, considering the close ties 
between the two countries. Clearly now, it was the deci­
sion of the Axis whether or not the Turkish government
would be able to maintain a neutral position.
The Italian venture in Greece did not have the bles-
46sing of Hitler. Hitler had not planned on operations
in this area, but with the Italian reverses in the face of
the combined forces of Greece and Great Britain, the Ftlhrer
had little choice but to aid the Italian armies. On
November 12, Hitler issued Directive No. 18 which concerned,
in part, preparatory measures to be taken in advance of
47German military operations in the Balkans. In the direc­
tive Berlin instructed the operational planning staff to 
take into account possible Turkish military activities 
when forming the approximate ten divisions for operations 
in the Balkans.
By the latter part of November, Turkey was still 
clinging to the role of a neutral. The reverses suffered 
by the Italians created a new problem for the Turkish 
government, namely, what would be the reaction on the part
^  Series I), XI, 408-09<. Turkey was most
suspicious of Bulgaria,
^  The ironic aspect of the invasion was that "His 
own system of presenting his partner with a fait accompli 
had turned into a boomerang." Papen, Memoirs, 464~ ’
47 H. H. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat, (New 
York, 1965), 42-3. [Hereafter cited as Trevor-Roper, 
Blitzkrieg,]
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of the Reich if the Italians were driven out of Greece, or
Albania, or both? When confronted with these queries, Papen
disregarded such possibilities and asked Menemencioglu the
Turkish position* Menemencioglu simply repeated that Tur-
4-8key would act only to protect her interests*
Throughout this period, both sides made numerous
attempts to obtain Turkey's allegiance* The British Foreign
Office felt that unless it did something quickly, Turkey
would surely be absorbed by the Germans* Thus, the British
requested Turkey and Yugoslavia to make a joint declaration
to Bulgaria that they would declare war on the Bulgars if
German troops were allowed to cross their territory* The
British Foreign Office was unsuccessful* The Turks were
well aware of their weak military position in the Balkans,
and there was no reason for a belligerent policy when aid
Liofrom Britain would nowhere approach their needs*
Hitler moved one step closer to a.ction in the Balkans 
when, on December 13, 1940, he issued Directive No* 20, 
Operation M a r i t a * I n  this directive, he assigned the 
Bulgarian forces the task of providing flank protection 
along the Turkish-Bulgarian border while the German armed 
forces invaded Greece* He also made provisions for German
PqG*F.P*„ Series D, XI, ?02~03*
4a Ernst L, Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War* (London, 19̂ 27", 129-30~ [Hereafter cited 
as Woodward, British Foreign Policy*]
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg * 46-8*
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forces to be ready if Turkey should make a move* The fate 
of the Balkans was soon to be decided*
During January 19^1* Great Britain offered Greece more 
troops and arms* Much to the surprise of the British* the 
Greeks declined the offer* The Greek government reasoned
51that a further build-up might cause the Germans to attack. 
The Germans, however, did not slow their troop movements 
into Rumania., much to the consternation of both the Greeks 
and the Turks. Ribbentrop used the movements in an attempt 
to bring the Turkish government into a position of guaran­
teed neutrality* He instructed Papen to inform the Turks 
that the number of troops in Rumania was sufficient to meet 
any eventuality in the Balkans* Further, if they should 
happen to call these forces into play, such action could be 
tantamount to the destruction of the Turkish state* On the 
other hand, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stressed that the 
Reich had no intention of deliberately attacking Turkey,
nor would it violate Turkey's Thracian frontier, as long as
52the Turks remained neutral*
In Operation Marita, the Germans planned to enter 
Greece through its Bulgarian frontier* Papen knew that 
the German troop movement through Bulgaria would not be wel­
comed in Turkey unless assurances were given that Turkish 
sovereignty would be respected and that the troops would
^  R„ J* Collins, Lord Wavell, (London, 19^7)8 310*
52 D»G*P„P*. Series D, XI, 1105-06*
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53stay at least twenty miles from the Turkish-Bulgarian border„ 
Papen reported this information to Hitler and -advised the 
Ftlhrer to send a personal letter to the Turkish President 
InSntt stating what route the Wehrmaeht would follow if the 
Reioh advanced on Greece„
On February 27, Papen received a telegram from Rib­
bentrop stating that the Bulgarians would accede to the
<LlTripartite Pact on March 1 and that the entry of German 
troops into Bulgaria was. imminent. The Ambassador was in­
structed to inform the Turkish government of these facts 
on February 28, Papen was also told to notify the Turkish
President that the Ftlhrer was transmitting to him a. personal
55letter clearly explaining Germany's actions in the Balkans,
On March 1, 19^1, the Turkish President received the 
message from Hitler, In the communique, Hitler discussed 
the unfortunate circumstances which necessitated the German 
involvement in the Balkans, The Ftlhrer stated that the 
Third Reich had no territorial ambitions in that area, and 
promised to withdraw the Wehrmaeht as soon as the danger 
was eliminated. Further, Hitler guaranteed that German 
units traversing Bulgaria would remain an adequate distance
53 Papen, Memoirs » ^71*
5k Originally, the pact cementing the Rome-Berlin 
and Tokyo-Berlin Axis, For a. copy of the agreement, see 
Baltzly, Readings. ^17-18,
55 D.G.F.P.„ Series D, XII, 187-88,
from the Turkish frontier„ In reply, President Indntt 
stated that if the German forces had to "become involved,
Turkey would not object as long as Turkish territorial
57rights were not infringed., Hitler was extremely pleased
with Indntt fs position* He felt that the Beich could now
58discount any Turkish action in the current situation*
As the time for the implementation of Operation 
Marita drew closer, the German government encountered 
difficulties from another Balkan state - Yugoslavia. In
59the first week of March, Yugoslavia’s Prince Regent Paul 
visited Berchtesgaden. Hitler, in an effort to get Yugo­
slavia. to accede to the Tripartite Pact, offered the Regent 
the Greek city of Salonika* On March 25, the Yugoslav 
government signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna. However, 
on the night of March 26-27, a number of Yugoslav officers 
rebelled against the pro-Na.zi leanings of their government
6 oand a.ffected a coup d’dtat in Belgrade* Hitler was 
furious* He immediately issued Directive No* 25 with the 
dual purpose of crushing Yugoslavia as quickly as possible
^  DqG.F.P*, Series D, XII, 201-03* The "unfortunate 
circumstances" referred to the Involvement of Great Britain* 
Ibid* * 309*
57 Ibid*. 286-87*
Franz Haider, The Private War Journal of General- 
Oberst Franz Haider, (n*p„ ,-n*d*)1, VI, "38T [Hereafter 
cited as Haider, Journal *]
SQ Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, (1893- )« Nephew
of King Peter I of Serbia, Regent of Yugoslavia 1931-19^1*
60 Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, (New 
York, 1962), 63^-35* [Hereafter cited as Bullock, Hitler*]
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a.nd showing Turkey the futility of opposing Germany 
with force
Following orders from the Wilhelmstrasse, Ambassador
Papen informed the Turkish government on April 6, 1941,
that the Third Reich had been forced to take military
mea.sures in both Greece and Yugoslavia, He explained that
this action had been caused, first by the continual build-
62up of British forces in Greece, and second by the illegal
63coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, J
While Papen was enumerating the reasons for German 
involvement, the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece were 
taking place. By April 13, Belgrade had fallen to the 
Nazis, and four days later, the rest of Yugoslavia capitu­
lated, On April 24, the Greek government surrendered and 
the British began to evacuate in the direction of Crete,
Hitler then issued Directive No, 28, Operation Mercury, for
64the conquest of that island. Mercury was launched on 
May 20, 1941, and within six days, Crete was controlled by 
the Third Reich, With the sole exception of European Turkey, 
the Axis now controlled the Balkans,
^  Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 60-2,
62 The Greeks' desire that further British military 
reinforcements be halted, as mentioned on Page 18, was 
reversed after the German concentrations in Bulgaria be­
came evident,
63 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 481,
64 Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 68-9<»
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Throughout the 1930's, the Third Reich tried to keep 
the Balkans as divided as possible* The Nazis believed that 
if the peninsula could be prevented from forming a united 
front against outside intervention, then it would be more 
easily exploited economically and politically* Turkey, on 
the other hand, continually searched for ways to strengthen 
the Balkan Entente and keep foreign influence out of south­
eastern Europe* However, Turkey's attempts were largely 
fruitless for two reasons: the distrust that the Balkan
states felt for each other, and the fear created-by expan­
sionist-minded Russia and Italy*
German influence increased in the Balkans prior to 
World War II, especially in Rumania and Bulgaria.* Berlin 
did not make any military moves into the peninsula during 
1939-^0, because it felt at that time that those countries 
were neither strategically important nor did they pose a 
threat* The Reich mainly desired that the Balkan states 
adopt a position of neutrality, the more "benevolent" the 
better*
Italy's disastrous invasion of Greece and the Yugo­
slavian coup d'etat caused the Third Reich to intervene 
militarily in the southeast* Turkey was the only Balkan 
country able to remain neutral throughout this period.
And the Turks accomplished this partly through their own 
maneuverings, but largely because the German Wehrmaoht was 
destined for Operation Barbarossa*
CHAPTER II
GERMANY'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 
1933 - 19^
When the Nazis gained control of Germany's politics 
in 1933. the economy had recovered very little from its low 
point of the depression,, The economic policy prior to the 
advent of Hitler consisted mainly of government spending 
and other money measures aimed at increasing employment 
and income. Accompanying this was strict control of wages 
and prices in the hope that the impact of Increased public 
expenditures would be on employment and output rather than 
on wages or prices. The National Socialists did not change 
this basic strategy; rather they tried to make it more 
effective. Government expenditures were increased, and the 
controls over prices, wages, and foreign exchange were
25
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tightened,, Thus, Na2i policy could not be considered a
basic change in Germany’s economic policy,^
In 193^* Germany's balance of trade dropped to a.
dangerous low. The gold and foreign exchange In the
country’s coffers were almost depleted, At this point,
2Economic Minister Schacht introduced his •famous-Mew Plan 
to guarantee the necessary imports. The Mew Plan dissolved 
the system of foreign exchange allotment and substituted 
an arrangement whereby every import transaction was sub­
ject to the approval of the proper supervisory office.
The alms of the Mew Plan were three: (1) to cut imports
to what Germany could buy with foreign exchange, (2) to 
channel German purchases only to the countries that bought 
equal amounts from them, (3) to give preference to the im­
port of certain commodities, especially those vitally 
connected with rearmament.
It also set up twenty-seven control boards whose 
function it was to help determine the value and sources 
of the various imports and issue instructions as to where 
they were to go within the domestic market. The boards 
were used as a tool in the bargaining for more favorable 
bilateral agreements. In addition, they were to try
1 Burton H, Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparation 
for War, (-Cambridge*. 1959T7~&<> Tiereafter■ citbd;:as Klein, 
Economic Preparation,]
2 Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht* (1877- ),
President of ReieM>ank 1933-1939; Economic Minister 1933- 
1938,
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restricting, as much as possible, imports to countries with 
which Germany had. clearing agreements. This made it possible 
for Germany to pay for foreign goods in Reichsmalks:rather 
than in foreign exchange. Along with this policy was 
another designed to restrict purchases from each non-clear­
ing country to the actual amount of goods that Germany ex­
ported to that country. The larger states, and those not 
dependent on German goods, could retaliate by restricting 
purchases from Germany, But for the others, there was
3little choice. This was particularly true in the Balkans,
The clearing agreements, or bilateral trade agreements, 
had been created prior to the Hitler regime as a means of 
overcoming the extreme exchange difficulties in the various 
countries in South America and southeastern Europe, The 
arrangements were complex since the monies arising out of 
the agreements were available only for bilateral trade and 
thus segregated into special accounts. In order to increase 
the demand for their goods, the Germans bought from clearing 
countries far above the world prices. Or they fixed special 
rates of exchange for the Reichsmark below the official rate 
and sometimes subsidized their exports. The Germans gained 
from these arrangements, a.s did many of their trading part- 
ners,
3 Maxine Y, Sweezy, The Structure of the Nazi 
Economy, (Cambridge, 19*1-1), 117-18, [Hereafter cited as 
Sweezy, Nazi Economy,1
Li Arthur W„ Lewis, Economic Survey: 1933-1939,
(London, i960), 93°
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In the Balkans, Germany was often the creditor in the 
trade agreements, If one of the countries could not pay 
for German imports in foreign exchange, the Beichsbamk 
would establish a. special account for the central bank of 
the particular government, For the special account, the 
amounts German importers paid for the goods shipped into 
Germany were added, and the expenditures of German expor­
ters were subtracted. The foreign country discharged its
obligation at its central bank in domestic currency, and
5that bank settled the account at the Reichsbank,
Through these agreements, Nazi Germany extended its 
sphere of economic and political influence in the Balkans, 
The economic plight of this area, aided the German effort 
to garner them into the bilateral trading system, for the 
Nazis tended to push trade with the weaker countries for­
cing dependence. The reason also existed, perhaps high in
German minds, that trade in the Balkan area, could more
6easily remain accessible in time of war,
A smaller country, such as Turkey, once caught in the 
clearing network, could hardly escape without help from a. 
large nation. Initially, Germany bought the available sur­
plus and sold in return imports actually needed by the 
small country. As time went by and the state became more 
dependent on Germany because of the clearing agreement, it
 ̂ Sweezy, Nazi Economy, 115,
6 Ibido, 121,
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had to take what Germany could spare and sell only those
7things Germany wanted,
Germany's trade with Turkey had been on the Increase 
prior to the rise of Hitler* One reason was the close 
association they had had during World War I, but more im­
portant was the confidence the Turks felt in German prod­
ucts , and, conversely, the German need for Turkish ra,w
8materials such as chromite ere. The Nazi government and 
the manipulations of Dr„ Schacht helped to further trade 
between the two countries0 Between 1933 and 1936, of the 
total Turkish exports, Germany's share rose from nineteen 
to fifty-one per cent, As a result, the sums owed by 
Germany to Turkey had reached a level equal to more than
9the total German clearing debts to the entire Balkan area.
In April 1936, Numan Menemencioglu of the Turkish 
Foreign Office met with members of the German Ministry in 
Turkey to discuss what could be done about the situation, 
at least from the Turkish standpoint* Menemencioglu said 
the increase in Turkish exports to Germany had caused' a. 
decline in exports to other countries; consequently,
7 Sweezy, Nazi Economy, 122„
® The principal ore from which chromium is derived.
Due to its harshness', surpassed'only by the diamond in its 
non-tarnishing properties and in its resistance to corrosion 
and heat, it is indispensible for steel of unsual toughness 
as required in armor plate, gun barrels, aircraft engines, 
ship machinery, etc, Turkey exported the raw material,
 ̂ Ernst J&ckh, The Rising Crescent, (New York, 19^), 
24l, [Hereafter cited as JS.ckh, Bjsing Crescent„1
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several states were now waiting payment for shipments to 
Turkey,, However, because of the lack of foreign exchange,. 
Turkey was unable to meet her debts# Furthermore, Turkey's 
high credit balance with Germany had the undesirable effect 
of restricting the Turkish government's freedom of action 
in commercial policy, for it had been compelled in the case 
of almost all orders to attempt having them placed in 
Germany# As a result, Germany had become too strong com­
mercially in Turkey# The Turkish delegation, therefore, 
declared that the only way Turkey would be able to carry 
on her present exchange of goods with Germany would either 
be for the Germans to pay a proportion of their liabilities 
in foreign exchange, or to ship the goods, paid for by 
Turkey through the clearing account, to third countries to 
which Turkey owed the foreign exchange#1 )̂
In reply, the Germans said definitely their government 
could not entertain the question of a favorable balance in 
foreign exchange# Although the second porposal did not 
seem to be a practical solution, they would submit the idea 
to their government# Menemencioglu then mentioned that he 
hoped to talk to Schacht concerning the aforementioned 
ideas when he met with him later in the year in Berlin#1'1'
In the meetings that followed, Turkey showed an in­
clination not only to maintain the exchange of goods between
10 D#G#F#P#. Series C, V, 5̂2#
11 Ibid** ^ 5 3 .
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Germany and Turkey at the same level but to increase it.
The Germans did not raise any basic objections, and trade 
agreements were soon concluded to the general satisfaction 
of both countries. The main significance of these meetings 
was that the question of the balance of foreign exchange 
was brought to the fore, as was the question of German econ­
omic dominance in the Turkish Republic. These two Issues 
were to play a major role during the following eight years 
of economic and commercial relations.
By 19379 Germany had succeeded in becoming the number- 
one purchaser within the Balkan countries. In terms of 
actual value, foodstuffs bulked largest in the exports, 
but most important to the Germans was the acquisition of 
several scarce metals. Turkey supplied the Nazis with 
large quantities of raw wool, raw cotton, as well as with 
skins, cereals, and dried fruits. But of all the goods 
Turkey exported to Germany, of prime importance was the 
ferro-alloy chromite. From 1933 to the end of 1937, chro­
mite exports of the southeastern countries to Germany in­
creased from 1^,000 tons to 79,000 tons. Turkey was the
leading source, accounting in 1937 for around thirty per
12cent of German supplies. This percentage was equal to
11seventy per cent of Turkey's total export of chromite. J 
12 Klein, Economic Preparation, 6l-2„
William N, Medlicott, The Economic Blooade, I, 
(London, 1952), 269° [.Hereafter cited as Economic Bloc- 
ade, I.]
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During this same year , Great Britain and. France 
(particularly Great Britain) became interested in the 
economic situation in Turkey, partly as an effort to coun­
teract the predominant influence of Germany in that area.
But Great Britain was limited in the degree of pressure it 
:sould apply to the Turks, both because of their self-suf­
ficiency as far as the maintenance of their standard of 
living was concerned and because of the inroads of the
14Germans in the areas of trade, capital, and technical aid.
In 1937, Great Britain, in particular, and France supplied
a mere fourteen per cent of the total Turkish imports and
received just eighteen per cent, while Germany supplied
15forty-four per cent and took thirty-nine per cent. With 
these facts in mind and cognizant of the growing power of 
the Nazis in Europe, the British government saw Turkey as 
a strategically important position from which it might be 
able to exert considerable economic pressure on Germany. 
Thus, during the following year, Great Britain strengthened 
its position in Turkey by negotiating agreements estab­
lishing a large credit in favor of the Turks and enabling
the Turkish government to order war material on credit 
l 6terms o
^  Medlicott, Economic Blocade. I, 269o
15 Ibid.. 270.
16 Ibid., 270 „
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Prior to the economic negotiations with Turkey in 
1937, the Germans viewed seriously their large unfavorable 
balance in clearing payments evidenced by the following 
figures:
Imports Exports
(In millions of Reichsmarks)
1932 4-0.1 31.0
1933 37.9 36.3
1934- 67.5 50.9
1935 93-4- 67.3
1936 118.5 79.4-17
These payments had developed a balance of 91.000,000 Reichs-
X8marks in favor of Turkey and, by clogging the clearing 
system, threatened to paralyze the entire exchange of goods. 
To counteract this trend, the Germans deprived the Turks of 
the right to export unlimited quantities to Germany and cut 
the German imports from Turkey to about sixty per cent of 
those of the previous year. This arrangement had such ex­
cellent results for the Germans that from September 1937 to 
March 1938 the balance was shifted by 90,000,000 Reichs­
marks. By the time new negotiations between the countries 
began in 1938, the balance in favor of Turkey had been en­
tirely eliminated and in fact had shifted in favor of Ger­
many. -̂9
17 P.G.F.P., Series D, V, 724.
1 A In 1931 the Reichsmark was worth 10.4-033 in 
United States dollars. This was the approximate value to 
1945. Irvine E. Eastman (ed.), Morld Almanac and Book of 
Facts for 1945, (Ne# York, 1946),
19 P.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 724.
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On June 30, 1938, German negotiator Karl Clodius20 
and Menemencioglu began their discussions in Berlin for the 
new trade agreement. The Germans were in a very advantageous 
position because of the favorable balance of trade and could 
now easily concede an increase in Turkish exports, plus 
extending a large credit. Further, the Germans could see 
possible political significance in the negotiations, par­
ticularly because of Great Britain's efforts to eliminate 
German influence in Turkey, especially in the economic sphere. 
Berlin considered the agreement between Grea.t Britain and 
Turkey as an attempt on the part of the Turks to prevent
21the danger of too grea.t an economic dependence on Germany.
It was evident to the Germans from the outset that the 
Turks desired a considerable increase of trade, with the 
prime idea, of regaining a favorable balance. The method 
proposed to accomplish this was that both parties lift all 
restrictions on imports. The Germans waivered but finally 
agreed. They reasoned that, since the imports from Turkey 
included a very large proportion of vitally important goods, 
such an arrangement would be to their advantage. Thus, im­
ports were unrestricted on both sides for the next treaty
22year.
20 Karl Clodius. German diploma!; expert in econ­
omics concerning the Balkans,
21 P.G.F.P.. Series D, V, ?25,
22 Ibid., 733. The treaty was to run from September 1, 
1938 to August 31, 1939.
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In former years, Turkey had been promised a guaran­
teed rate of exchange for the sums credited to it in the 
German clearing house. The Turks wanted to maintain the 
193? level of 28,000,000 Reichsmarks, but the sum was re­
duced to 26,000,000 Reichsmarks through the insistence of 
the Germans that the higher level was, in principle, bad 
for their trade neogitations with other countries,^3
In view of the agreements between Great Britain and 
Turkey and the known fact that the Turks had given the Bri­
tish definite commitments as to what raw materials they 
would send to cover the credits granted, Germany demanded 
at least equal treatment. The Turkish delegation was re­
luctant to grant this point. But since Germany was Turkey’s 
best customer by far, the Turks finally guaranteed at least 
the same deliveries of ores and wheat as had been exported 
in 193?o Menemencioglu further stated that he would try 
to provide for an increase in the export of chromite ore
from the 65,000 tons of 1937 to 100,000 tons in the coming 
24years. This statement seemed to quiet any fears that the 
Turks planned to reduce tra.de with the Germans and gravi­
tate towards Great Britain,
The Turkish negotiators stressed the importance of 
the two countries understanding that during the following 
treaty year, war materials would be delivered through the
23 DqGoFoP,. Series D, V, 733. 
rbid-. 733*-3̂ .
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clearing system* Germany realized that Turkey did not have
the foreign exchange to buy war materials otherwise and felt,
economically and militarily, that this policy was desirable*
The countries agreed on this point for the duration of the 
25treaty*
At the conclusion of the treaty on July 25, 1938,
Germany felt it had successfully countered Great Britain’s 
move of the previous May. However, it came to the atten­
tion of the German Foreign Office that the French were soon 
to offer Turkey a considerable trade credit in the near 
future. The Germans realized that this offer, along with 
that of the British, could go a long way in undermining 
Germany’s economic position in Turkey, And to a larger ex­
tent, it was regarded by the Economics Ministry "as a part 
of the economic offensive against Germany launched in south- 
east Europe and the Middle East by France and Great Britain." 
Germany immediately offered a credit to Turkey before France 
could act, hopefully stabilizing the position.
On January 16, 1939, after several months of nego­
tiations over the particulars of the credit agreement, the 
two countries came to terms. By the agreement, the Ger­
mans set up a credit of 150 million Reichsmarks for the 
payment of industrial orders from the Turks. The time limit 
on the credit was ten years, By pouring sufficient capital
25 P.G.F.P., Series D, V, 73̂ .
oC
Ibid., 739.
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into Turkey, Germany thought it possible to stop any Tur-
27kish dependence on British goods.
With the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the 
Italian invasion of Albania and the conclusion of the Pact 
of Steel. during March,' April, and May, 1939, the war tempo 
in Europe was quickly reaching the breaking point. Germany’s 
economy was not designed for an all-out conflict, and if 
war broke out, it would have to be short and fast, or more 
simply stated - a blitzkrieg.
In May, the question arose whether Turkish orders 
for war materials should be delivered. During the first
p Qpart of the month, G8ring informed Weizs&cker that de­
livery to the Turks of six cm, guns could not now be 
considered for military reasons. He added that the Ftlhrer
agreed with this opinion, and some excuse must be given for 
29non-delivery. This led to a conference later in the 
month concerning what policy the Germans should follow in 
their dealings with the Turks in these matters. It was 
mentioned that, if the contracts were not fulfilled, es­
pecially in cases where Turkish inspectors at the manu­
facturing plants knew they were ready for shipment, the 
effects could be disastrous for future economic contracts
27 P.G.F.P.. Series D, V, ?^2.
^  Ernst von Weizs&cker, (1882-1951). State Sec­
retary in the German Foreign Office 1938-19^3; Ambassador 
to the Vatican 19^3-19^50
29 P.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, iH6.
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with foreign countries, Clodius pointed out that this 
was not the purpose of the conference, but that they were 
gathered to examine how the deliveries of the heavy war 
materials could be separated from those not as important 
in a manner which would create the least friction possible 
between Germany and Turkey, With the decision of the 
Ftlhrer not to continue deliveries of heavy war material, 
the committee only suggested that other current delivery 
transactions be continued, especially since the country 
needed Turkish chromite
The Turkish Embassy in Berlin did not waste any time 
complaining about the non-delivery of shipments, Clodius 
was approached several times by the Turkish Ambassador 
who asked questions about the heavy guns and, when the ne­
gotiations for the renewal of the trade agreement were to 
begin, Clodius claimed ignorance of the withheld guns, 
adding that the Germans were not able to send a delegation 
to Ankara at the present. The Germans were trying to keep 
the Turks in suspense until they had something definite to 
say, Franz von Papen was directed to stall the Turkish 
home office on these points. He tried to do this by calling 
the Turks1 attention to their political attitude toward Ger­
many, This question had arisen in light of the recently 
concluded Anglo-Turkish Friendship Treaty,
3° DqGqF.P,. Series D, VI, 581-8^.
Ibid,. 611-12, This treaty was a forerunner of 
the Anglo-Turkish-French Tripartite Pact of October 1939.
For further details, see Chapter V,
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Throughout the rest of June a.nd July, further economic 
talks between Berlin and Ankara were at a. standstill. The 
main point of contention was German non-delivery of con­
tracted for war materials. On August 20, with the ter­
mination date of the current trade and payments treaty 
only eleven days away, Germany sent a list of proposals to 
Turkey hoping the trade agreements could be renewed. The 
proposals Included: (1) cancellation, by mutual consent,
of all outstanding armament contracts remaining unfulfilled, 
(2) non-ratification by Germany of the Credit Agreement of 
January 16, 1939, envisaging a 60,000,000 Reichsmark credit 
for arms purchases and continuation of more purely indus­
trial contracts, (3) prolongation of the Payments and Ex­
change Agreement of July 25, 1938, for a year on condition
32that the governments agreed on points (l) and (2)„
Three days later,. Papen called on the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Sttkrti S a r a c o g l u , 3 3  to ask about his government's 
decision on Berlin's1 proposal of August 20, The Foreign 
Minister replied to the effect that if Turkey could not 
buy in Germany, then Turkey could not supply, Papen at­
tempted to keep the question open by proposing that they 
at least agree to a month's extension of the current com­
mercial treaty due to expire on August 3 1 This request
32 D-GoF.Po, Series D, VII, 156,
33 stlkrtl Saracoglu, (1890-1953) <> Foreign Affairs 
Secretary 1936-19^2; Prime Minister 19̂ 2-19̂ -6,
^  D°G,F,P., Series D, VII, 260-61*
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was submitted, formally on August 28, but on September 12
Papen reported that Turkey had declined the extension on
the basis that it believed in the principle of complete
35fulfillment of contracts.
Turkey’s action in refusing to renew the trade agree­
ment and in placing all trade with Germany on a compensa­
tion basis gave Great Britain the opportunity it was 
anxiously awaiting. However, it did present a problem in 
that exports to Germany would be resumed if the Allies 
were not able to find markets for Turkey’s commodities.
On September 6, the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir 
Hughe Knatchbuli-Hugessen, sent an urgent telegram to 
London suggesting large purchases of the more important 
commodities. Since this was the harvest season, he fur­
ther stated, considerable losses would result if there were 
no markets, and more important, Great Britain’s position 
in Turkey would be endangered.
At this same time, the British and French were nego­
tiating with the Turks for the conclusion of a military 
assistance treaty in the event of aggression by any Euro­
pean power against Turkey. It was concluded on October 19* 
1939. The British used this opening to discuss the limita­
tion of chromite exports to Germany. On October 26, the
33 P.G.F.P., Series D, VII, 402.
Sir Hughe Kna.tchbull-Hugessen. British Ambas­
sador to Turkey 1939-1944.
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Turks agreed to cease the export of chromite to the Ger­
mans, but they made it a condition that the British govern­
ment guarantee the purchase of not less than 200,000 tons 
of chromite each year. The British agreed to the proposals 
on October JO only to be faced with a change in Turkish 
demands. The Turkish government now wanted to add similar
guarantees on Turkish exports of tobacco, hazel-nuts, raisins, 
38and figs. These demands impeded negotiations for the 
Allies knew that they could never completely replace Ger­
many as a. market for Turkish exports unless they were pre­
pared to buy the goods and sink them in the sea.
Early in November, the German Foreign Office sent 
Instructions to Papen requesting him to present the fol­
lowing proposals to the Turkish government in the event 
it still refused to restore the clearing agreement: (1)
a comprehensive compensation trade arrangement, and (2) 
acceptance of (1) would ensure delivery of part of the im­
ports of chromite ore, the rest to be paid for by specific 
compensations - preferably industrial material other than 
military arms.. Berlin stated that it desired the equal of 
last year's chromite ore imports of 80,000 tons but would 
settle for 60,000 tons.-^ Papen reported on November 9 
that the Turkish Foreign Minister seemed agreeable to the 
German proposal, especially the part in which war materials 
could possibly be sent in exchange for chromite ore. Turkey
Medlicott, Economic Blocade. I, 273®
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promised an answer in a. few days. It was received on
November 17 to the effect that it would enter into nego-
40tiations for a general settlement.
When the discussions began, the Turks drew a clear 
distinction between chromite ore deliveries and "other" 
deliveries. They believed chromite was to be delivered 
only in exchange for war material. The Germans, unwill­
ing to send certain heavy war materials, threatened not . 
to negotiate unless chromite ore was included. However, 
as the discussions continued, it became evident the Turks 
were not to be forced into yielding, especially since the 
British were trying with equal vigor to obtain all the 
chromite ore for the Allies, The Germans began to see 
they would get no chromite ore if they made no deliveries 
of military equipment„ Such deliveries could not be prom­
ised at the time because of the directive issued the pre- 
vious May l k a
The Germans now had to decide whether further nego­
tiations should be entered into before the chromite ore 
question was settled, or whether the talks should be com­
pletely cancelled at least for the time being. There were 
several good reasons why Germany should continue the dis­
cussions, among them the risk that the other goods of in­
terest such as cotton and olive oil would probably be sold
P.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII, 6,
^  Ibid,, '155-56,
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to Great Britain and the lesser items left to Germany
unless they negotiated. But of greater significance w&s
real danger that the Turks would be drawn into the arms of
42Great Britain if they were ignored. At the London econ­
omic negotiations, the Turks made full use of this German 
eagerness to obtain chromite ore.
Turkey was aware that the Allies were in a better 
position to grant the heavy war materials desired because
of the considerable quantity stockpiled in Great Britain
43and previously destined for the Polish front. Further, 
the Turks knew that the Allies were willing to go to al­
most any lengths to corner the chromite market. Thus, 
Menemencioglu insisted on certain positive guaranteed 
purchases before he would agree to the complete with­
holding of chromite ore from Germany. Finally, on January 8, 
19^0, in Paris the agreements on chromite and other ex­
ports were signed. The chromite agreement was to run for 
two years with the option to extend it for an additional 
year. Menemencioglu had tried getting the Allies to con­
tract the purchase of chromite for the next twenty years, 
but he had to be satisfied with the two-year agreement. 
Another interesting item was the British desire that con­
siderable amounts of Turkish chromite be marketed in 
Scandinavia. Turkey agreed with certain limitations.
P.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII, ^56.
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Later events proved the British would have been wiser to
have tied up the chromite for a longer period and kept it
LiL\,from going to Scandinavia*
The negotiations between Germany and Turkey on items 
other than chromite had been progressing throughout Decem­
ber 1939-. On January 6, 19^0, Papen telegraphed Berlin 
that agreement had been reached with the Turkish Minister 
of Commerce; in return for the delivery of papers for the 
goods in customs storage, Turkish products with an approx­
imate total value of 10,000,000 Reichsmarks would be ex- 
k5ported* The list included products ranging from olive 
oil to tobacco. The Germans in return would send indus­
trial goods such as spare parts and railway equipment. A 
further transaction was concluded later in the month which 
dealt with virtually the same materials. The German Foreign 
Office reminded Papen during those negotiations that it was 
not interested in the greatest volume of trade, but its
basic economic interest in Turkey concerned only "conces-
i.f-6sions in the chromium ore question.1'
The chromite ore situation in German industry was 
not yet at a critical point. The total mobilization re­
quirement was 12,000 tons of ore per month, and according 
to the figures of the Reich Office for Iron and Steel the 
current supplies were adequate for the next thirteen months.
Lih. Medlicott, Economic Blocade. I, 27^-75*
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Further, Germany was obtaining chromite ore supplies from 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria equaling another 32,000 
tons per year above the current stockpile. The possibility 
also existed that Russia would provide another 100,000 tons 
before the end of the year. If Germany received all po­
tential resources, an adequate supply would be assured for 
the next two years, Germany was also working on separate 
arrangements to obtain 35,000 tons from Norway and 40,000 
tons from Hungary, The Interesting aspect about the chro­
mite in Norway and Hungary was that it had been mined in 
47Turkey,
Berlin was still interested in Turkish chromite but 
was not interested enough to pay the necessary price. Ger­
many's forthcoming invasion in the west meant that virtually 
all heavy war materials would be headed towards France.
Thus, German policy now was to keep Turkey neutral though 
still economically connected. Turkey's tripartite pact 
with France and Great Britain and the economic agreement 
with the same two countries aroused considerable suspicion 
in Berlin that Turkey was drifting into the Allied orbit. 
However, Germany still held one trump card - the Turkish 
doubt concerning Russia's attitude since the failure of the 
Russo-Turkish commercial negotiations of October 1939. The 
Germans hoped this active distrust would forestall any
Jh O
inclination on Turkey's part to join the Allies. With an
^  D.G.F.P., Series D, VIII, 635.
48 Ibid., 918.
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eye continually on Turkish chromite, Germany worked for a. 
gradual improvement of relations through economic agreements 
on a moderate scale.
Direct trade between Germany and Turkey fell con­
siderably between August 1939 and July 19^0. During 1939, 
Germany supplied the Turks with fifty per cent of its total
imports, but by the middle of 19^0 this figure decreased to 
if, 9ten per cent. The primary reason being the failure to 
come to an agreement after the lapse of the 1938-1939 treaty 
on August 31, 1939* The principal countries to gain from 
this situation were the Allies who, as previously mentioned, 
were able to corner the Turkish chromite market. Germany, 
however, developed another method to obtain withheld sup­
plies from Turkey through use of its economic connection 
with other Balkan states.
Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria all had economic rela­
tions with Germany and Turkey. Germany had established 
clearing agreements with these states and had a consider­
able hold on their economies. Through these countries, 
the Germans bought Turkish goods ordered specifically for 
resale to Germany. Great Britain objected strenuously, 
reminding the Turks of their agreement to prevent such a 
practice. Turkey justified its actions on the grounds that 
the assurances had applied to enemy and occupied territory 
and not to a country such as Hungary. Actually, Turkey was 
concerned with its own well-being. Since the British could
Medlicott, Economic Blocade, I, 610.
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not guarantee purchase of the commodities being resold to 
Germany, no valid reason existed for Turkish producers to 
suffer.^0 After the conclusion of the German-Turkish agree­
ment of July 25, 19^0, the Germans were not as dependent 
on this practice. It was, however, still used in relation 
to certain items such as jute bags,^
The Germans had not been satisfied with the outcome
of the earlier economic negotiations of January 19^0, The 
discussions that followed did not yield any notable changes
in Turkish attitude until the invasion of France in 19^0,
The speed of the German victories impressed the Turks and 
caused them to re-evaluate their relations with Germany.
In an interview with Papen, Turkish President Indntt stated 
"despite their option for the Allies, his government had
always wished to maintain friendly relations with old 
52allies," Indnti added that he desired the conclusion of 
an economic agreement as a show of Turkish good will. How­
ever, the question still remained concerning Turkish reac-
<3tion to the entry of Italy into the war.r Two days later, 
Turkey decided to remain neutral. It was thus possible for 
Germany and Turkey to exchange notes and begin full-scale 
economic negotiations,
^  Medlicott, Economic Blocade, I, 60?,
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52 D«G.F.P.. Series D, IX, 507*
53 Under article 2 of the Tripartite Pact, Turkey was 
obliged to join the Allies if the European war spread to 
the Mediterranean, The entire treaty can be found in 
Baltzly, Readings, *1-76-77*
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Germany hoped that these talks would Include the ques­
tion of chromite ore, and Turkey had given indications that 
they well might, Papen, however, on June 14, reported to 
Berlin that, though such prqspects had looked good, InSnti 
now stated it was impossible ‘because of the firm commitments
which Turkey had entered into with the Allies the previous 
cJlJanuary, The other items in the negotiations were readily
agreed upon. The major obstacle to the conclusion of the
treaty was Turkish suspicion that the Germans would quickly
buy up and export Turkish products but fall into arrears
with their own deliveries. The Turks, therefore, submitted
a formula by which German goods must arrive in Turkey before
the government would give the Turkish exporter permission
to ship goods to Germany for the equivalent amount, Papen
was hesitant in agreeing to this, but he did include it in
55the exchange of notes to allay Turkish mistrust.
On July 25, 19^0, the German-Turkish commercial agree­
ment' was signed. It was to last for one year. According 
to its terms, the volume of commercial exchange between 
the two countries was to equal ^2,800,000 Reichsmarks. 
Elaborate lists were devised whereby only designated Ger­
man goods could be exported in order to obtain certain Tur-
56kish goods and vice-versa, ■ All told, both countries were
^  DqG.F.P.. Series D, IX, 568.
55 Ibid., 570.
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reasonably satisfied with the outcome. Germany, of course, 
regretted that chromite had not been included but was re­
lieved that Turkey had decided to remain neutral. The Turks 
had fared better than the Germans, primarily because they 
still retained their economic connections with Great Britain 
concerning several commodities Germany would have liked to 
pre-empt - most notably chromite. The Turks had also bene- 
fitted by the inclusion of finished products from Germany 
such as locomotive, railway equipment and pharmaceutical
products, compared with such raw materials as olive oil,
57cotton, and similar products they could readily supply.
The German conquest of Greece and takeover of vir­
tually all the Balkan peninsula in the spring of 19^1 
ushered in a new phase of German-Turkish economic relations. 
Previously, the Turks had the buffer sta.tes of Bulgaria and 
Rumania, between themselves and the Third Reich, but now they 
were faced with a direct threat along their Thracian fron­
tiers. Germany was anxious to cultivate this Turkish neigh­
bor and lead it into close relations with the "New Order," 
but if this were not possible, at least be assured of Tur­
kish neutrality. The reason for Germany's desire to main­
tain a friendly Turkey was the planned invasion of Russia 
Earlier Hitler had considered either luring the Turks into
57y Annette B. Fox, The Power of Small States,
(Chicago, 195 9) , 19« [Hereafter cited as Fox, Small States,]
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58the Tripartite Pact or forcing them to scrap their alliance 
with Great Britain, However, with "Barbarossa." to begin in 
a matter of a few weeks, he would be satisfied with a gua.r-
59antee of neutrality.
Early in May, Hitler called Papen to Berlin and told 
him to start negotiations for the conclusion of a closer 
alliance with Turkey, Discussions began in Ankara and a 
Friendship Treaty was signed on June 5» 19^1° The treaty 
merely stated that both parties would respect the integrity 
of the other's territory and consult each other "in a 
friendly spirit in all questions affecting their common in­
terests,"^ There was also a secret protocol in which Ger-
6lmany agreed to recognize Turkish sovereignty in the Straits,
Germany had gained no more than a guarantee of Turkish 
62neutrality. At this time, the Germans began to exert 
pressure on Turkey for the conclusion of an economic agree­
ment that would include the sale of chromite to Germany.
Karl Clodius arrived in Ankara, soon after the conclu­
sion of the Friendship Agreement, The prime item on his
58 Not to be confused with the Tripartite Pact pre­
viously mentioned between Great Britain, France, and Tur­
key as this pact was between Germany, Italy, and Japan,
For a complete text, see Baltzly, Readings, ^17-18.
59 W. L. Danger and E. S. Gleason, The Undeclared 
War, 19^0-19^-1, (New York, 1953)» 511» [Hereafter cited 
as Langer, Undeclared War.1
60 . Series D, XI, 938,
^  Germany had not been a, signatory for the Montreux 
Convention of 1936,
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agenda, was the acquisition of Turkish chromite„ The Germans 
were prepared to offer the delivery of considerable war 
material to obtain access to chromite, but one obstacle 
confronted them* In 19^0, the Turks had signed an agreement 
with the British whereby their entire output of chromite 
would be bought by Great Britain for the next two years. 
Attached to this agreement was the option for the British 
to extend their acquisition of chromite for another year. 
When pressed as to whether they would sell Germany chromite, 
the Turks made it clear they would not be free to do so un­
til January 19^3» Clodius suggested that the Turks sell 
chromite ore to Germany after they supplied the quantity 
desired by Grea.t Britain* The Turks answered that the chro­
mite ore agreement bound Turkey not to exceed the produc­
tion of 250,000 tons yearly and to deliver the entire amount 
to Great Britain* Thus, if the Turks supplied only chromite 
to third parties, it would be a breach of contract which 
Turkey was not about to commit without a release from Great
63Britain* The Germans offered heavy guns in return for 
the chromite, and Clodius even threatened to cut off the 
negotiations * The Turks repeatedly explained that their 
hands were tied but added that after January 8, 19̂ +3» they 
would be willing to supply Germany with any desired quantity 
of chromite ore* Further, Turkey was willing to stockpile 
the amount of chromite desired by Germany from the beginning
63 DoG*F*P * * Series D, XIII, 556-57.
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of the present treaty period, and would, therefore, he able 
to ship the necessary chromite as soon as the present treaty 
with Great Britain expired, Menemencioglu pointed out that 
according to his information, Germany was sufficiently 
supplied until the end of 19^2, Thus, it should make no 
difference if chromite ore were not shipped until that time, 
Clodius reported to Berlin the stalemate in the nego­
tiations, and German authorities were not at all pleased 
with the failure to obtain agreement on the acquisition of 
chromite. The question was raised as to whether negotia­
tions should stop, but Berlin realized there were other 
factors to be taken into consideration. For one, the pros­
pect of obtaining chromite ore was valuable for the future. 
For another, if German successes in Russia, continued, Tur­
key might feel pressured to supply chromite ore in 19^2, 
Also, Turkish deliveries of copper and cotton, promised for 
19^2, would be extremely valuable and would form the basis 
of an acceptable treaty, Berlin decided that a treaty
65should be arranged without the inclusion of chromite.
The proposals to be offered Turkey divided German 
armament deliveries into three groups, the guiding prin­
ciple being delivery of the most valuable armament in re­
turn for chromite. The first group, including such items 
as anti-tank guns, explosives, and machine guns, was to be
DoG,F»P, , Series D, XIII, 556-57«
65 Ibid,. 587-88,
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used in bargaining for copper or cotton, , The second group 
consisted of larger equipment such as field cannons, bridge- 
building materials, and mountain guns, These were to be 
traded only in the event that chromite ore was obtainable 
in 1942, in which case deliveries would be made item by 
item for the individual shipments of chromite, The third 
group contained the heaviest equipment such as howitzers,
Only in the event that an agreement was reached that chro­
mite would be delivered after January 8, 1-943-* could these 
armaments be promised,^
On October 9, 1941, the economic agreement was signed, 
Germany obtained copper, cotton, and lesser items in ex­
change for machine guns, anti-tank guns, and explosives.
It was further agreed that before March 31, 1943, the two 
governments would negotiate a treaty concerning the delivery 
of chromite ore to Germany, The Turkish government would 
then approve the export to Germany of an annual amount of 
90,000 tons of chromite ore for the periods January 15 to
67December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944, 
Germany had finally concluded an agreement for Turkish 
chromite, but it would be fifteen months before it could 
make use of it.
Since December 1940, Turkey had been receiving ship­
ments of foodstuffs and war materials from the United States,
66 PqG,FoP,. Series D, XIII, 602-04.
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Originally, the goods had been contracted by Great Britain 
from the United States and then shipped by the British to 
Turkey,, In November 19^1, the Americans announced they 
were going to deal directly with Turkey and ship the goods, 
themselves. Berlin did not particularly care for this 
situation, but little could be done, Turkey vitally needed 
certain of the items it was receiving from the United States 
and told the Germans that it was the duty of the Turkish 
government to utilize every possibility in strengthening 
its military position. The part of the arrangement that 
irritated the Germans was the American acquisition of Tur­
kish chromite. Papen attempted to counter the American 
moves by suggesting to Berlin that a statement be issued to 
the press to the effect that these deliveries showed Presi­
dent Roosevelt’s intention of extending the war to peace­
ful countries. WeizsScker instructed Papen to ask Turkey 
to confirm the fa.ct that these commercial agreements did 
not involve any political or economical concessions. The 
Turks denied any such implications, and lend-lea.se continued.
The halt of the German offensive in Russia in December 
19^1, combined with the Russian counter-offensive, had 
serious repercussions in Turkey. The Turks knew Russia, de­
sired partial, if riot full, control of the Dardanelles. In 
January 19^2, Papen wrote to Berlin that President Inbntl 
had recently stated that "Turkey was Interested to the
68 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XIII, 801-02.
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highest degree in the ’destruction of the Russian colossus' 
and that Turkey’s present neutrality was in the Axis inter­
est, as otherwise the British navy would be able to support
69the Russians in the Black Sea.1' With this problem in mind,
Menemencioglu approached the Germans in an attempt to gain
further arms for the defense of Turkey* He proposed that
70the Funk Agreement be revived, Papen answered that Ger­
many would expect some political equivalent, Menemencioglu 
balked at the idea,, but Papen, considering the overture by
the Turks as a chance to draw them further from the Allies,
71flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler.
Papen explained to Hitler that the British at that 
time were in Ankara, studying Turkish military requirements. 
However, Great Britain was reluctant to send arms to Turkey 
as long as the Turks were hesitant to join the Allies. Papen 
suggested Turkey might remain neutral more easily if Germany 
supplied its urgent military needs. It was also possible 
Turkey would acquire the altitude it could defend itself 
against a Russian attack without British assistance. Hitler, 
under the impression that the arms would tempt Turkey to
69 George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: 
1939-1946; The Middle East in the War, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, (London, 1952), ^51• [Hereafter 
cited as Kirk, Middle East.]
70 Kilic, Turkey. This was an agreement for credits 
to be used in the purchase of war materials from Germany.
71 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
German Foreign Office Documents; German Policy in Turkey, . 
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join the Axis, authorized Papen to begin discussions, The 
following summer, Clodius visited Ankara., and an agreement 
was signed granting the Turks a loan of 100,000,000 Reichs­
marks for the procurement of German arms. The loan was to
be repaid by the shipment of goods, particularly chromite,
72due to arrive in 1943,
In January 19^3» Germany and Turkey began final nego­
tiations for the conclusion of the promised "arms for chrome" 
agreement. During the period from January 15 to March 31» 
Germany received quantities of chromite under the Clodius 
agreement. However, because Germany did not supply the 
amounts of war materials promised, Turkey believed that 
they were responsible to provide only a part of the 45,000 
tons of chromite that Germany was entitled to receive by 
March 31, This failure of delivery on the part of the 
Germans could have allowed the Turks to refuse further sup­
plies of chromite, but Turkey declined to use this option, 
and on April 18, 1943? new German-Turkish trade agree­
ment was signed. The chromite provisions of the Clodius 
agreement were delayed until December J l t 19^3* thus allow­
ing the Germans an extension to make the shipments on which
73the chromite allotments would be based,
72 Papen, Memoirs, 487-88,
73 William N, Medlicott, The Economic Blocade. II, 
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The new Clodius agreement generally followed the
lines of that concluded in October 1941« The importance
of German arms to the Turks was clearly demonstrated by
the fa.ct that all the goods most important to the Third
Reich would be set aside for it. Such Turkish goods as
copper, cotton and tobacco were to be traded for German
war materials., pharmaceutical products, copper products,
?4and iron and steel wares. Chromite was not mentioned 
in the main agreement which was to last for a period of 
fourteen months, that is until May 31* 19^. It is clear 
that when Germany could withhold the arms needed by Turkey 
it was an effective weapon in driving advantageous agree­
ments with the Turks,
Chromite shipments under the Clodius agreement had 
not reached German expectations during the first few months 
of 19^3* but this was at least partially explainable for 
two reasons. First, chromite shipments were generally 
light during the winter months because of bad weather con­
ditions, Second, Great Britain had previously contracted 
for all chromite stocks above ground up to January 8, 1943* 
Thus, Germany was only entitled to the new output which 
was generally small at that time of year. All told, approx­
imately 1,000 tons of chromite ore were shipped to the Third
75Reich during the first quarter of the year,
74 For a more complete list, see Medlicott, Economic 
Blocade, II, 535"*36°
75 IMd,, 531,
58
During the following quarter, Germany imported in­
creasing amounts of Turkish chromite to the total of about 
13,500 tons by the end of June, The Germans were likewise 
sending increasing amounts of war materials to the Turks 
which by the end of August had almost reached the value of 
100,000,000 Reichsmarks, At the beginning of November, 
around 30,700 tons had been delivered from Turkey to the 
Third Reich, and by the close of 19^3 about 46,783 tons had 
been received by Germany since the preceding January, The 
average chromite delivery by Turkey, i*rhich had been a. little
over 3,000 tons through the first nine months, increased to
76about 79800 tons in November and 8,100 tons in December,
In spite of the fact that the war was going more and more
against the Third Reich in 19^3* Turkish supplies to Germany
77were continually increasing.
Throughout 19^3, the Allied powers met to discuss 
their combined operations against Nazi Germany,The 
question of Turkish participation against Germany was 
occasionally raised, but other than suggesting that Turkey 
be asked to join the Allies, no strenuous effort was made 
to enlist its aid0 In the fall, however, the British pre­
sented a note demanding, among other things, Turkey's
Medlicott, Economic Blocade, II, 531°
77 For the total Turkish exports to Axis countries 
during 19^3, see Ibid,, 540,
78 mThe conferences were held at Casablanca, Adana, 
Quebec, Moscow, Teheran and Cairo,
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complete severance of trade with the Axis powers,, Turkey,
knowing full well that the German air force was only a few
79hundred miles away, stated its intention of fulfilling 
present agreements.
During the first quarter of 19^, shipments of war 
materials and chromite between Germany and Turkey con­
tinued at an increasing rate. By the beginning of March
19i}4, the Germans had received approximately 62,000 tons 
80of chromite. However, there was increasing pressure by 
Great Britain and the United States on Turkey to break its 
commercial agreements with Germany. Finally, on April 1̂ ,
O  " i
19^, United States Ambassador Steinhardt and British 
Ambassador Knatehbull-Hugessen presented the Turkish gov­
ernment with identical notes stating that if the Turks 
continued to furnish the Reich with important war materials 
including such items as chromite, copper, iron, and steel, 
the United States and Great Britain would be forced to apply
Q pa blockade against Turkey. On April 20, Menemencioglu,
79 Papen, Memoirs, 507. The Germans had a major air 
base at Constanta, Rumania.
80 Arnold and Veronica. Toynbee (eds„), Survey of 
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Royal Instituteof International Affairs,(London, 1956)7 
360. [Hereafter cited as Survey, Neutrals.]
At Laurence A. Steinhardt. U. S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, 1939-19^1; Ambassador to Turkey, 19^2-19^5.
Op Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New 
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fearing a, break with the Allies, informed Papen that the 
Turkish government was obliged to suspend further deliveries 
of chromite starting May 1, 19^.^^
Papen was not surprised at this decision, but Berlin 
reacted in a different manner„ On April 2?, the German 
government, after ordering Papen!s return to Berlin, issued 
a. communique stating that the German Ambassador in Ankara, 
would not return to Turkey for the time beinge When For­
eign Minister Ribbentrop informed Papen of this decision, 
plus the fact that he was considering counter-measures,
the Ambassador answered that such an act would have no
8^effect beyond causing the Allies to rejoice. Upon joint 
consultation with Papen, the Ftihrer agreed that it was ri­
diculous to threaten counter-measures since Germany was in
no position to carry them out; further it was essential
85that the Ambassador return to his post.
Because the production of durable armour plate was 
dependent on the availability of chromite, the stoppage 
of the Turkish source dealt a blow to the German war econ­
omy, Thus, in the few remaining days, the Reich transported 
every available stock into Axis controlled countries. On 
May 18, Great Britain and Turkey began serious discussion 
on the possibility of cutting Turkish exports to Germany
8 3 papen, Memoirs, 52̂ °
Ibid., 524.
85 Ibid., 52^-25.
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in certain other areas to fifty per cent of such exports 
in 194*3. These trade negotiations were halted during 
the Turkish Straits affair which resulted in the resigna­
tion of Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu on June 15,
O  ry
but resumed shortly thereafter. The Turks then agreed 
to reduce exports of certain commodities to the Germans by 
fifty per cent and to discontinue the other fifty per cent 
when the Allies could provide the corresponding Imports,
OOThe Allies agreed with this view.
It was evident in July 1944 that the Germans would 
have their troubles holding the Allied invasion. In view 
of the continueing successes of the Allies and their in­
creasing pressure on Turkey, the Turkish government agreed 
to sever its commercial and diplomatic relations with Ger­
many on August 1, 1944.
As is clear, Germany's trade with Turkey was a bene­
fit to the Third Reich's economy, Germany was a ready 
market for Turkish raw materials, and its industrial goods 
were in great demand in the Turkish Republic, The Turks 
had earlier developed confidence in German industry, and 
Germany's trade experts took full advantage of the situation
86 Medlicott, Economic Blocade, II, 544-45,
8  ̂ This affair involved the passage of twelve armed 
German ships through the Straits, and will be discussed in 
Chapter III on the Turkish Straits,
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The Germans had an ingenious method of obtaining economic 
exchange with Turkey,, and as a result Turkey became more 
and more dependent on the Third Reich, With Hitler's 
establishment of the Four-Year Plan, economic relations 
with the Turks increased significantly, Germany's prime 
interest in Turkey concerned chromite ore. This steel 
alloy had immense strategic importance. However, when 
the Germans could:no longer import chromite from Turkey in 
the latter part of 1939, their preparations for war were 
not seriously endangered, Germany knew, before the invasion 
of Poland, that it could not win a lengthy world conflict 
without the aid of at least two major powers, German 
economy, therefore,' was built on the basis of a short war. 
After the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact a.nd the 
lightning successes on the Polish front, the Germans did not 
feel that it was necessary to increase their production of 
war materials; thus the import of Turkish chromite was not 
considered vital. However, when Germany failed to end the 
war in 19^0, its need for chromite became painfully evident, 
and it was forced to turn to other suppliers. The Reich 
obtained limited amounts from Greece and Yugoslavia, but 
they were insufficient to meet future needs, Germany at­
tempted to import chromite from Turkey, but was prevented 
by the fact that Great Britain had an exclusive agreement 
for the Turkish ore. It was not until January 19^3/ that 
Germany finally negotiated an agreement with Turkey over 
chromite ore.
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Had. the Germans been preparing for a full-scale war 
when it broke out in 1939» no doubt they would have attemp­
ted to gain complete control of Turkish strategic raw 
materials0 But the Germans, who were counting on a. short 
war, had not deemed it necessary to grant the Turks major 
concessions until it was too late.
CHAPTER III
GERMANY AND THE TURKISH STRAITS 
1933 - 19^
From the Straits Convention of 1841 to 191^» it was 
a fundamental doctrine of international la,w that, "So 
long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit 
no foreign ships of war into the said Straits,"'3' It was 
the violation .of this principle which aroused the indig­
nation of the Allied governments when on August 10, 191^*
2two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau passed
As quoted in James T, Shotwell and Francis Deak, 
Turkey at the Straits, (New York, 19^0), 38* [Hereafter 
cited as Shotwell, Straits,] The Turkish Straits consist 
of three bodies of water - the Dardanelles, the Sea of 
Marmara,, and the Bosporus, It controls the water route 
between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas,
2 The Goeben was.renamed the Yavuz and is the only 
battleship still In service as a, combatant vessel in any 
navy. It is actually rated as a battle cruiser rather
than a battleship and has ten eleven-inch guns.
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through the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople. 
When the Allies protested this breach, the Turks purchased 
the vessels from the Germans, though they were left under 
the command of German naval officers.
On September 26, 191^. & British destroyer stopped a 
Turkish warship outside the Dardanelles and forced it to 
return. As a consequence, the Turkish government, though 
technically still neutral, closed the Straits on the fol­
lowing day. A month later the Turkish fleet, under German 
command and without declaration of war, attacked elements 
of the Russian fleet and shelled several Russian ports.
As a result, the Allied powers declared war on Turkey; the
3Straits remained closed until the end of World War I.
After the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, the 
Allies occupied the strategic areas surrounding the Straits. 
In the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) which was never 
ratified by Turkey, the Allies attempted to establish the 
rule that the Straits would be left open in either war or 
peace to both merchant and warships of all countries. How­
ever, the Greek invasion of Turkey at Smyrna on Hay 1̂ ,
1919, caused the development of a strong nationalistic 
movement which was eventually sufficient to repel the in-
hvaders and overthrow the peace settlement.
 ̂ Shotwell, Straits, 96-7.
^ IMd.. 106-07.
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In the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923» which followed the 
Greco-Turkish war, Turkey was able to improve its situation 
in the Straits, The principle of full freedom of passage 
during time of peace or war, Turkey being a neutral, was 
laid down; however, if Turkey was a belligerent, the gov­
ernment was allowed to exercise belligerent rights under  
international law. To insure freedom of the Straits, the 
Treaty called for demilitarization of both the Asiatic and 
European shores of the passage with the notable exception 
of Constantinople, The regime established by the treaty
lasted until Turkey's demands for even greater improvement
5resulted in the Montreux Convention of 1936,
Turkey's desire for a revision of the Straits Conven­
tion of 1923 was not a. sudden decision. The Turkish gov­
ernment's request came after a series of international 
events which seriously changed the original foundations 
Of post-war Europe, Several of these events were: the
failure of the Disarmament and the World Economic Confer­
ences, the undeclared wars of Japan and Italy, the strong 
foreign policies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and 
the gradual deterioration of the collective security system,^ 
The advent of the Nazi regime did not immediately affect 
Turkey's attitude toward the Straits, In fact the Germans
5 For the complete text of the Treaty of Lausanne, 
see League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol, 28, 115-37.
 ̂ Shotwell, Straits, 120; and D,G0F,P,, Series C,
v, *1530-31.
6?
were never solely responsible for the Montreux Convention*,
However, the Reich's attempts at economic and. political
expansion towards southeast Europe along with its growing
stature on the international scene did cause considerable
consternation in the League of Nations, making the members
more agreeable to a change of the Straits Convention of the
7Treaty of Lausanne,,
On April 10, 1936, the German Embassy in Turkey was 
informed by Menemencioglu that on the following day, his 
government would communicate to the signatories of the 
Straits Convention of 1923, that due to the changed poli-
8tica.l situation, the guarantee provided for in Article 18 
was ineffective and no longer protected the Turkish terri­
tory concerned. Therefore, the Turkish government was pre-
9pared to renegotiate the current status of the Straits,
This message was not surprising to Berlin, for it had 
been known to the Germans for several months that the Turks 
were desirous of a. change*^ However, the Wilhelms trass e
 ̂ DoGoFoP., Series C, V, ^30-31; and Anthony Eden,
The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: Facing the Dic­
tators , (Boston, 1962), ^7 2 * [Hereafter 'cited as Eden, 
Dictators„]
8 The League itself was not involved in the Montreux 
Convention,, According to that article the signatories would 
take the necessary action against any country or countries 
which violated the provisions,
9 DoGoFoP,, Series C, V, *00-31.
10 DoGoFoP, . Series C, IV, 889-91* In December, 1935, 
the Turkish government had called in several German naval 
experts and asked their advice as to what additional naval 
forces Turkey would require to defend the Straits if they 
were not permitted to fortify them.
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did not care either to attend the Montreux Convention in 
an official capacity or to send an observer, It reasoned 
that since the British desired to retain the International 
Straits Commission, and since this was not in Germany's
11interest, it would be superfluous for Germany to attend,
Turkey's request was delivered to the signatories of
the 1923 Convention, plus Yugoslavia and the Secretary
General of the League of Nations, The unsteadiness of the
world scene exemplified by the Italo-Ethiopian War and the
German remilitarization of the Rhineland did much to cause
1 2a generally favorable reaction. The conference met at 
Montreux, Switzerland, on June 22, 1936,
From the outset the conference was a battle between 
the colliding interests of Great Britain and Russia. The 
original proposal set forth by the Turks included their 
desire not only to refortify the Straits but also to make 
Turkey sovereign over navigation. If adopted, the situation 
would have been exceedingly favorable to the Russians, How­
ever, as finally agreed upon on July 20, 1936, the Montreux 
Convention was a compromise between the Turkish and British, 
positions , ̂
11 PaG.F.P.. Series C, V, 669.
TO Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 4, Italy, still smarting 
from the economic sanctions Imposed on it as a result of the 
invasion of Ethiopia, did not attempt the Montreux Convention, 
Ciano, in effect, said that Italy would refrain from atten­
ding any international meetings until the sanctions had been 
abrogated,
13 Shotwell, Straits, 122-23, For the complete text
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Generally speaking, the chief 'beneficiaries of the 
Convention were Turkey and Russia,, The Turks did not ob­
tain complete control over the Straits0 But they did reg­
ister several major gains, for both the demilitarization 
clauses and the International Straits Commission were abol­
ished, Ands most important, when in the role of the bel­
ligerent, Turkey was free to close the Straits to warships 
of all nations0 Russia’s long sought-for right to send un­
limited, numbers of warships into the Mediterranean from the 
Bla.ck Sea was its major achievement in the Montreux Con­
vent ion.1^
The agreements reached in Montreux were in general, 
not appreciated in Berlin,, Although the Germans expressed 
satisfaction that Turkey was again sovereign over the Straits., 
the fact that Russia, had improved its position was partic­
ularly irritating to the Wilhelmstrasse„ Germany had no 
desire to be relegated to a position in Turkey secondary 
to that of either Great Britain or Russia. However, the 
German Foreign Office instructed its representatives in 
Ankara, not to lodge a formal protest against the agreements 
reached concerning the Straits but instead to quietly in­
form the Turkish government that Berlin was not especially 
happy about its attitude in the matter0 Hopefully, this
Shotwell, Straits, 12d-27„ This right of unlim­
ited access by Russian warships through the Straits during 
time of peace was also strengthened by the fact that no 
non-riparian power (that is a state which does not border 
on the Black Sea) could send into the Black Sea a force 
greater than, the most powerful fleet of a riparian state.
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would Induce the Turks to alter their views 0 v Such feelers
by the Heich, however, were too late. On July 30, 193&,
the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the Convention,
and on November 9, 1936, the ratifications of virtually
X 6all signatories were deposited in Paris„ . The Montreux
Convention was now international la.w„
Several days after the signing of the Montreux Con­
vention, the German Embassy in Ankara sent a. poltical re­
port to Berlin discussing the situation created by the 
Convention„ Turkey was now to be viewed as a power to be 
reckoned with in any international policy dealing with 
the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.„ However, 
the extent of Turkey*s strategic importance in the area 
of the Straits would not be known until it demonstrated 
the extent to which the Straits would be fortified and 
controlled,,
Turkey’s relations with Russia were also regarded as 
an important factor, for, if the Turks gained the distrust 
of their northern neighbor as concerns the Straits, it 
could develop into a threat to Turkey’s national existence„
D°G°F.,P.» Series C, V, 795-99» An interesting 
note to the Montreux Convention is that on July 24, 1936, 
the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Belgium had 
extended a formal invitation to Germany to attend the 
conference, which seems a, little ridiculous in view of the 
fact that the Convention had already been signed, though 
not yet ratified by a sufficient number of states 0 Ciano, 
Diplomatic Papers, 20o
*1 ̂ DoGoFcP., Series C, V, 669„ The one hold-out was 
Japan whose ratification was received on April 19, 1937,
71
On the other hand, it was believed that as a means of 
countering any changes in Russian attitudes, Turkey would 
pursue a continueing friendly relationship with Great 
Britain* This policy would draw the additional benefit 
of security against Italy’s expansionist designs in the 
eastern Mediterranean*'1'̂
Early in the spring of 1937:. the German government 
started making serious overtures towards Turkey concerning 
the Reich’s accession to the Montreux Convention,, Berlin 
reasoned that since Germany had regained its position of 
equality on the international scene, it should be treated 
with equal rights in the Straits question. Thus, the State 
Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Ernst Weizs&cker
18informed the German Embassy in Ankara to open negotiations.
One serious drawback to the Germans’ desire for nego­
tiations was their idea that both Germany and Italy would 
enter into discussions at the same time and on the same
19basis. When the German Ambassador, Friederich von Keller, ' 
conversed with his Italian counterpart to see if this was 
feasible, he was told that nothing could be done in this 
area "until the Abyssinian question was settled in the 
League of Nations by recognition of the Italian Empire at
17 °F°Po. Series C, V, 83^-38.
1 DoG,F,Po, Series D, V, 706-07*
19 Friederich August Wilhelm von Keller, (1873-1960)„ 
Last permanent German delegate to the League of Nations un­
til Nazi Germany’s withdrawal in 1933; served in many di­
plomatic posts, his last being Ambassador to Turkey, 1935- 
1939o
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20least on the part of Turkey," Keller, not knowing whether 
to proceed, telegraphed Berlin for additional instructions, 
WeizsMcker immediately replied in the affirmative.
Upon consultation with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras 
in August, the German Ambassador was informed that while 
the Turkish government realized the position of the Ger­
mans , it could not agree to a bilateral agreement between 
the two countries on the Straits question. If Berlin uni­
laterally declared German adherence to the Montreux Con­
vention, it would be respected by Ankara, Nevertheless, 
the Foreign Minister did not wish to express his govern­
ment’s opinion on a future bilateral agreement at this 
21time.
With the passage of several months and still no reply
from the Turkish government on whether it would agree to
treat Germany as a. signatory to the Convention through a
bilateral agreement, Keller again approached the Turkish
22Foreign Ministry, After a series of talks with the Tur­
kish ministers concerned, he was left with the familiar 
statement that before Turkey could assent to such an ex­
change of notes, there would have to be further examina-
23tion of the points in issue,
20 D.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 710,
21 Ibid,. 710-12,
22 The main reason why Germany wanted to gain the 
rights of a signatory was because according to article 2 k ,  
paragraphs k  and 5 of the Montreux Convention, the signa­
tories would be informed of all movements of foreign ves­
sels of war through the Straits,
23 D.G.F.P.. Series D, V s 716-17.
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Germany was not content to let the matter drop; its 
interest in the Straits was again demonstrated in March 
1938o At that time Weizs&cker telegraphed the German Em­
bassy that in view of reports that Turkey would soon recog­
nize Italy’s Ethiopian Empire, it wa.s highly possible Ger­
many and Italy could present their common naval interests
2 kin the Straits simultaneously, However, during the fol­
lowing month, Italy requested that it be allowed to accede 
to the Montreux Convention without having to influence 
German-Turkish relations on the question,2  ̂ Germany re­
luctantly agreed„
On July ?, 1938» the Secretary General of the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry, Human Menemencioglu, called on Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin, Ribbentrop stated that 
Germany was ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with 
Turkey which would make the terras of the Montreux Conven­
tion effective between the two countries. Inherent in the 
agreement would be the understanding there would be no re­
vision of the Montreux Convention without Germany, The 
Secretary General answered that the question was the sub­
ject of considerable study by his Foreign Ministry9 and
2 k DoGoFoP,. Series D, V, 718-19. Specifically, 
both countries wanted to insure a wide interpretation of 
the term "auxiliary vessels," which was defined in para­
graph 6 of annex II in connection with article 8 of the 
Convention, Such a. definition they hoped would affect 
the passage of Russian ships carrying war materials or 
troops if it were a belligerent,
2< Fbid,, 721, At this time Germany also lost in­
terest in the definition of "auxiliary vessels,"
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he regretted to say that unsolvable problems stood In the 
path of Germany's desires ,
Foremost, Turkey did not ha.ve sovereign rights con­
cerning the Convention,, Thus, any alteration such -as the 
one Germany espoused, required unanimous consent of the 
signatories. Further, Turkey feared that the Convention 
itself would be endangered if it unilaterally concluded an 
agreement concerning the Straits, Menemencioglu said that 
the only alternative he could think of was for Germany to 
accede unilaterally to the Convention with reservations in
hopes that Turkey could find some way to take cognizance
2 6of the declaration,
Ribbentrop expressed his bafflement with the Turkish 
attitude, saying that he could not understand how the other 
signatories could object to Germany and Turkey arriving at 
the same agreement existing between Turkey and the other 
signatories. The Foreign Minister attempted to sway the 
Secretary General by stating tha.t a satisfactory German- 
Turkish agreement on the Montreux Convention would greatly 
aid the further development of relations between the coun­
tries, But Menemencioglu refused to budge from his original 
position no matter what insinuations Ribbentrop threw at 
him,2'? Prior to his return to Ankara, the Secretary 
General was handed a new draft proposal which took into
26
Ibid., 730-32,
D.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 730-31.
27
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account the legal objections he raised In his conversation 
with Ribbentrop, He promised to examine thoroughly the 
document and report any change in the Turkish position to 
Berlin,2̂
In the following January 1939» Menemencioglu returned 
to Berlin, Though officially he had come to attend the 
economic negotiations between the two countries, he immedi­
ately brought up the Straits question with State Secretary 
WeizsScker, The proposal he handed WeizsScker granted 
Germany equality with the signatory powers concerning no­
tification of passage through the Straits of all warships 
and merchant vessels. However, to the consternation of the 
Germans it did not mention Germany’s right to attend any
29conference attempting to revise the Montreux Convention,
Upon notification of the Turkish proposal, Ribbentrop stated
that Germany's position had not changed, and added that in
his view Turkey acutally was not ready for a settlement of
30the Montreux question.
During the next several months, the relations between 
Germany and Turkey on the Straits question took on a dif­
ferent aspect. Due to the slow but steady move by Turkey 
towards friendlier relations with Great Britain and France 
and the consequent unhappiness of Berlin, Friederich von
p 8 D.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 735-36,
29 Ibid.. 7£H-^2,
30 Ibid,, 7^3o
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Keller was replaced by Franz von Papen as German Ambassador 
31to Turkey*
After presenting his credentials, Papen talked with 
Turkish President,, Ismet Inbnti* The President expressed 
his fear that if the unsteady situation in Poland was not 
settled, it might lead to war* Inbntt also raised the ques­
tion of Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean* Papen 
tried to dispel any anxiety along these lines, but added 
that if war resulted, then Germany expected strict neutra­
lity from Turkey* And by strict neutrality Papen meant
32that the Straits be closed to all countries*
Throughout the summer of 1939» there was a definite
movement by Turkey towards a closer alliance with Great
33Britain and France* Turkey, alarmed by the Polish Ques­
tion and Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean, was an­
xious to safeguard its territory* Germany, well aware of 
Great Britain’s guarantees to Rumania, did not favor the 
conclusion of a Turco-British Pact, for such an agreement 
might allow the British to send warships through the Straits 
In the event of war* This German desire to force, if
Kilic, Turkey* Von Papen arrived April 27, 1939* 
Hitler hoped that von Papen, having served with the Ottoman 
army during World War I, might be In a. better position to 
keep Turkey in line with the Third Reich’s policy or at 
least get the Turks to assume a neutral position if war 
should break out*
DoG*F*P,, Series D, VI, 36 .̂
33 For a. more detailed analysis of this drift and 
German reaction, see the later chapter on the Tripartite 
Treaty*
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necessary* the Turks to close the Straits was also shared 
34-by Russia,,
Thus, during the period of negotiations for the Na.zi-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, there was continual pressure
by both Germany and Russia on Turkey to close the Straits
3 5to warships and war materials of non-riparian powers
After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, 
Turkey held the position that as long as it was a. non­
belligerent, war munitions and troops in merchant ships
36of any power could pass through the Straits0 Turkey’s 
stand did not receive a. favorable reception in Berlin, In 
a. communique to the German Embassy in Moscow, German 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop instructed Ambassador Schulen- 
burg-^ to inform Russian Foreign Minister Molotov3  ̂that 
it was in the common interest of both Germany and Russia 
to obtain a Turkish guarantee to prevent the passage of
3A Kilic, Turkey„ Russia previously tried to stop 
the passage of warships of non-Black Sea powers through 
the Straits at the Lausanne and Montreux Conferences,,
35 Raymond J„ Sontag and James S„ Beddie (eds„), 
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-19̂ -1; Documents from the Ar­
chives of the German Foreign Office,(New York,19^8),Pas­
s'imT" [Hereafter cited as Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations<■]
36 PqGoF.Po. Series D, VIII, 173-7*1-.
37J Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, (1875- 
19^)o German Ambassador In Moscow 193*1—19*H; directly in­
volved in an anti-Hitler conspiracy in 19*l-*t; executed on 
November 10, 19*I-*J-.
Vyacheslav Michaelovitch Molotov, (1890- )„
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (equivalent 
to premier) 1930-19*1-1; People’s Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs 1939-19^9*
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39Anglo-French, war material or troops through the Straits.
Mo such guarantee was worked out at that time, but on
October 2d, 1939s Russia assured Germany that it would
allow neither a, hostile position to be taken by Turkey
against the Germans or Russians, nor the passage of Bri-
L,0tish and French warships through the Straits ,
Throughout the period of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres­
sion Pact, the Russians continually brought up their in­
terests in the area of the Turkish Straits, Initially, 
and perhaps to maintain smooth relations, the Germans ex­
pressed their disinterest concerning Turkish domination of 
the Straits and added that they understood Russia's desires 
to establish its own bases thereHowever, a.fter the 
German victory in the West in the summer of 19d0, Hitler 
reversed his stand and decided tha.t the Russians were not 
to be allowed to expand beyond the Baltic area and Bess­
arabia, and most Important, they were to be prevented from
it?seizing the Straits„  ̂ German successes in France also 
affected the Turks, who began to view their strong stand 
on the Montreux Convention as perhaps a little hasty*
39 DqGoFoP°. Series D, VIII, 17d. 
itO United States War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, (Washington, 19d6~19d8) , VI, 979=. fHereafter 
cited, as N,C,A,]
itl Ibid*, 990* The Russians particularly wanted a 
naval base located in the Sea of Marmara, See DoG.F.P., 
Series D, VII, 15d„
L i p A* _Rossi, The Russo-German Alliance, August 1939- 
June 19dl, (Boston, 1951)» 211~ [Hereafter cited £LS RoS S 
Alliance,]
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When discussions between Germany and Russia began 
over the future of the Balkans and specifically the Straits 
in the fall of 19^0, Russia was quick to remind its part­
ners of its ambitions in Turkey, In a. conversation between 
Hitler and Molotov, the Fdhrer agreed that there should be 
an alteration of certain terms of the Montreux Convention, 
However, Molotov said that he wanted more than a paper
guarantee against an attack on the Black Sea via. the 
if-3Straits, Specifically, Russia requested not only naval
bases in the Straits but also bases in the Kars-Ardahan 
i(4region.
In a talk with Papen, RiTpbentrop outlined\the ■ 
progression of the talks with the Russians and stated that 
the time had come to discuss spheres of interest, Berlin 
realized that it would have to provide Russia with warm 
water ports and wanted to hear Papen's opinion on the 
Straits, Papen said that he believed that Turkey considered 
its sovereignty over the Straits as unquestionable. Although 
the Turks might allow a revision of the Convention to per­
mit Russia to send its warships through the Straits, any 
attempt to alter the Treaty by force would involve Turkey's 
entry into the war,^
^  Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, R, H, C.
Steed (ed„), (New York, 1951)*218, [Hereafter cited as 
Schmldt, Interpreter„]
Ml- Kilic, Turkey, The Kars-Ardahan region is lo­
cated' in eastern Turkey close to the Turco-Russian border,
^  Papen, Memoirs, ^65®
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In an effort to induce Russia, to abandon its plans in
Turkey, Germany presented the Russians with a scheme based
on the conquest of Grea.t Britain which suggested that upon
the dissolution of the British Empire, Russia would receive
land in Asia in the area of the Indian Ocean, Berlin hoped
that an Interest in the Persian Gulf and its vast oil re-
46serves would be enough to deflect Russian ambitions.
Along with these proposals, Berlin agreed to bring, joint 
pressure on Turkey to alter the Montreux Convention so that 
Russia was granted the right of unrestricted passage of 
warships, whereas the non-riparian powers were not allowed
1},7the right of passage for their warships into the Black Sea.
On November 26, 1940, Moscow replied to Berlin's offer by 
demanding, among other things, the granting of military in­
stallations in Turkey. These growing Russian ambitions 
alarmed Hitler, who was still contemplating an Invasion of 
Great Britain. Thus, in fear of Russian exploitations, and 
before it was too late, Hitler answered the Russian demands 
by ordering his Chiefs of Staff to prepare for 'Operation 
Bar bar ossa,. '
With the invasion of Russia on the drawing board, 
Germany's attitude toward the Straits became somewhat re­
served. Ambassador Papen was notified to answer Turkish
Rossi, Alliance, 211; and Papen, Memoirs, 466.
^  Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 257-58.
h o Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 48-52.
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inquiries concerning Germany’s current attitude towards the 
Montreux Convention by saying that he had not received in­
structions on that subject. Papen expressed concern that 
the failure of Germany and Turkey to reach an agreement on 
the status of the Straits might push the Turks closer to 
the British. But Berlin insisted that the question remain
i.f-9open.
The German buildup of troops in Rumania and its 
activities on Rumania's Black Sea coast early in 19^1 
caused the Turkish government on March 18 to ask its Ambas­
sador in Berlin, Htlsrev Gerede,^0 to question Hitler con­
cerning Germany's intentions. The Ftlhrer denied any ter­
ritorial ambitions in the area of Turkey and added that 
this attitude was the cause of much difficulty with Russia. 
Hitler then mentioned that Russia wanted bases in the 
Straits, but quickly pointed out that Germany had refused 
to agree. However, Berlin did advocate a revision of the 
Montreux Convention whereby only the warships of Black
Sea powers would have the right of exit and entry through 
<1the Straits. The Chancellor concluded by saying that 
Germany was interested in Turkey remaining the guardian 
of the Straits, Gerede, Impressed by the German attitude, 
said that he would relay the information to Ankara..-’2
^  P.G.F.P.. Series D, XI, 793.
50 Htlsrev Gerede, Turkish diplomat; Ambassador to 
Berlin 1939-19^2; known to be pro-German,
51 P.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 309-10.
52 Ibid.. 312,
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On March 28, Papen telegraphed Berlin that he had
talked to Turkish Foreign Minister Saraeoglu about the
Hitler-Gerede conversation, Saraeoglu said that the
Turkish President was favorable to the statements made
by the Ftlhrer, and the President asked that Papen express
to Hitler the Turkish government's satisfaction at the
53German attitude adopted in the interest of Turkey,
The German conquest of Greece and Crete in April and 
May of 1941 placed the German forces within excellent 
striking distance of ships going to and from the Straits,
It also influenced the position of the Axis Powers in re­
lation to Turkey for the Turks would surely have second
thoughts .about joining the Allies while Hitler was their 
54-neighbor.- This situation did much to cause the conclu­
sion of the German-Turkish Friendship Treaty signed at 
Ankara on June 18, 1941.-55 Four days later Germany invaded 
Russia,
With the German armies striking and advancing along 
the Russian front in rapid success, Berlin now became 
vitally interested in control of the Black Sea and spe­
cifically, the rights of Russian war and merchant ships to
52 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 384-85.
54 United States Navy Department, Ftlhrer Conferences 
on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939~1945, (Wash­
ington , 1947-1949), 194-1, I, -98. [Hereafter c i ted as Ftlhrer
Naval Conferences.!
The events which led to the conclusion of this 
treaty are discussed at length in ChapterVI.
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traverse the Straits. Thus, Papen was instructed to 
approach Saraooglu with the proposal that Turkey close 
the Straits to-Russian merchant ships, Germany knew that 
the Soviet merchant tonnage approached 400,000 tons and 
the Germans did not want it to get away.-'
Papen reported to Berlin that he had talked with
Saraeoglu, and the Foreign Minister was of the opinion
that the Russians would not attempt to send their merchant
ships out of the Black Sea until the ships were definitely
in danger. The German Ambassador felt that if the situa-
5?tlon did arise, Turkey would cooperate with Berlin, 
However, the Germans were not satisfied with this state­
ment and attempted other ways to get Turkey to close the 
Straits to all Russian ships.
In August 1941, several suggestions were sent to 
Papen concerning ways to stop Russian ships. State Sec­
retary Weizsacker suggested that the Turks be shown the 
actual paragraph of Molotov's proposal of November 1940 
concerning Soviet bases on the S t r a i t s , - ^ 8  Ribbentrop said 
that perhaps Turkey could be persuaded to do everything 
possible under the Montreux Convention to delay the passage
56 D.G.F.P., Series D, XIII, 3« The German Navy had 
no forces of its own in the Black Sea at this time with 
which to combat the Russians.  ̂Further, the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet was far superior to 'the few vessels of the German 
allies, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians, Karl DJJnitz, 
Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, (Cleveland, 1959)» 387, 
thereafter"cited as Dffnitz. Memoirs.]
D.G.F.P.. Series D, XIII, 3*
Ibid.. 304.
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of Russian merchant ships, thus allowing time to report 
the movements of the ships to Axis naval and. air forces 
in the Aegean. ■ A third person suggested that Papen point 
out to the Turks that the political power change in the 
Black Sea caused by the rapid German advance into Russia 
was sufficient reason to block the Straits.^0 On August 
30, Papen reported that he had discussed the problem with 
Turkish President InSnd, but Turkey denied the seriousness 
of the situation. In the eyes of the Turks, the problem 
could not be considered acute until the ports of Novoros- 
sisk and Batum were controlled by the Germans, Con-
sequently, Russian merchant ships were free to traverse 
the Straits,
Towards the end of 19^1, Germany considered two dif­
ferent ways to increase its number of warships in the 
Black Sea, They were designed both to assure that Russian 
merchant ships would not enter the Straits, and to pro­
tect German convoys carrying war materials to the advan­
cing German front along the northern Black Sea coast, One 
proposed the idea that Germany send submarines from ports 
in France through the Mediterranean as far as Greece. From 
that point the submarines would submerge and be towed through 
the Straits. However, after simulated runs in the Baltic,
*59 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XIII, 35^-55.
60 Ibid... kQJ-Ok,
^  Ibid,-. 405. The port of Batum was never cap­
tured by the Germans.
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62the idea was abandoned for navigational reasons.
The Reich, however, did adopt the other method of 
transferring light naval vessels to the Black Sea. The 
ships first passed down the Elbe to Dresden, then by high­
way to Regensburg, and finally down the Danube to the Sea.
In this manner a considerable number of warships were sent
to provide convoy escort, to guard the northern entrance
63to the Straits, and to harrass the Russian fleet.
With the gradual buildup of Axis naval forces in the 
Black Sea. and their increasing effectiveness against Rus­
sian. warships and merchant shipping, the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet assumed the defensive. Germany’s army soon controlled 
the Russian sea coast with the exception of a. small area, in 
the southeast. This allowed the Axis to send escorted oil 
tankers from Rumania into the Straits with little danger
of Russian attack, and assured that Turkey would not close 
64the Straits.
Throughout 1942, the German navy had virtual freedom 
of movement in the Black Sea. However, with the fall of 
Stalingrad in the beginning of 1943 and the German wlth- 
62
FtHiisr ‘Naval Gonf erences . 1941, II , 82-3.
6l ' , ;Dbnitz, Memoirs. 387-88. The actual transfer of
vessels was not a simple process as it Involved the dis­
mantling of all extra equipment on the larger ships. See 
Ftlhrer Nava.l Conferences. 1941, II, 84.
^  D8nitz, Memoirs, 389. During World War II, the 
Allies did not attempt to send supplies to Russia via. the 
Turkish Straits. The war materials were shipped to Mur­
mansk and the Persian Gulf.
86
drawal to the west, the German navy’s area of control was
65correspondingly less and less. Grand Admiral Dt5nitz, 
in a conference with Hitler in October 19^3, expressed 
his opinion that as long as the Germans held the Crimea, 
they could safeguard the shipping going to and from the 
Straits, Hitler agreed and added that only by holding that 
Russian peninsula could the neutrality of Turkey be assured. 
By mid-lay 19^, the Germans had completely evacuated the 
Crimea.
The German reverses in the area, of the Black Sea had 
placed their naval vessels in a precarious position. In 
an attempt to avoid scuttling the ships, several of them 
were camouflaged and sent into the Straits although it 
was a violation of the Montreux Convention. On June 5,
19^, the war-transport Kassel entered the Bosporus en 
route to occupied Greece. After being stopped and searched 
by the Turkish authorities, its true character was discov­
ered and passage through the Straits was denied. Because 
of the fact that the same type of German ships had been 
previously allowed through the Straits, the incident created 
a political crisis in Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Menemencioglu was forced to resign. Ger­
many reacted to the situation by halting, temporarily, the
■̂5 Grand Admiral DSnitz, (1891- ). Commanding
Officer of Submarines 1935*19^3; Supreme Commander of the 
German Navy 19^3-19^5; Head of the German State and Com­
mander in Chief of the German Armed Forces May 1 to May 23, 
19^5; Convicted at Nttrnberg and imprisoned from 19^6-1956.
66 Ddnitz, Memoirs. 389,
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6?passage of German ships through the Straits, On August 1, 
19^. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with the Third Reich,
During its initial years, the Third Reich did not 
concern itself with the status of the Turkish Straits, Dis- 
Germany was concentrating on rebuilding its internal struc­
ture and its position on the international scene. Thus, 
it was not surprising when the Germans did not demand a 
representative at the Montreux Convention.
As Germany grew stronger and moved closer to war, its 
interest in the Straits increased, and attempts were made 
to accede to the Convention as a signatory. This would 
have assured the Germans a voice if another Convention 
were held. However, Germany was not allowed the status of 
a signatory.
In its dealings with Russia, Germany expressed ; -
interest in Russian desires to establish bases In the Straits 
as part of the lure In the formation of the Nazi-Soviet Non- 
Aggression Pact, But once the pact was concluded, Germany 
reversed its stand because the Reich actually did not want 
the Balkans as a Russian sphere of influence. Germany even 
mentioned the Russian interests in the Straits to the 
Turks in order to gain special rights in that area, but to 
no avail.
^  Ftlhrer Naval Conferences, 19^, 58 and 99.
88
With the invasion of Russia, Germany tried to get 
Turkey to close the Straits to all Russian shipping* Tur­
key refused the request and said that it would have to see 
the full effect of the German campaign before it took 
such action. Had Germany successfully established itself 
in the Caucasus, its Influence in the Straits would have 
been paramount.
CHAPTER IV
OPERATION CICERO 
OCTOBER 19^3 - APRIL 19^
By October 19^3* the enemies of the Third Reich were 
rapidly gaining momentum. Italy had been invaded, the Russian 
armies were advancing, and the opening of a Second Front- was 
being disbussed by the Allied leaders. The ascendancy of 
Nazi Germany was definitely in jeopardy.
1On the evening of October 26, 19^3* man, later
1 According to Elyesa Bazna, I Was Cicero. (New York, 
1962) , [Hereafter cited as Bazna, Cicero.!], the spy*s name 
was Elyesa Bazna, This wds disagreed with by Robert M, Wt 
Kempner; ifi "The Highest-d?aid Spy in History,” Reader’s Digest. 
June 1950, 92, who stated that the spy’s name was Diello.
Both sources agreed that he was the British Ambassador’s valet. 
He was a kavass (in Turkey, a. person who serves a foreigner) 
at different times with Jankovio, Yugoslavian Ambassador, 
with Colonel Class of the United States Embassy, with Mr, Busk, 
First Secretary of the British Embassy, and with Sir Hughe 
Knatchbull-Hugessen,
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2 3known as Cicero, visited the home of Albert Jenke with a
very unusual proposition, The British Ambassador's valet
stated that he had taken photographs of highly classified
material in the Ambassador's safe and was prepared to sell
the first two films for 20,000 pounds, British pounds
sterling; if the Germans accepted the proposition, each
additional film would cost 15,000 pounds. Jenke answered
that such matters were not in his line of duty, but he
would contact the right man. Leaving Cicero to wait, the
iFirst Secretary phoned Papen's attache, Ludwig C. Moyzisch,
5to come right over.
In a short time, Moyzisch entered the room and, after 
hearing the offer, indicated his interest but said that the 
German Embassy did not carry such sums of money and that an 
authorization would have to come from Berlin, Cicero an­
swered that he was willing to give the Germans until the 
afternoon of October 30 to consider the proposition, at
which time he would contact Moyzisch by telephone and iden-
6tify himself with the code name Pierre,
2 Originally called himself Pierre* Was given the 
code name Cicero for correspondence purposes by Papen be­
cause of the very eloquent documents he gave the Germans.
3 Albert Jenke. Commercial Counsellor to the German 
Embassy in Turkey 19*f-0-19*1-2; First Secretary of the German 
Embassy in Turkey 1 $4 3-19*4; Brother-in-law of German For­
eign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.
k L. C. Moyzisch, Commercial Attache at the German 
Embassy in Turkey; member of the Reich Security Department 
which was headed by S. S, General Ernsth Kaltenbrunner.
^ Bazna, Cicero. *1-7-9.
6 Ibid.. 51.
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The next morning Jenke and Moyzisch talked with Am­
bassador Papen over the advisability of carrying the matter' 
any further. They considered the distinct chance that it 
might be a British trap, although Papen felt that in either 
case the amount of money involved placed the matter in the
hands of Berlin. A telegram was immediately sent to Ber-
7lin stating the facts and asking for instructions.'
After reading the telegram from Ankara, Ribbentrop
Ocontacted Walter Schellenberg of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service and requested his opinion on whether the offer 
should be accepted. Schellenberg did not have much on 
which to base a decision, but he though that it was worth 
a gamble and gave his approval of the project. Thus, on 
October 29, a, telegram was sent to Ankara, instructing 
Papen to accept the offer and adding that the money would
9arrive on the following day by special courier plane.
At three o'clock on the afternoon of October 30» Moyzisch 
received the promised call from Cicero, and a rendezvous 
was planned for that evening on the German Embassy grounds,
^ Ludwig C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. (New York, 
1965), 30-1. [Hereafter cited as Moyzisch, Operation 
Cicero.]
® Walter Schellenberg, (1910-1952). Chief of Amt.
VI (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Reich Security Main 
Office (RSHA) 19^1-19^5; Chief of the unified Intelligence 
Service (which assumed the military intelligence functions 
of the Abwehr) 19^-19^5.
9 Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth. (New York,
1956), 335-36. [Hereafter cited aa Schellenberg, Labyrinth.]
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At the first meeting, Moyzisch insisted that he be 
allowed to develop the films before handing over the money. 
Cicero agreed, a.nd the German attache soon found that at 
least on the surface the documents looked real enough. The 
money was paid, and another exchange was planned for the 
next evening,^0
The following day Moyzisch showed Papen the docu­
ments. The more the Ambassador read, the more excited he 
became. The correspondence contained references to the 
gradual buildup of R.A.F, personnel in Turkey, the volume 
of Lend-lease equipment being sent to Russia, the creation 
Of the Second Front, and other such important matters all 
marked either SECRET or MOST SECRET. However, Papen 
was not completely sold on their authenticity and said that 
Cicero's next delivery would help him decide that point,^ 
At the next meeting with Cicero, Moyzisch obtained two 
more rolls of film and then asked the valet a few questions 
about his method of operation, Cicero was reluctant to 
talk about himself. He did say, however, that he worked 
alone, used a German Leica camera, and took all the photo­
graphs inside the British Embassy. Moyzisch wanted to
learn more so that he could answer any inquiries from Ber-
1 ?lin, but Cicero quickly changed the subject.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 39-41; and Bazna, 
Cicero, 6l-4, Both of these accounts differ somewhat; 
though generally over insignificant matters.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 48-9.
12 I M d . . 54- 5 .
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Berlin’s reaction to the initial documents was very 
cautious, Schellenberg was very Impressed with the con-
13tents and sent a copy to Hitler through Heinrich Himmler, ■
He also called in several experts to determine the relia­
bility of the material. Ribbentrop, on the other hand,
believed that it was most likely a British trick, a view
1 *1-which he held throughout the Cicero affair,
Berlin sent continual inquiries to Moyzisch asking
him to provide more precise information on Cicero’s actual
name, his usual hang-outs, and his relatives, Moyzisch
resented the questions, for he thought that it was only
the value of the material that counted. Particularly
irritating to Papen’s attache? was the personal interest
that the chief of the Main Security Office, Ernst Kalten- 
15brunner was beginning to take in Operation Cicero. 
Kaltenbrunner*s large staff sent growing numbers of tele­
grams concerning the progress of the affair, and Moyzisch 
feared that a leak might occur,
13 , ,Heinrich Himmler, (1900-194-5) • Chief of the German
Police 1936-19*1-5; Relchsftihrer S,S. 1929-19*1-55 Reich Mini­
ster of the Interior 19*1-3-19*1-5; Chief of the Waffen S.S.; 
Expelled from the Nazi Party and ordered arrested for trea­
son by Hitler in 19*1-5; committed suicide after capture by 
Allies in 19*1-5*
1 *1- Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 337-38*
^  Ernst Kaltenbrunner, (1903-19*1-6). Commander of 
S.S. in Austria 1933-193*1-5 Chief of Security in Seyss-In- 
quart government 19395 Chief pf the Reich Security Main 
Office (RSHA) 19*1-3-19*1-5; Tried at Ntlrnberg & hanged 19*1-6.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 58.
9^
On November 6, another contact was made. Moyzisch 
asked more questions about Cicero's personal life. Al­
though Cicero still refused to give his name, he did men­
tion that he was not a Turk, but an Albanian, and further 
that he hated the British because they had killed his 
father
After showing the newly acquired documents to Papen, 
Moyzisch was handed a telegram instructing him to report 
to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin. The attache was 
to bring all the Cicero material. He left on the Ankara 
Express the following day to catch a courier plane in Istan­
bul .
Meanwhile, Schellenberg received a message that Moy­
zisch was on his way to make a personal report to Ribbentrop. 
This irritated the Chief of Foreign Intelligence, and he 
immediately made arrangements for Moyzisch to see him first. 
Schellenberg also met with his immediate chief, Kaltenbrunner, 
and complained about Ribbentrop's Intervention in the case. 
Schellenberg believed that Operation Cicero fell within the 
scope of the Foreign Intelligence Service and not the Foreign 
Ministry.18
17 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 6l. In his personal ac­
count, Cicero claims the latter statement was a deliberate 
lie in hopes of satisfying Berlin's curiosity. Bazna,
Cicero. 73.
18 Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 338. There is an in­
consistency between Schellenberg and Moyzisch as to whom the 
German attach^ spoke to first. However, it seems clear that 
it was not Ribbentrop. According to Moyzisch, he talked to 
Kaltenbrunner then Ribbentrop, but does not refer to any con­
versation with Schellenberg. See Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 65.
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Moyzisch’s flight trip from Istanbul to Berlin was 
interrupted in Sofia where he received instructions from 
Kaltenbrunner to proceed to Berlin by special plane. Upon 
arrival, the a.tta.ch§ was brought directly to the chief of 
the German Security Police. For almost three hours Moy- 
zisch answered questions on the status of Operation Cicero. 
Later, Kaltenbrunner explained the conflict between his 
department and Ribbentrop over the Cicero affair and ex­
pressed his desire that all further correspondence be 
carried on with his department and not the Foreign Ministry.
He added that further developments of the operation were
19necessary before the value of the documents was established.
Several days later, the Foreign Ministry informed Moy- 
zisch that Ribbentrop would like to see him. As he entered 
the Foreign Minister's office, the German attach^ was im­
mediately aware that Ribbentrop was extremely displeased 
about the previous visit to Kaltenbrunner. Ribbentrop asked 
what facts, if any, he possessed which would prove the 
authenticity of the documents. The attache started to re­
late all that he knew about the operation but was inter­
rupted by Ribbentrop with the comment that he wanted facts 
not opinions. The Foreign Minister mentioned that if Moy- 
zisch proved that Cicero worked alone, then Berlin could 
assume that the documents were real, Moyzisch answered that 
the only way he could discover if Cicero had an assistant
19 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 65-8.
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would be for Cicero to give himself away. The conference
ended with Ribbentrop Instructing the attache to remain in
20Berlin for the time being.
Soon after Ribbentrop's interview, Schellenberg 
called Moyzisch to discuss the Cicero case. The Foreign 
Intelligence Chief stated that even if the photographs 
proved to be frauds, the expenditure was justified, for it 
was important to know the manner in which your enemy wanted 
to deceive you. Schellenberg personally believed that the 
material was genuine because it corresponded to his view of 
the present military and political situation. Before par­
ting, he told Moyzisch to send all films received from
Cicero immediately to Berlin, so that additional copies
21could be sent to the appropriate authorities.
On November 22, the Foreign Ministry informed Moy- 
alsch that he should return to Turkey, Several days later 
in Ankara, the attach^ was contacted by Cicero. At their 
rendezvous Moyzisch told the valet where he had been the 
past weeks. Cicero was pleased with the importance that
20 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 75-6.
pi Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 338-39, Schellenberg 
gave the messages bearing date-time notations to the mili­
tary communications-lntelligence section, in an attempt to 
break the British diplomatic codes. However, the British 
were superenciphering the most important messages in a 
one-time pad, and the Nazi codebreakers found it impossible 
to use the Cicero documents in deciphering the one-time 
keys of any other messages. The cryptanalytic services of 
the German Foreign Office, Pers Z, was probably also invol­
ved in the Cicero documents. David Kahn, The Codebreakers, 
(New York, 1967), ^51-52. 1
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Berlin plaeed on him* Only one roll of film exchanged hands
this time for Cicero said that he had had to destroy an
earlier one because of Moyzisch's long absence. This one
roll, however, proved of considerable political importance
since it showed the attempts by the British to bring Turkey
into the war and Turkey's equal determination to remain
neutral. The British hoped the first step would be the
22termination of German-Turklsh diplomatic relations.
After sending these latest documents to Berlin,
Moyzisch received a confidential communication from 
Kaltenbrunner, The attache was told not to show Ambassador 
Papen anything concerning Operation Cicero and to forward 
all the Cicero material directly to Kaltenbrunner's depart­
ment, Moyzisch did not follow these orders, and his failure
23to do so placed him in a difficult position later on.
The month of December was the operation's most pro­
ductive - and its most dangerous, Cicero became very assured 
of himself. He provided films every few days and they con-
itained such important documents as the complete minutes of 
the conferences at Cairo and Teheran, However, during the 
second week of December at a rendezvous, Moyzisch noticed 
that he was being followed by another car. A chase followed
22 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 85-7.
^  Ibid., 91. Moyzisch felt that the documents 
would be of value to the Ambassador in his work.
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through the streets of Angara In which the attache finally
managed to elude his pursuer, Cicero then jumped from the
car near the British Embassy, and Moyzisch returned to his
office. It was evident that somebody was at least partially
wise to Operation Cicero, and according to Moyzisch, this
2 Awas the beginning of their troubles.
Three days later Moyzisch met with Cicero and ex­
changed a roll of film which aroused much concern in Ber­
lin, It was not the contents of the documents that in­
terested Berlin, but the fact that a finger and a thumb 
were clearly visible on the edge of several transcripts.
Without doubt they belonged to Cicero as his signet ring
25was on the index finger in the photograph.
Previously, Moyzisch explained to Berlin that while 
Cicero took the exposures, he held the camera in one hand 
without the aid of any other support, and with a. finger of 
that hand, he snapped the shutter. On the surface such a 
method seemed impossible, and now that the picture with the 
fingers was discovered it appeared that either he had an 
accomplice or the Information on his method was incorrect, 
Berlin sent a photographic expert to Ankara in an
oh, Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 95-100,, For a slightly 
different and more heroic account of the chase through the 
streets of Ankara, see Bazna, Cicero, 81-3. Cornelia Knapp, 
who appeared later as Elizabet, stated that the pursuers 
were agents of the American Secret Service (0,S,S,)., Bazna, 
Cicero, 109.
ff
Ibid,. 102.
26 Ibid.. 102-03.
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attempt to discover what really was happening. Moyzisch 
arranged a meeting with Cicero at which the latter was 
quizzed by Moyzisch while the photographer listened in 
the next room. Following the meeting, the expert from 
Berlin expressed his amazement at the photographic ability 
of Cicero; however, he felt that the odds against Cicero’s 
working alone were about one thousand to one. The photo­
graphic expert returned to Berlin the following day, and
to Moyzisch’s delight no further word was heard on the 
subject^
Towards the latter part of December, Cicero photo­
graphed a. number of documents concerning the gradual build­
up of British personnel into Turkey. One report made 
mention of the possibility that Turkey might allow Great
Britain to set up radar in Turkish Thrace to guide Allied
pO
bombers in their attacks on the Rumanian oil fields. The 
attache showed them to Papen, which was, of course, against 
the instructions of Kaltenbrunner. The Ambassador was very 
concerned with the content of the documents sand decided to 
talk to the Turkish Foreign Minister Human Menemencioglu. 
Papen figured that the mere mention of possible German re­
prisals could go a long way in keeping Turkish military 
policy more in line with Germany, The danger in this 
approach was that the Turkish government might relate
2? Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 10̂ ,
28 Papen, Memoirs, 511-12; Bazna,, Cicero. 92,
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Papen's Information to the British and thereby put them
on the alert for a security leak. This was precisely what 
29happened.
Immediately after . Papen's interview with Menemen-* 
cioglu, the latter contacted the British Ambassador Knatchbull- 
Hugessen. The Turkish Foreign Minister repeated to Knatchbull- 
Hugessen what had taken place and they both concluded that 
the Germans must be receiving their information from some 
top-level source. After returning to his Embassy, the Bri­
tish Ambassador sent a complete report to London, And the
30following da.y, Moyzisch had a photocopy of the document,'
The German attach^ had second thoughts about sending
the document to Berlin for he knew that he had disobeyed
Kaltenbrunnerfs orders by showing the material to Papen.
However, the money for the film had been payed to Cicero
and Moyzisch would have to account for it. Reluctantly
he dispatched the documents to Berlin. A week later he
received a letter from Kaltenbrunner which said that he was
31responsible for a flagrant breach of discipline.
Shortly after Knatchbull-Hugessen's conversation with 
Menemencioglu, the British began tightening the security 
in their Embassy. Cicero reported that rooms were searched, 
different alarm systems were installed, and locks were
29 Bazna, Cicero. 91; Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 105.
30 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 106.
31 Ibid., 107.
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changed. All In all, It seemed evident that the British
12thought the lea.kage was from within the Embassy.'' Con­
sequently, the documents that Moyzisch received from Ci­
cero never again reached the high quality of those deliv­
ered in December, and the exchanges were fewer and farther 
between.
During mid-December 19^3. Moyzisch was told that a 
German diplomat in Sofia was eager to find a, job for his 
daughter in the German Embassy in A n k a r a . 33 The attach^ 
said that he could use her, and she was employed the fol­
lowing January as a secretary to Moyzisch. The new sec­
retary's arrival was to have a profound affect on Opera­
tion Cicero.
On January Ity, , an event occurred which lifted
any doubt concerning the reliability of the Cicero documents.
32 According to Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender,
(Mew York, 1966), 2^-5, the United States during November 
19^3 received word from its contact (code name Wood) in the 
German Foreign Office in Berlin that Papen had reported the 
acquisition of documents from the British Embassy via a 
German agent. Dulles said that he immediately informed the 
British who simply changed safes and combinations, thus im­
mediately putting Cicero out of business. This account 
does not agree with either Moyzisch or Bazna who state that 
the change was not made until the following January 19^, 
and even then it did not put Cicero completely out of busi­
ness, Bazna, Cicero, 105; Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 113*
33 According to Bazna, Cicero, 107-08, the diplomat's 
name was Knapp, and his daughter's, Cornelia Knapp, refer­
red to by Moyzisch as Ellzabet. Mr, Knapp had served in 
the German diplomatic corps at posts in Bombay, and Clev­
eland prior to the war, then was transferred to Rome and 
Sofia, Cornelia Knapp first engaged in espionage for the 
United States (O.S,S.) while employed as a secretary by the 
German Embassy in Sofia, during 19^3» Her primary mission 
in Ankara, was to find the true identity of Cicero.
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One of the documents previously received by Moyzisch con­
tained a reference to the fact that the Allies would soon 
begin a number of air attacks on the capitals of the Balkan 
countries allied to the Third Reich. The first city on the 
agenda was Sofia, and the attack was to take place on Jan­
uary 1̂ . Berlin felt that if the air attack occurred, 
there would be no further doubt about the truthfulness of 
the documents. On the morning of the 15th, Moyzisch called 
the German Legation in Sofia and found that the air attack 
had taken place and the deaths of approximately ^,000 Bul­
garians had provided Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner with 
the final proof.
In the first week of February, Cicero became active 
again. The pressure within the British Embassy had re­
laxed somewhat, but more importantly, Cicero had learned 
how the new safety measures worked. One of the initial 
films Moyzisch received definitely showed the deteriora­
tion of the quality of the documents, The film consisted 
merely of fifteen shots of the statement of petty expen­
ditures in the British Embassy. The German attache refused 
to pay Cicero for the film, but said that he would ask 
Berlin for its opinion. And to Moyzisch*s astonishment,
Berlin instructed him to pay Cicero as the film had proved
3*5exceptionally valuable.
^  Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, ll*b Bazna, Cicero,
117; Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 3̂ 3-Jp.j-, who stated that though 
there were those in Berlin who believed that the attack 
would take place, little could be done to prevent it,
35 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 166-67.
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Elizabet was beginning to get on Moyzisch’s nerves. 
Nothing seemed to please her. Moyzisch tried to find out 
what was wrong, but to no avail. Finally, he went to Am­
bassador Papen in an effort to obtain his help to get rid 
of her, Papen was not initially enthusiastic, but when 
his attach^ mentioned that such an unstable woman might 
endanger Operation Cicero, the Ambassador said that he 
would see what he could do.
As the end of February approached, Moyzisch*s meetings 
with Cicero became less frequent, and also the importance 
of the material was nowhere near the former standard. Moy­
zisch reasoned that because of the tightened security 
measures, the important documents remained in the Ambas­
sador *s safe for a much shorter period of time. Thus, 
Cicero was more dependent on luck. However, Moyzisch did 
receive one more important series of documents.
During the past weeks, the documents from Cicero had 
contained repeated references to a new and evidently im­
portant operation. Berlin sent urgent telegrams to many 
of its Embassies and Legations instructing them to find the 
significance of the new operation. In the beginning of 
March, Moyzisch received a role of film in which the code 
name Operation Overlord appeared,^ He considered the sit­
uation very thoroughly, remembering past references in the 
Cicero documents to something that was to happen on May 1^,
^  Befers to the Allied invasion of Normandy which 
took place on June 6 , 19*i4.
10^
19^, This information, along with the knowledge that at 
Teheran Churchill had committed himself to the opening of 
a second front in Europe in 19^. caused Moyzisch to 
theorize that Overlord was the name of the operation and 
the code name for the Second Front. He immediately sent 
a message to Berlin explaining his theory and reasoning, 
hut the only reply was "Possible but hardly probable."3?
This film containing the reference to Operation Over­
lord was the last received from Cicero. The British valet 
intended to deliver more documents but the work had be­
come very hazardous. There was an increase of agents 
within the British Embassy, and Cicero felt that if he 
continued it would only be a matter of time before he was
O O
discovered. Moyzisch thought that the valet might pos­
sibly attempt to deliver more material, but events soon 
prevented any chance of that.
Towards the end of March, Papen told Moyzisch that he 
had contacted Elizabet’s father in Budapest and was in-
37 As quoted in Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 125-26, 
Bazna. gives a somewhat different account of the content of 
the documents given to the Germans. He said that by reading 
the documents he knew that Operation Overlord referred to 
the Second Front, and further the name Eisenhower was men­
tioned as the supreme commander of the operation. Bazna, 
Cicero, 1^8-50. However, after reading both books, Moy­
zisch, I believe, presents a better case.
88 According to Bazna., Cicero, 173, Cicero told 
Moyzisch that the film deliveries could no longer be made 
because he had seen Moyzisch’s secretary at the British 
Embassy, and was afraid that he would soon be discovered. 
Moyzisch claims that Cicero gave no reasons for stopping 
delivery, much less mentioning anything about Elizabet. 
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 126-27.
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formed, that It would, be impossible to bring her back until 
after Easter. The attache was happy to hear that she would, 
soon be gone, but he was even more elated, a few days later 
when Elizabet requested some time off over Easter to visit 
her parents. Moyzisch agreed to the request and even prom­
ised to secure the necessary reservations. However, on 
April 6 when Moyzisch went to the train depot to give Eliza- 
bet the tickets, she did not appear.
For the next twenty-four hours, Moyzisch searched 
throughout Ankara for his secretary - but to no avail. 
Finally, he realized that there was no alternative but to 
inform Berlin. Four days later Moyzisch received a dis­
patch from Kaltenbrunner ordering him to report to Berlin.
39Operation Cicero was now history.'
39 Actually, Moyzisch did not return to Germany until 
the conclusion of the war. Knowing what his fate would 
probably be, he found excuses to stay in Turkey until it 
was even too late to return by train because of the Russian 
advance into the Balkans, He was interned until transpor­
tation by Swedish ship could be arranged to Germany, and 
luckily none was available until April 19^5• By the time 
the ship reached Gibraltar, the war was over, and he no 
longer had diplomatic immunity. Moyzisch was then interned 
by the British. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 151-52. Cicero 
resigned his position at the British Embassy soon after 
the disappearance of Elizabet, He had received 309*000 
pounds sterling (over $1 ,000,000) and lived expensively un­
til May 19^5, when it was discovered that except for the
initial sums, the money was counterfeit* Bazna, Cicero,
183-201, passim. For further information pn the use of 
forged money by the Nazis, see Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret 
Front, (New York, 195^), 85. Elizabet had been flown out 
of Ankara by the O.S.S. on the same day she missed the train. 
She was never able to positively identify Cicero, although
all signs had pointed to the fact that he was employed by
the British Embassy. Besides her work with Cicero, she gave 
her contact all the secret information she could obtain. In 
payment for her espionage work during the war, she was al­
lowed to become a citizen of the United States. Bazna,
Cicero. 203-0^.
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The documents Berlin first received from Cicero were 
viewed with considerable reservation. The contents seemed 
to be "too good.” Bibbentrop especially seemed skeptical 
over the affair. There soon developed a rift between the 
Foreign Ministry and Reich Security Department as to which 
should have control over Operation Cicero. Moyzisch re­
ceived conflicting orders on how the documents should be 
handled, and it was never clearly settled. Thus, through­
out the Cicero episode, the attache was generally left on 
his own, and the messages from Berlin were more of an 
harrassing nature than a constructive one.
The information contained in the documents ranged 
from the Allied conferences held in Moscow, Cairo, and 
Teheran to evidence of Turkey’s absorption by the Allies, 
Had Berlin believed the information, it would have clearly 
seen that the Allies were sparing nothing in attempting to 
defeat the Nazis, and, consequently, the overthrow of 
the Third Beich was only a matter of time.
However, for some unknown reason, Berlin preferred 
not to believe the Cicero documents. Perhaps, the future 
of Nazi Germany was too clearly visible; a fact which 
Hitler and his thugs did not care to admit. But no matter 
what the reason, it is clear that one of the most daring 
and successful spy episodes in history was virtually a 
waste of time.
CHAPTER V
GERMANY AND THE TRIPARTITE PACT 
1939 - 19^0
As the Third Reich extended its control into Austria 
and Czechoslovakia in March of 1938 and 1939 respectively, 
the Turkish Republic assumed a policy of strict neutrality. 
This attitude pleased Germany because any Turkish align­
ment with the Western Powers would compel Germany to be­
come more Involved in the eastern Mediterranean than it 
desired at that time. However, during the latter part 
of March 1939 * the Wilhelmstrasse received reports that 
Turkey was seriously considering strengthening its ties
During the spring of 1939, Hitler was considering 
the possibility of military operations in Poland, On 
April 3, 1939, the Ftfhrer, through the High Command of the 
Armed Forces (O.K.W.), issued a directive on war prepara­
tions, Annexed to it was a plan containing the details of 
Fall Weiss (Case White), the projected attack on Poland. 
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg. 3.
10?
with Great Britain and Prance through the conclusion of 
mutual assistance treaties. State Secretary WeizsIJcker 
immediately telegraphed instructions to the German Embassy 
in Ankara to contact Turkish State Secretary Menemencioglu 
and inform him of Germany*s displeasure should Turkey aban- 
don strict neutrality. About two weeks later, the German 
Embassy notified Berlin that the Turkish government de­
nied that it was Involved in any such negotiations9 and
furthermore, would continue to reject an assistance treaty
2with any great power.
The German Foreign Ministry had several reservations 
about these assurances. It was well aware through the Tur­
kish press that the Turks had not sympathized with Ger­
many’s action in Czechoslovakia, and even less with Italy's
3action in Albania. The Germans received Information 
during April that the Turks were eontlnuelng their talks 
with the Western Powers. The principal topic was possible 
defensive measures that Turkey could put into effect with 
the aid of Great Britain in the event of an Axis attack in 
the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Berlin 
reasoned that Turkey would maintain neutrality, only as long 
as southeast Europe remained clear of conflict between the
2 DoG.F.P.. Series D, VI, 8^, On April the Tur­
kish Ambassador Hamdi Arpag personally called on Ribben­
trop and stated that Turkey was not adopting a favorable 
attitude towards Great Britain's attempt at encirclement 
of Germany. Ibid.. 188-89,
3 Italy invaded Albania on April 7, 1939,
1 09
l|,major powers. In an attempt to counter the moves by Great 
Britain and France to extend their encirclement of Germany 
by an alliance with Turkey, the Germans increased their 
press propaganda and economic pressure. But more impor­
tant, Franz von Papen was appointed by Hitler as Ambassador 
Kto Turkey.
Upon arriving in Ankara on April 2?» Papen began a
series of talks with Turkish officials aimed at a reorien­
tation of that country along German lines. But it soon
became clear that Turkey was definitely drifting into
the British sphere of influence. Turkish President Ismet 
InSntt told Papen that it was Italy*s actions that were most 
instrumental in determining the outcome of the Anglo-Turkish 
negotiations. IniJnti stated that Italy had been following 
an unfriendly policy towards Turkey since the Ethiopian 
Campaign and that relations between the countries were 
slowly deteriorating as was evident in the question of pos­
session of the small Islands of the Dodecanese, and more 
recently the Italian occupation of Albania. In respect to 
Albania, Turkey was especially alarmed at the size of the
D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 355-56.
^ Kilic, Turkey. 6?. For further information on the 
economic pressure, see Chapter II, p. 37, Papen*s appoint­
ment to Ankara was based on several reasons: his previous
military experience in Turkey during World War I; his po­
litical astuteness shown by his prominent roles in both 
Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship and the annexa­
tion of Austria.
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Italian garrison. Therefore, the Turkish government felt
that It was obliged to secure Its position even if it meant
alignment with Great Britain, Papen cautioned the Presi-
dent that any commitment by Turkey to the Western Powers
would probably draw the Turks one step closer to war, but
Intfntt answered that, personally, he discounted the pos-
7sibility of war.
At the conclusion of the interview Papen telegraphed 
Berlin that it should advise Rome to Inform Ankara of 
Italy’s peaceful intentions in the Balkans and announce a 
reduction of Its troops in Albania, Papen hoped that such 
action would forestall the conclusion of a mutual assistance 
pact, but such preventive moves by the Axis were too late.
On May 2, 1939» Turkey signed with Great Britain a declara­
tion which stated that the two countries would soon conclude 
a long-term treaty and in the meantime would cooperate on a
mutual aid basis if an act of aggression occurred leading
8to war in the Mediterranean area.
Initially Italy had occupied Albania with 20,000 
men, but by the end of April, this number had risen to 
72,000. D.G.P.P.„ Series D, VI, *K>8.
^ Ihido 9 *1-08-09 o Indntt also added that "if Germany 
expected a world war, she would have to make Italy march 
twenty-four hours ahead of herself, to be sure of Italian 
participation,"
O Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 76-7, France 
would have signed the declaration if problems had not arisen 
with the Turkish government concerning the cession of the 
Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta). The difficulty was soon 
resolved, and on June 23, 1939, a Franco-Turkish declaration 
was announced in terms similar to the Anglo-Turkish decla­
ration. For the text of the declaration, see Documents on 
Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War. (Berlin, 1939), 321.
Ill
Several days after the conclusion of the declaration,
Papen visited State Secretary Menemencioglu who stated that,
though It was correct that the agreements, except for minor
details, had been completed, there was still some question
concerning when the declaration would be presented to the
National Assembly for approval. The State Secretary assured
Papen that it was directed towards Italy, not Germany.
Further, it was purely defensive in character and designed
to quiet anxiety in the Mediterranean and contribute towards
the general peace. The German Ambassador expressed Berlin*s
displeasure with the entire affair and its hope that Turkey
and Italy would soon be able to resolve their differences.
The Secretary replied that Italian duplicity had gone too
9far for any such event in the near future.
On May 12, 1939. the Turkish National Assembly ap­
proved the declaration of May 2. Turkey had moved from 
Its position of absolute neutrality into the camp of the 
Western Powers, However, all was not lost on the German 
side, for a definite pact with Great Britain had not yet 
been concluded. Papen informed Berlin that it was highly 
possible that the future pact could be restricted in its 
scope by German counter measures and suggested that a way
9 D.G.F.P.„ Series D, VI, ^37-38. Italian Foreign 
Minister Ciano believed that Turkish hostility was also 
directed toward Germany; see Galeazzo Ciano, The Cla.no 
Diaries. 1939-19*1-3. (New York, 19^6), 85.
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be found for the Italian threat to be reduced in the area
10of the Dodecanese, but primarily in Albania.
During June, Ambassador Papen met several times with 
both the Turkish President and State Secretary. Following 
instructions from Berlin, Papen expressed Germany's sur­
prise and displeasure with Turkey's move towards Great 
Britain, He told the Turks that the Wilhelmstrasse viewed
the Declaration a definite move by their country to asso-
11ciate itself with the policy of the encirclement powers.
The Turkish officials denied any such implication and
repeatedly stated that their policy was only designed to
serve Turkish security in the Mediterranean and was in no
12way intended to damage German Interests,
In Berlin, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop met with the 
Turkish Ambassador Arpag and discussed the recent Anglo- 
Turkish Declaration, The Foreign Minister was particularly 
annoyed by the fact that Turkey had told the German Ambas­
sador during April that it had no intention of abandoning 
its neutrality; only two weeks later Germany was faced with 
a fait accompli. Ribbentrop warned the Ambassador that if 
it should appear that Turkey was pursuing an aggressive pol­
icy, there could be serious repercussions* Arpag quickly
10 ILGjJhP., Series D, VI, 5¥Ml<5.
Refers to Great Britain and France and their 
policy of trying to surround Germany by the conclusion of 
military treaties.
12 D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 66?.
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assured the Foreign Minister that the declaration "was
13an agreement directed not towards, but against, aggression," 
After receiving the Turkish Ambassador’s report con­
cerning the conversation with Ribbentrop, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Saracoglu questioned Papen about its significance, 
Papen told him that Berlin wanted to make clear the serlousi­
ness of the situation that had arisen as a consequence of 
the new Turkish policy, Saracoglu stated that he hoped 
Germany would soon decide if there was to be a change in 
its relations with Turkey, for this "policy of suspense" 
was not appreciated by the Turkish government, Papen an­
swered that he would inform the Turkish Foreign Ministry
Ikif there were any change.
Several days later, the German Ambassador was told by
Menemencioglu that a Franco-Turkish declaration analogous
to the Anglo-Turkish declaration was soon to be concluded,
Papen mentioned to the State Secretary that Berlin would
consider it a friendly act if the reference to the Balkan
Pact, which appeared in the Anglo-Turkish agreement, were
15left out of the Franco-Turkish declaration. He explained
DoGcF.P,, Series D, VI, 673.
^  Ibid,, 709.
15 Papen was referring to paragraph 6 of the Anglo- 
Turkish Declaration which stated: "The two Governments
recognize that it is also necessary to ensure the estab­
lishment of security in the Balkans and they are consulting 
together with the object of achieving that purpose as 
speedily as possible. Ibid., 636.
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that the omission of the paragraph would be regarded by 
the Wilhelmstrasse as evidence that Turkey was not attemp- 
ting to draw the other states of the Balkan Entente into 
the encirclement against the Axis. Menemencioglu answered 
that such an act was impossible. An identical text had 
already been agreed upon, and the omission of the paragraph 
would only cause assertions that the Franco-Turkish Decla­
ration was substantially restricted as compared with the 
Anglo-Turkish Declaration, The State Secretary further 
stated that the paragraph in point merely meant that the 
Balkans were a Turkish sphere of Interest and was not an 
attempt at collective security with the help of Great 
Britain and France, Berlin was not pleased with the Tur­
kish position; however, it did nothing further to prevent 
the agreement, and on June 23 the declaration was conclu­
ded.16
While Turkey negotiated with Great Britain and France 
throughout the summer for the conclusion of a definite 
pact, Germany attempted to limit the extent of Turkey’s 
commitments, Papen gave State Secretary Menemencioglu con­
stant warnings that Turkey should not, as advised by 
Great Britain, guarantee Rumania’s frontiers, as it would 
be viewed as an unfreindly act in Berlin. The State Sec­
retary explained that his country did not unilaterally 
guarantee any frontiers; however, if Rumania was attacked
16 D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 764.
and it was supported by Great Britain, then the Turkish 
treaty would also come into operation,
By the end of July 1939» Papen*s efforts to persuade 
the Turks to limit the forthcoming treaties seemed to be 
resulting in some success, Turkey had abandoned the pro­
posed bipartite British and French pacts and had decided 
to conclude a tripartite pact. The Ambassador felt that 
this arrangement provided the Turks with greater elasti­
city, and Turkey could, if the situation occurred, "raise 
objections with one of the partners to the policy of the
third if it became too burdensome to her own interests and 
18obligations,"
With the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression 
Pact on August 25* Berlin instructed Papen to find if there 
had been a change in Turkish policy, specifically if the 
Turks had returned, as Germany desired, to a position of 
strict neutrality. In a. conversation with Papen, President 
Intott stated that though his country was impressed by the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, Turkey would still act in its own inter­
ests, And though Turkey hoped to remain neutral, if a con­
flict occurred, it could not withdraw from its treaty ob­
ligations, Papen pointed out that the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
had profoundly changed the balance of power in Europe and 
that a blockade of the Axis was no longer possible. There-
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fore, he advised the President to withdraw his country from 
the policy of encirclement* Intfntt answered that if war 
did occur, then Italy would likely sooner or later join 
against the Western Powers and endanger Turkey’s position 
in the eastern Mediterranean* It was because of this pos­
sibility that Turkey had entered into agreements with
19Great Britain and France,
Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1 had no 
immediate effect on Turkey’s attitude towards the pro- 
posed tripartite pact* Foreign Minister Saracoglu men­
tioned to Papen that he hoped Turkey would be able to stay 
outside a European war but reiterated that his country’s 
reaction depended on Italy* Of more importance to the Turks 
in relation to the negotiations with Great Britain and 
France were the actions of their northern neighbor - Russia* 
As a result of a previous Russo-Turkish treaty, the 
Turks were faced with the possibility that their agreements 
with Great Britain and France which were likely to be for­
malized in a Tripartite Pact might lead Russia and Turkey 
20into war. Thus, in early September, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Saracoglu visited Moscow in an attempt to explain
19 - Series D, VII, 189-90.
20 According to the terms of the Russo-Turkish Non- 
Aggression Pact of 1925* Turkey could not conclude any 
alliance or agreement with a third country or group of 
countries if it were directed against the military and 
maritime security of the Soviet Union* D.G.F.P„„ Series 
D, VIII, 115*
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the situation to the Soviets and to propose the conclusion 
of an assistance pact between Turkey and Russia which would 
apply to the Straits and the Balkans. Stalin informed 
German Ambassador Schulenburg of the negotiations and 
added that the Turkish government wanted the inclusion of 
a restrictive clause stating that Turkey would not be re­
quired to aid the Soviet Union in actions directed against 
Great Britain and France
In his reply to the Soviet government, Ribbentrop 
stated Germany's objection to the proposed Tripartite Pact 
and added that Turkey might hesitate to conclude the agree­
ment if pressured by Russia, In reference to the proposed 
Russo-Turklsh pact, Ribbentrop felt that basically the 
instrument would not be in the interest of Germany because 
of the implications it would contain towards Germany and 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Therefore, if the Soviet Union con­
cluded such a pact with Turkey, Berlin would demand that a
22reservation in Germany’s favor be included,
Schulenburg relayed this information to Molotov who 
stated that though Russia agreed with Berlin and was attemp­
ting to shape Turkish opinion into the same channel, it 
appeared that Turkey was too closely involved with Great
Pi Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 97 <>
99 BoGoFoPo, Series D, VIII, ll*f~l6, Ribbentrop 
further objected that even if the treaty contained the 
reservation in Germany’s favor, it would in practice be 
directed entirely against Italy and Bulgaria, both of 
which were close friends of Germany,
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Britain and France for a complete abort of the Tripartite
Pact, However, Molotov added, his government would attempt
to ’’neutralize" the terms of both the proposed Tripartite
23and Russo-Turkish Pacts ,
During the first week of October* the Turkish gov­
ernment, in hopes of smoothing relations between Germany
and Turkey, appointed a. new Ambassador to Berlin, HtJsrev 
2kGerede, This move did not change the Turkish attitude 
toward either the Tripartite Pact or the Russo-Turkish 
Pact, and negotiations continued. Nevertheless, it soon 
became apparent that Turkey’s talks with Russia were run­
ning into difficulties.
On October 9* Schulenburg informed the German Foreign 
Office that Molotov had mentioned that the chances for the 
conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Russia and 
Turkey were not good. The principal block was that the 
Soviet government had specifically told the Turks that it 
had to safeguard German interests; therefore, the clause 
in favor of the Germans would have to be included in any 
assistance pact. But, he added, the possibility still 
existed that the pact might be concluded, as Turkey had 
not made a final decision,
D0G,,FoP,, Series D, VIII, 200; and Sontag, Nazi- 
Soviet Relations, 113,
2k Httsrev Gerede, Turkish diplomatist; Ambassador 
to Germany‘ 1939-19^2; had fought with German forces during 
World War I and was notably pro-German,
25 DqG-FcPo, Series D, VIII, 2kk and 280,
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On October 17, the Turkish delegation headed by 
Foreign Minister Saracoglu left Moscow., No agreement had 
been reached,, Schulenburg reported that he had been in­
formed by Molotov that Turkey's position still was not 
clear, and the Turks probably wanted time to consider all
aspects. Two days later, in answer to Germany and Russia,
26the Anglo-Franeo-Turkish Tripartite Pact was signed.
The Tripartite Pact brought Turkey firmly into the 
Allied camp. According to its terms, Turkey was to be 
assisted by the Allies in the event it was attacked by a 
European power. The Turks would assist the Allies if there 
were an outbreak of war in the Mediterranean caused by a 
European power, or if Britain and France should have to 
enter a conflict because of the promises given Greece and 
Rumania in April, 1939* Turkey also agreed to assume a 
position of benevolent neutrality in any other cases in­
volving an attack upon either Great Britain or France, 
However, Turkey's obligations were qualified by a protocol
which allowed it to refrain from taking any action invol-
2 7ving the possibility of war with Russia,
According to Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 1̂ , 
the Russo-Turkish talks failed "mainly over Russian demands 
(1) that the treaty should not involve the U„S,S,R, in 
taking part in a war against Germany, and (2) that Turkey 
should deny passage through the Straits to warships and 
transports other than those of Black Sea Powers,”
Shotwell, Straits. 133”3̂ * For the complete text 
of the Tripartite Pact, see League of Nations Treaty Series, 
Vol, 200, l6?-75*
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The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was not happily 
received by the Wilhelmstrasse, On November 3» Ribbentrop 
instructed Papen to inform the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Saracoglu that Berlin considered the Pact a violation of 
Turkey*s responsibilities as a neutral power and "an in-
✓>oternational affront to Germany," Saracoglu answered with 
the familiar statement that the Pact was not against Ger­
many, but merely a defensive measure, Further, Turkey
had wished to limit the extent of the Pact, but the Allied
2 9Powers had refused, Ribbentrop also talked with Turkish 
Ambassador Gerede and accused Turkey of advocating the en­
circlement policies of the Allies, Gerede denied any such 
implications and stated that Berlin5s information was 
simply not correct. Throughout the remainder of the Phony 
War, Germany followed a policy of neutrality towards Tur­
key and worked to insure that any attempt on the part of
the Turks to fulfill their duties under the Tripartite Pact
20would be checked by a fear of the Soviet Union, J 
28 D.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII, 372,
^  Ibid,, 389, Specifically, Turkey had wanted to 
limit Article 3 which stated: "So long as the guarantees
given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rou- 
mania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 
1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively 
with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all 
aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France 
and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in 
virtue of either of the said guarantees.1'
Ibid,, 27-8, The Phony War was the period be­
tween the defeat of Poland and the invasion of Norway,
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With the conquest of Norway and the following inva­
sion of France, the attitude of Turkey became of great 
importance to Germany, The Germans felt that should Italy 
enter the War and conduct its operations either in France 
or the Balkans that the Turkish Army would surely move 
against the Italians in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, 
Consequently, the Wehrmacht might be forced to over-extend 
its available man-power and endanger the chances for final 
victory. Thus, the Ftthrer attempted throughout the initial 
phases of the French Campaign to keep Mussolini out of the 
conflict, at least temporarily,-̂1
When the extent of the German successes in France 
became evident during the latter part of May, the Turkish 
government began to modify its stand on how strictly the 
Tripartite Pact would be interpreted if Italy took an 
active role In the war. On June 2, Turkish Prime Minister 
Seydam released a statement on the European conflict which 
avoided any mention of the treaty with Great Britain and 
France, Also, an editorial appeared in the Turkish news­
paper Tan, previously anti-Italian, which commented that 
"if a belligerent Italy were to confine operations to the 
French frontier, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean - 
Turkey’s ’security area* - might still remain outside the
31 Wilhelm Keitel, The Memoirs of FIeld-Marshal 
Keitel, (New York, 1965), 111; and D.G.F.P.. Series D,
IX, 513-1**.
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32war." On June 10, 19*K), Italy declared war on the Allies. 
Turkey now had to make a decision.
Four days later, the Turkish government issued a 
confidential statement to the Germans which said in effect 
that if Turkey entered the war at the present time, there 
was a definite chance that it might result in a Russo-Tur- 
kish war. Therefore, Turkey had decided to put into effect 
Protocol No. 2 of the Tripartite Pact and preserve its 
position of neutrality.-^ Berlin was relieved by Turkey’s 
assumption of neutrality, for it could now turn its full 
attention to the invasion of Great Britain without fear 
of immediate involvement in the Balkans.
Prior to 1939 * Germany did not particularly eoncern 
Itself with the position of Turkey, for the Turks were fol­
lowing a neutral policy. However, when the Nazis began 
planning the invasion of Poland and the Turks started 
moving in the direction of alignment with the Western Powers, 
the importance of a neutral Turkey became clear to the 
Wilhelmstrasse. A close association with the West would 
force the Germans to take Turkey’s position into serious 
account in the event of a European war. In an attempt to 
change Turkey’s views, Papen was sent to Ankara as the Ger­
man Ambassador.
Quoted from Survey, Neutrals, 3̂ 7*
^  P.GoF.P... Series D, IX, 566. This protocol stated 
that Turkey would not be compelled by its obligations under 
the Tripartite Pact to take any action resulting in an armed 
conflict with the Soviet Union.
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Papen’s arrival came too late to forestall the Anglo- 
Turkish Declaration,, However, he continued working to stop 
the conclusion of a more encompassing and definitive treaty 
and at the same time tried to bring Turkey?s views closer 
to those held by Berlin, Initially, the Ambassador was 
unsuccessful due to Turkish fear of Italian motives in the 
eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and the promises of 
aid which the Western Powers offered if there were a war 
in Turkey’s "security area,” After the conclusion of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, Berlin realized that one trump card 
existed short of invasion which could possibly control the 
sway of Turkish foreign policy - fear of an expansion- 
minded Russia, With this in mind, the Wilhelmstrasse 
attempted to prevent a Russo-Turklsh treaty.
The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was a disappoint­
ment to Berlin, but considering that it followed the failure 
of Russo-Turklsh negotiations and was worded so that it was 
not an actual threat to Germany, the Pact was definitely 
not a complete defeat from Berlin’s point of view. The 
German Foreign Ministry figured that the mere thought of a 
Russian Straits would be sufficient to keep Turkey in the 
role of a neutral, and it was., proved correct.
CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN - TURKISH FRIENDSHIP TREATY 
19^0 - 19*H
Italy * s declaration of wax and Turkey’s refusal to 
furnish actiye aid to the Allies in June 19^0 caused the 
Third Reich to begin pursuing ways to draw Turkey closer 
to the Axis orbito The geographical importance of Tur­
key was apparent to the Germans, especially in relation 
to operations in the direction of the Suez Canal, Ber­
lin was anxious to gain concessions for the transit of 
war materials and troops, if necessary into the Near 
East,^ And it would be much easier if the Germans were
 ̂ The Near East is analogous to the British Middle 
East and includes Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and the countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula,
12k
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allowed to traverse Turkish territory,, As a move in this 
direction, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop attempted to 
force the replacement of Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoglu,
In July 1940 , the German Foreign Ministry began the 
publishing of a sixth German White Book consisting of 
French military and diplomatic documents which had been 
captured during the French Campaign, The documents 
given the greatest attention by the Germans were those 
allegedly containing information on plans for Allied opera­
tions in the Near East, and most significantly, against the 
Russian oil fields located in the Caucasus, Concerning 
the operations in the Caucasus, the Germans made a special
effort to emphasize the role supposedly played by France’s
2Ambassador in Ankara, Rene Masslgli, and Turkish Foreign
Minister Sukru Saracoglu, According to the White Book,
Masslgli had had an interview with Saracoglu in which the
latter suggested that air attacks on the Russian oil fields
3take off from a base within Turkey, Consequently, the Ger­
man propaganda machine was now demanding Saracoglu*s dismissal. 
The Turkish government denied emphatically that either 
it or any of its ministers had been involved in any dealings
2 Rene Masslgli, (1888- ), Ambassador to Turkey
1938-1940,
 ̂ Kilie, Turkey, 84; and D,G,F.P,, Series D, X, 124- 25, In view of this informatlon Ribbentrop was also con­
sidering demanding the removal of Masslgli from his post 
through the German-French Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden,
The French Ambassador was soon recalled, but whether or not 
for this specific reason, I do not know.
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of that type. Turkish Prime Minister Seydam publicly 
stated that his country's policy had been and was directed 
solely towards guarding its own Interests and had never 
suggested that such an act be directed against Russia.
It soon became evident that, in spite of Ribbentrop*s 
accusations. Turkey was not going to dismiss Saracoglu 
without a complete investigation.
The Foreign Minister had built his image within the 
government to such an extent that Seydam was hesitant to 
oust him unless the Prime Minister was prepared to accept 
responsibility for the alleged incident. And more impor­
tantly. the Turkish public, in light of the capitulations 
following the First World Wax, was extremely touchy about 
doing anything which might be considered the result of 
pressure by a European power. One official in the Turkish
Foreign Ministry asked Papon: "Why are you creating a
ksecond Delcasse case?" Ambassador Papen denied that there 
was any parallel with the present situation and added that 
the Third Reich was not concerned over who conducted Tur- 
kish Foreign Policy.
k D.G.F.P., Series D, X, 233* The Delcasse case 
refers to the First Moroccan Crisis, 1905-1906, in which 
William II of Germany made speeches in Tangiers calling for 
free trade and equality in Moroccan affairs. The German 
Foreign Office then suggested an International conference 
to bring reform and guard interests of countries interested 
in Morocco. Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, who was 
looking for French ascendency there, opposed the German 
plan. However, the French cabinet was not in agreement 
with Delcasse, and he was forced to resign.
K Considering what had happened, Papen surely must
12?
Berlin soon realized that Turkey could not be coerced 
Into removing Saracoglu„ Turkey Indicated that it was 
willing to fight even if pressure were brought by Russia,' 
though no pressure appeared from that sector* And in 
these circumstances, the German Foreign Office let the 
matter drop*^
At the beginning of the Battle of Britain in August 
1940, Germany realized that this campaign would be greatly 
benefitted if the Axis were able to attack the British 
Empire at different points of its vital interests* Speci­
fically, a joint German-Italian operation against the 
Empire in the Near and Middle East* It was obvious that 
a friendly Turkey would be an asset to any such operations, 
for the Turks could present an unpleasant threat to the 
flank of any military movements in that direction* So 
throughout the following months, Berlin tried to bring a 
recalcitrant Turkey into a closer association with the 
Axis* However, these efforts by Germany soon received 
a definite setback*
Italy’s invasion of Greece on October 28 posed a 
direct threat to the sovereignty of Turkey. Turkish
have said this with 1 tongue-in-cheek”, but nevertheless 
he said it. Ibid,
6 In his memoirs, Papen flatly disavowed any major 
role in Ribbentrop*s plot, Papen, Memoirs, *1-63-64, However, 
it is evident in the official messages he sent to the Ger­
man Foreign Office that he played a vital role*
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officials questioned Papen on the effect that the Italian-
Greek war would have on German policy* He replied that
Berlin felt that it was Italy's concern and that the
Italians could solve the problem through their own means.
However, Germany wanted to make clear that If Great Britain
opened a front in Greece, the Reich would likely recon-
7sider its position.
On November 29, Papen met with President Indntt and 
extended overtures for Turkish cooperation in the New Order. 
The Ambassador stated that he was authorized by Berlin to 
offer Turkey assurances on the same basis as those given by 
Great Britain in the Tripartite Pact. Germany realized that 
Turkey's commitments to Britain were completely defensive 
and felt that the assurances of the Axis Powers added to 
those of the British would surely meet with the approval of 
the Turkish people. Also, Turkey would not have to accept 
a British victory as the only answer. Inbntt asked the Am­
bassador what Germany's position was in respect to peace 
in the Balkans. Papen answered that, as previously stated, 
Berlin had complete confidence in Italy's ability but 
would intervene if a British front were created in the
Balkans. When asked what was meant by a British front,
8Papen said the presence of operational forces.
7 Series D, XI, 679-80.
8 Ibid.. 742-^3. Actually, at this time, the situa­
tion was not good for the Italians, and Great Britain was 
sending as much aid as possible. Thus, Papen*s statement 
as much as meant that Germany would take action in the Balkans,
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The President stated that Turkey hoped the Germans 
would not find it necessary to extend military operations 
into the Balkans,, But he was Interested in the authenticity 
of the rumors that the Third Belch would invade Greece In 
order to save the situation for the Italians. Papen ad­
mitted there was a. vague possibility but assured the Presi­
dent that if it did occur, Germany would protect Turkey’s 
interests. In reference to the assurances offered by Ger­
many, InCntt mentioned Turkey’s profound distrust of Italy. 
The German Ambassador replied that Germany would be guaran­
tor of any assurances and that Italy would pose no problems. 
In closing, Papen pointed out that though the European war 
was not over, it was reaching a, turning point; thus, it was 
important for the Turks not to hesitate too long before 
deciding on a definite course of action. The President 
stated that he would instruct Foreign Minister Saracoglu
to contact Papen after a serious consideration of Berlin’s 
9suggestions.
On December 2, Saracoglu met with Papen. The Foreign
Minister stated that his government was interested in the
New Order in Europe as presented by the Axis and would
probably like to take an active role, especially concerning
problems In the Balkans and the Near East. However, he
added the Axis would have to guarantee the sovereignty of
10Turkey and Its zones of interest. Also the Turks would
 ̂ DoGoFoP.„ Series D, XI, 7̂ 3«
1 0 The zones, of course, were the Balkans & eastern Med­
iterranean.
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not care to negotiate with Italy. Papen answered that all
decisions would he made in consultation with the Italians,
hut he would try to arrange for the negotiations to he con-
11ducted hy Germany.
Two weeks later, State Secretary Menemencioglu ques-
tioned Ambassador Papen concerning the state of the political
conversations. Papen replied that Berlin had not sent any
further instructions and was most likely awaiting the out-
12come of the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations. Menemencio'glu 
accepted the explanation, hut little did he suspect the 
true reason for Berlin’s hesitancy.
On December 13, 19^0, Hitler issued Directive No. 20, 
’Operation Marita’ - the invasion of Greece, The German 
Foreign Ministry knew that this military operation placed 
the proposed German-Turkish negotiations in a different 
light. The Turks did not want further intervention in the 
Balkans and had even stated that a peaceful southeastern 
Europe was a basis for talks with the Germans. Therefore, 
Berlin evidently felt that any further attempts to draw 
Turkey closer to the Axis would he wasted until the Ital- 
ian-Greek conflict was resolved. So, for the next several 
months, the Germans directed their efforts in Turkey towards
11 P.GcF.P,. Series D, XI, 7 6 k,
1 2 Turkey was attempting to bring Bulgaria into a 
closer association with the Balkan Entente, hut was un­
successful.
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assuring its neutrality during the forthcoming German 
13intervention,,
During March 1941, a political revolution occurred in
Iraq supported by the Axis, By the end of the month, the
1Regent, Abdul Ilah, fled from Baghdad, and pro-Nazi 
Rashid Ali1  ̂assumed the premiership on April 4, Immedi­
ately, Rashid All contacted Papen In Ankara and asked for 
military aid, Germany was anxious to aid the rebels; how­
ever, it was busy in Greece and, more importantly, Berlin 
would have to secure the right of transit for arms and 
troops through Turkey in order to give their cohorts suffi­
cient support. Thus, Berlin decided to wait until the con­
clusion of the Balkan Campaign before turning its attention 
to the problem in Iraq,
It did not take the Nazi war machine long to add 
Yugoslavia and Greece to its list of occupied countries.
By April 24, both areas had capitulated to Germany, and 
the following day Papen met with Turkish Ambassador Gerede
F0r a more detailed discussion of Germany’s 
political policies in Turkey from January - March 1941, 
see Chapter i: , pp, 21-24,
14 ,Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq 1939-1941; was the
maternal uncle of the Infant King Faisal II,
Rashid All el-Gailani, Premier of Iraq March 
1940-January 1941, and Aprll-May 1941; fled to Germany 
after the failure of the revolt; sentenced to death in 
absentia,; after the war was granted asylum in Saudia Arabia,
1 £
George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 
(New York, 1953)# 224-25, [Hereafter cited as Lenczowski,
The Middle East,]
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to discuss the possiblity of a German-Turkish mutual treaty0
The German Ambassador brought up the question of Iraq and
asked Gerede If Turkey would be willing to back that coun-
17try’s desire to gain independence. Gerede answered that 
though he hoped that Germany and Turkey would pursue a 
parallel policy concerning the Near Eastern Arab States, 
he was not certain whether the treaty with Great Britain 
allowed Turkey to make any agreement with the Germans re­
garding Iraq. However, he personally would support any
l8German proposals In that connection.
In Berlin, there was a definite move to bring Turkey
into closer relations with the Third Reich. On May k t
Hitler delivered an address to the Reichstag in which he
praised the inspired leaders of the Turkish Republic and
the achievements they had made since the defeat of the First
World War, The Ftthrer also complimented Turkey’s realistic
attitude in preserving its independence and not, such as
19Yugoslavia, following the wishes of the British,  ̂ In line 
with this policy, Ambassador Papen was recalled to Germany
17 Actually, Iraq had gained its full independence In 
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, However, it was obvious 
from the terms of the treaty that Great Britain was the 
most favored nation and obtained many rights within Iraq 
not enjoyed by oi:her nations. It was probably this fact 
that caused Papen to refer to Iraq as not independent.
For a discussion of the treaty’s major provisions, see 
Lenczowski, The Middle East, 219-20.
18 D-Cr.F.P., Series D, XII, 637“38.
19 Ibid., 1021.
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and directed to acquire the right to ship arms for Iraq
across Turkey,
Upon returning to Ankara, Papen was visited by the
20Iraqi War Minister, Naji Shawkat, The Minister informed 
Papen that the Gailani government in Iraq was still deter­
mined to resist British attempts to restore the former 
government to power,, Nevertheless, he hoped that Turkey 
could be persuaded to continue mediation of the dispute if 
only to gain time. Papen agreed that Turkish mediation 
should continue, for it would allow more time for the mo­
bilization of German-Italian assistance. In addition, it 
might impair Anglo-Turkish relations. However, the Ambas­
sador pointed out, in the present circumstances the Axis 
would have a difficult time sending adequate military
assistance to Iraq. But it was hoped that this question
21would be settled very soon.
On May 16, Ambassador Papen met with Foreign Minister 
Saracoglu and discussed German-Turkish relations. Papen 
stated that Berlin was extremely interested in sending war 
munitions to Iraq. And he had been directed to inquire if 
they could be shipped through Turkey. Germany would demand 
absolute security of the transit route. However, he added 
that the war materials would be addressed to Iran so that 
Turkey would be guarded against any obvious violation of
20 Sayid Naji Shawkat. Iraqi War Minister, April-
May 19^1.
21 PoG.F.P.. Series D, XII, 812.
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its treaty with Great Britain* Saracoglu made no Initial 
objection to these proposals and said that he would present 
them to his government,, But he said that if it was recep­
tive to Germany's proposals, it would first be necessary to 
contact the British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen and in­
form him that Turkey felt it necessary to clarify its posl-
22tlon towards the Third Belch,
After reading the report of the conversations, Ribben­
trop instructed Papen to conduct oral negotiations aimed 
at the conclusion of an open treaty with Turkey plus a 
secret protocol which would allow Germany the right of un­
limited shipment of war munitions through Turkey. Also, 
the German Foreign Minister told the Ambassador to explain 
that the treaty Turkey had concluded with France and Great 
Britain wa.s no longer of any value, France had been de­
feated and Britain was in no position to render effective 
aid to Turkey, Furthermore, France was moving towards the 
German side. Thus, the agreement had lost both Its legal 
and practical foundations, Bibbentrop believed that if 
nothing else,-Turkey would be able to explain the proposed 
treaty with Germany on reasons of self-preservation, in 
view of the fact that Britain could no longer supply sup­
port against the supposed German and actual Russian danger. 
In regard to the Russian threat, Papen was directed to state 
that G@rma.ny would provide sufficient protection to the
22 D.GoFoP o, Series D, XII, 828.
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23Turks. v And as a final incentive the German Ambassador was
to mention the possibility that some land near Adrianople
and one or more Islands in the Aegean might be given to 
pitTurkeyo
The following day, Papen telegraphed Berlin and told 
the Foreign Minister that evidently he had misinterpreted 
the Ambassador’s previous reports, for it would not be easy 
to effect such an extensive treaty with Turkey, In fact 
it would be impossible at the present time to conclude a 
treaty which would allow Germany to ship through Turkey an 
amount of war material to be determined solely by the Ger­
mans, Papen admitted that he had said that InSntt was going 
to alter his relations with Britain, but this did not mean 
that the change would be immediate. Actually, it was im­
perative that Germany allow Turkey gradually to change its 
relations with the west for it would not be to Berlin’s 
advantage to try forcing Turkeys hand, Papen reminded 
Ribbentrop that since the start of the war, public opinion 
in Turkey had been in favor of a British victory simply on 
the basis of Italo-Turkish antagonism. Therefore, the
23 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 836-3?.
2l\- G,F,OoDo, Turkey, 10. There Is a close correlation 
between these documents and those contained in D,G,F.P,, 
Series D; however, occasionally they do differ. According 
to Jfickh, Rising Crescent. 250-51, Turkish Ambassador Gerede 
had been offered, in addition to the above, fifty per cent 
of the output of the Mosul oilfields and a fifteen - year 
mandate over Syria, if Turkey would permit Germany to 
transmit war materials across Turkish territory. However,
I found no other reference to this information.
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Wilhelmstrasse should continue along a moderate policy, be­
cause any flagrant disregard of Turkish national dignity 
could possibly result in a coup d1etat similar to the one 
in Yugoslavia.2'”’
Two days lapsed before Foreign Minister Ribbentrop 
replied to Papen9s communique, but in the telegram he agreed 
with the German Ambassador*s statements and cancelled the 
previous Instructions. Instead, the Foreign Minister dir­
ected the Ambassador to conduct the negotiations in several 
phases. Initially, the Foreign Ministry wanted an agreement 
permitting the passage of war material through Turkey.
Papen was Instructed to explain that the Turks would gain 
a guarantee of their national sovereignty and possibly ad­
ditional land. However, the Turkish government must under­
stand that Berlin wanted the right of unlimited transit, If
2 6the need should arise.
On May 20, Ambassador Papen presented Foreign Minister 
Saracoglu with a list of proposals and suggested that they 
be used as the basis for discussion. The documents con­
sisted of an open treaty defining the mutual understanding 
between the two countries. Along with three secret proto­
cols dealing with areas of land to go to Turkey at the con­
clusion of the war, transit of war materials, and a trade 
agreement. The Turkish negotiators agreed with the chief
25 D.G.F.P o, Series D, XII, 839-^1.
26 G.F.O.D.. Turkey. 13-15.
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points, although Menemencioglu felt that his government 
might be influenced by Great Britain. A question also 
arose concerning the French request for arms transit to 
Syria, Saracoglu indicated that a judicial situation 
existed due to the lapse of the Franco-Turki sh trade 
agreement, but that the transit request would be given
27every consideration by Turkey,
Several days later, Great Britain replied to Turkey's 
feelers on the negotiations with Germany, The British made 
such caustic remarks against Turkey's participation in the 
talks that Saracoglu expressed concern that they might break 
relations with Ankara, Thus, the Turkish Foreign Minister 
felt that it would be better for his government not to pro- 
vide any excuse for the world to think that Turkey broke 
its word with Britain, State Secretary Menemencioglu handed 
Papen a tentative declaration to be made public simultan­
eously with the proposed treaty which stated that Germany 
would not ask anything of the Turks incompatible with the 
Anglo-Turkish treaty. The German Ambassador objected to 
the declaration, because he felt that Berlin would probably 
have to be satisfied with oral promises concerning the 
transit of arms. The Turkish government then withdrew the 
declaration and stated that it could not give Germany even 
oral promises about the transit of arms. Papen argued that 
at least in regard to French-controlled Syria the Turks had
27 DoGoFoP*. Series D, XII, 866-67,
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a legal obligation, but he was rejected by the Turkish 
opinion thats "One must be In a position to reply to the 
English that nothing had been agreed upon which directly
28or indirectly might be aimed against the former allies, ”
Nevertheless, the next day Papen and Saracoglu drew
up a tentative agreement pending the approval of their
individual governments,, The open treaty merely stated
promises of non-aggression by each of the signatories, The
secret protocol, on the other hand, contained the changes
in Turkey's frontier which would be taken Into account at
the time of peace negotiations, Papen believed that the
political effect of the treaty on world opinion would be
far more important at that time than shipment of material
and, therefore, recommended that Berlin conclude the treaty.
The Ambassador reasoned that the proposed German-Turklsh
friendship agreement contained several aspects beneficial
to the Axis: it would appear to the other nations that the
final British ally in Europe had lost confidence in Britain's
ability to win the war; Great Britain could no longer count
on Turkey; and Britain's anticipated verbal attacks on Turkey
29would push the Turks closer to the German point of view, 
Ribbentrop9s reaction to Papen*s report was anything 
but agreeable. He criticized the Ambassador for promising 
Turkey areas of land and receiving nothing in return,
28 . Series D, XXI, 886-8?,
29 Ibid,. 887-89,
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Further, he stated, if Turkey were willing to allow shipment
of war material addressed to Afghanistan and Iran, then it
did not make sense why the Samsun-Teheran route through
Turkey should be the only one allowed for passage, espe-
cially in light of the fact that earlier Germany had trans-
30ferred materials to Iran via Iraq,
The German Ambassador defended every action he had 
taken during the negotiations. Generally, he felt that the 
Turkish government should not be forced into making conces­
sions which it could not justify before both world opinion, 
and more Importantly, its fellow-countrymen. If this did 
happen, there could very easily be a coup d’etat, Papen 
requested permission to continue the talks on the present 
basis. Ribbentrop refused to grant such authority and in­
structed him to adopt a, more demanding policy. However, 
the Ambassador was directed not to resume talks until 
June 2.
By the first part of June, the situation was completely 
reversed in Iraq. Britain had sent reinforcements from 
Palestine, aided by a motorized regiment from Transjordan, 
These troops fought several successful battles and by the
30 Turkey allowed the Axis to send small quantities 
of war materials to Iraq in a camouflaged manner. That is, 
the goods were addressed Iran or Afghanistan when actually 
they would end up in Iraq, Also, Turkey permitted the ship­
ment of aviation fuel (which it interestingly classified as 
non-war material) to Syria. DoG.FoP., Series D, XII, 88?, 
915o For disagreeing opinions, see Kilic, Turkey, 891; 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, 1?0„
31 DqG oF.P.. Series D, XII, 915.
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end of May entered Baghdad,, The rebellion was over. Berlin 
now took a different view of the German-Turkish negotia-
tions.^2
Foreign Minister Elbbentrop telegraphed Papen on June 1 
and informed him that due to the change of circumstances in 
Iraq during the last few days . Berlin was not interested in 
the transport of war materials across Turkey. Thus, a 
political treaty was no longer contingent on a commitment 
by the Turks. Ribbentrop instructed the Ambassador to 
notify Saracoglu that Germany was now in basic agreement 
with the previous proposals. Enclosed with the Foreign 
Minister's message was a separate telegram containing drafts 
of a treaty and a. secret protocol drawn up by Berlin* In 
the open treaty. Germany requested mutual promises of non- 
aggression and consultation over questions of common interest. 
And in the secret protocol, the Germans promised to guarantee 
Turkish sovereignty in the Straits, if Turkey would take into 
account the necessities of German shipping. Further, the 
Reich would consider Turkish territorial desires in south­
eastern Europe, at the conclusion of the p e a c e . 33
The following day. Papen questioned Ribbentrop as to 
the advisibility of the wording of Article 1. Though it
32 Due primarily to the Luftwaffe's commitment in 
Crete. Germany had not been able to provide much aid to 
the Rashid All regime. However, about fifty German planes 
did land in Iraq. Lenczowski. The Middle East. 226.
33 For the complete text of Ribbentropfs proposals, 
see D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 938-40.
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proposed a non-aggression pact for Germany, Turkey would be 
free to attack the Reich any place outside Germany’s national 
frontiers. Also, the Ambassador thought that the apticle 
should be constructed so that it precluded an attack on 
Turkey by any other power allied with the Third Reich, In 
answer, the Foreign Minister reminded Papen that the Axis 
was the master of Europe, and he was certain that Turkey 
was aware of this fact, Thus, the Third Reich had little 
fear of a Turkish attack. And concerning the second cri­
ticism, Berlin would have no objection if the Turkish gov­
ernment desired to protect its frontiers by concluding 
treaties with other nations, namely Italy,
Throughout the next week, negotiations continued be­
tween the two countries. Various phrases in the treaty 
drafts were added and deleted by mutual agreement. Berlin, 
however, would not budge on what it considered to be the 
essence of the treaty - neutrality on the part of Turkey,
On this point the Turkish government was willing to refrain 
from any military cooperation with Great Britain. But the 
Turks would not agree to abandon political discussions with 
the British because such talks could become absolutely 
necessary In cases like the administration of the Baghdad 
Railway if Britain occupied Syria.Ribbentrop accused
^  D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 952, 95^-56.
35 After the British victory in Iraq, it became likely 
that they would soon attack Vichy-controlled Syria. The 
Baghdad Railway was regarded by the Turks as their property,
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Turkey of trying to protect Itself from Germany while 
openly aiding Great Britain In Syria, However, Papen as­
sured the Foreign Minister that such was not the case. 
Turkey was only trying to protect its property and sin- 
cerely desired to assume a neutral position.
On June 1?, Papen reported to Berlin that he had 
compared treaty texts with Foreign Minister Saracoglu and 
except for a minor revision, both parties were in full 
agreement. The Ambassador stated that Turkey was prepared 
to conclude the agreement the following evening, and he 
requested authorization to sign the treaty. Ambassador 
Papen was immediately granted full powers, and the German- 
Turkish Friendship Treaty was concluded at Ankara, June 18, 
19^1»37
The treaty pleased the Germans, In it, the two states 
agreed to respect each other9s territory, to refrain from 
action, direct or indirect, against one another, and to 
settle all questions affecting their common interests by
and the fact that the route crossed the Turkish-Syrian fron 
tier four times would put transportation within Turkey on 
a precarious basis if Britain occupied Syria and the Turks 
were not able to negotiate with them. More importantly, 
since Turkey was cut off from Europe, the Baghdad Railway 
was the main connection with the outside world. On June 8, 
19^1» British troops invaded Syria and an armistice was 
signed on July 1*!-. However, Turkey was not forced to close 
the railway,
36 DqG,F,P, . Series D, XII, 102*1-25,
3 7 For the complete text of the treaty, see D,G.F,P,, 
Series D, XII, 1051*
14-3
peaceful means,, Germany, no doubt, would hare preferred 
a closer understanding with the Turks, But this might have 
necessitated military Intervention, Thus, Berlin settled 
for a neutral.Turkey to insure flank protection during the 
invasion of Russia on June 22.
Turkey’s failure to act during the advance of the Axis 
forces into France in the spring of 194-0 left Berlin with 
the idea that the Turks could be negotiated into a position 
of neutrality, if not into an outright alliance with Ger­
many. Ribbentrop took the first step when he unsuccessfully 
attempted to force the Turks into adopting an attitude 
favorable to the Germans by disgracing Saracoglu and the 
Turkish government.
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 194-0 dealt a 
blow to Nazi hopes of a German-Turkish alliance because of 
the mistrust Turkey felt for the Italians. However, the 
subsequent spectacular German conquest of the Balkans and 
the potential threat posed by the huge concentration of 
forces in Bulgaria caused the Turks to reconsider their 
position.
Berlin’s request for the right to transit war material 
across Turkish territory was carefully considered by Ankara, 
Personally, the Turks were favoraMe to the idea, but Great 
Britain, with whom they had a close alliance, objected 
vehemently. Turkey was caught between the two belligerents.
i M
Fortunately, the Germans withdrew their request, allegedly 
due to the failure of the Rashid Ali rebellion, and settled 
for the mildly worded Friendship Treaty,
The agreement was certainly less than Berlin wanted, 
but the Nazis had to be content unless they were willing 
to endanger the Russian campaign and divert substantial 
forces for an attack on Turkey, However, the Germans did 
receive one benefit from the agreement » a guarantee of 
Turkish neutrality. And, furthermore, if the Wehrmacht 
was successful in Russia, it would present such a threat 
to Turkey that unless the Turks wanted to suffer a similar 
fate, a close alliance with Germany would be the only 
reasonable alternative.
CHAPTER VII
THE EFFECT OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA 
ON GERMAN - TURKISH RELATIONS 19*H-19*14
As the Wehrmacht poured across the Russian frontiers 
from the Baltic to the Black Sea on Sunday morning, June 22, 
19*ML» there was great excitement throughout Turkey, The 
Turkish government, which had been deeply concerned over 
Russians hostile attitude and the definite possibility of 
a combined Russo-German operation against the Straits, now 
felt that it had been granted at least a temporary re­
prieve. Turkish public opinion regarded both Germany and 
Russia as actual threats to Turkish sovereignty and was 
anxious to see each side destroy the other. However, due 
to Its geographical position and the possibility of in­
vasion, Turkey was careful not to agitate either party.
1*1-5
\k6
Prior to the invasion of Russia, Hitler had con­
templated an advance from Bulgaria through Turkey to Suez, 
but because of British successes in the Near East, nothing 
was actually planned. At the end of June, the Ftthrer issued 
amendments to Directive No. 32 which concerned preparations 
for events after the defeat of Russia,.1 The directive 
called attention to the expected British buildup in the 
Near and Middle East, and ordered plans to be drawn up for 
the assembling in Bulgaria of adequate troops to cause 
Turkey’s capitulation either freely or through force.
Also, an offensive was to be planned from Transcaucasia 
against Iraq to be launched in conjunction with the one
through Turkey. Neither of these operations was to be put
2into effect until Russia was defeated. However, unaware 
of Hitler’s plans for the future, the Turkish government 
continued to express its satisfaction with the course of 
events in Russia.
In a, conversation with Foreign Minister Saracoglu 
and State Secretary Menemencioglu, Papen attempted to 
explain that it would be in Turkey’s self-interest, in 
view of its mistrust of Russia, to join with the Reich
1 Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 78-82. The actual dir­
ective had been issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
Wehrmacht on June 19. Whether or not the amendments con­
cerned Turkey, I do not know. But Trevor-Roper seems to 
indicate as much,
2 Francis H. Hinsley, Hitler’s Strategy. (Cam­
bridge, 1951) t 156. [Hereafter cited as Hinsley,
Strategy,]
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as soon as possible. He pointed to Great Britain's de­
cision to side with Russia and stated that the British, 
who never in the past had advocated European solidarity, 
must be considered a definite enemy of Europe, The Turkish 
statesmen were in sympathy with the ideas put forth by the 
Ambassador, but they were hesitant to commit their govern­
ment until the situation in Russia was clearer. Instead, 
they told Papen that for the present it was necessary to 
remain neutral, which placed a. limit on the extent of Tur­
key's collaboration with the Reich. But if in the future,
it developed that a closer alliance with Germany was in
3Turkey's interests, it would be assured.
As the Wehrmacht advanced deeper into Russia, the
definite possibility arose in the minds of many Turkish
generals and statesmen that Germany might soon win an
overwhelming victory. Also, there appeared a concern, es-
4pecially among the Pan-Turanians, for obtaining from the 
Germans guarantees of freedom for the millions of Turkish­
speaking peoples of the Soviet Union. Specifically, Pan- 
Turanian circles within Turkey wanted to create these areas 
with the exception of Azerbaijan,^ into an outwardly
3 Survey, Neutrals, 353•
4 A movement within Turkey consisting of government 
officials, army officers, and most importantly, the Turkish 
intelligensia, who desired a national unity for all the Turks 
in the world. They were especially interested in the area 
between the Black and the Caspian Seas, including the Crimea.
^ A region south of the Caucasus Mountains and west 
of the Caspian Sea. It is one of the world’s most famous 
oil-deposit areas.
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independent Turkish state which would serve as a buffer 
area between Russia and Turkey.
On August 5? Ambassador Papen reported to Berlin the 
existence of this movement. After explaining the general 
feelings within Turkey and the Turklsh-tspeaking areas to­
wards Pan-Turanianism, he recommended that Germany support 
the idea. Also, he attached great importance to the forma­
tion of a strong state in the area above the Caucasus.
About a week later, Ribbentrop answered Papen’s communiquS 
and explained what Berlin believed should be the aims of 
the German diplomatic effort in Turkey,
The Foreign Minister felt that until Russia was 
definitely smashed during the coming fall, the Embassy 
in Turkey should not pursue an overly aggressive policy.
He believed that no territorial demands should be made on 
Turkey, and on the contrary, that Papen should emphasize 
Turkey’s role as guardian of the Straits. Ribbentrop 
agreed with Papen’s view of the Pan-Turanian question, and 
suggested that Turkey’s introverted imperialistic tendencies 
be promoted by the Embassy. Further, he instructed the 
Ambassador to assume a negative attitude to all peace over­
tures and attempts at compromise, especially concerning 
Great Britain. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion 
that if every German mission abroad followed this policy, 
it would make it easier for Berlin to pursue Its objectives
1*1-9
In the future,
lOn August 25, Ribbentrop met with Turkish Ambassador 
Gerede and brought up the question of Turkey's official 
attitude toward the Turkish populations in the Caucasus. 
Gerede stated that Turkey was not interested in any ter­
ritories outside its boundaries, at least according to the 
present policy. The Ambassador further stated that the 
Pan-Turanian idea no longer existed in Turkey. The Foreign 
Minister did not press the topic but informed Papen later 
of the conversation.
7Early in September, a Pan-Turanian leader, Nurl Pasha/ 
visited German State Secretary WeizsSeker. Hurl Pasha 
explained his views on Pan-Turanianism and admitted that 
the movement was not as strong in Turkey as he and his
It had been reported through United States and Bri* 
tish radio and press reports during July that Ambassador 
Papen had started a peace offensive to begin after the con­
clusion of the Russian campaign. Papen, of course, denied 
the reports, and was supported by Paul Leverkuehn, German 
assistant military attache in Istanbul. D.G.F.P.. Series 
D, XIII, 207-08, 228-31, 305-06; and Ian Colvin, Chief of 
Intelligence, (London, 1951), 182. [Hereafter cited as 
Colvin, Chief of Intelligence,] The truth seems to be that 
Papen had advocated to the Nazi heirarchy the need for pre­
senting a "constructive peace plan" to Europe at the con­
clusion of the Russian campaign which would hopefully meet 
with its approval. According to former German Ambassador 
to Italy, von Hassell (1932-1937), Papen maintained that 
Hitler did not object to the idea, Ulrich von Hassell,
The Von Hassell Diaries. 1930-19^. (New York, 19^7), 217.
7 Nuri Pasha. A wealthy factory owner and brother 
of Enver Pasha, Turkish War Minister during World War I, 
who had once occupied a leading post in the Islam Orlu 
(a Pan-Turanian organization in Turkey); he was reputed 
to have particular sympathy for his brother's Pan-Turanian 
plans.
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cohorts desiredo WeizsUcker stated that Germany had no 
political,, but only economic interests in the area of the 
Caucasus, and, therefore, approved of Turkey either incor­
porating the area or establishing an eastern Turkish state, 
Pasha added that he would like to stay on in Berlin as an 
advisor concerning the Caucasus, with which he was extremely 
familiar concerning its geographic, ethnographic, military, 
and economic aspects, WeizsUcker, somewhat hesitant to
grant this request, instructed him to contact Under State
8Secretary Woermann in regard to further discussions,
Woermann and Nuri Pasha held several discussions during 
September 19^1. In answer to questions placed by the Under 
State Secretary, Nuri admitted that Ataturk’s policy fol­
lowed the principle that Turkey would, except for a few 
frontier changes, not seek objectives beyond its present 
boundaries. However, he explained, this was merely a matter 
of expediency caused by fear of the Soviet Union, Further­
more, Nuri felt certain that at the proper moment both the
Turkish government and the Turkish people would adopt the
9ideas espoused by the Pan-Turanians, In his report to 
the Foreign Ministry, Woermann recommended that Berlin 
should encourage the creation of ethnically Turkish states
8 Ernst Woermann. German diplomatist; Director of 
the Political Department, and Under State Secretary at the 
German Foreign Office.
9 It was not specifically stated what the proper 
moment would be, but it would probably arrive when Russia 
was defeated.
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In the area desired by the Pan-Turanians* But he advised 
that Germany study carefully the economic implications 
before handing the land to the Turkish government010
By the end of October, the German Foreign Office had 
started to take positive action concerning the Pan-Turanian 
question* Minister von Hentig‘L1 was recalled to Berlin to
12consult with Nuri Pasha, on the question* Also* the 0*K«W* 
had been directed to separate the ethnically Turkish and 
Mohammedan prisoners of war, in the hope of gaining the 
Turkish government’s good will* Ambassador Papen reported 
to the Wilhelmstrasse that the Turkish government did not 
object to Germany placing prisoners of Turkish ethnic 
origin in special camps. However, the Turks were opposed 
to any policies which would accentuate Pan-Turanian propa­
ganda within Turkey, for it might place their government 
in a very awkward position. Therefore, Papen recommended 
that any such propaganda, be confined to the prisoner camps
and to the training of persons who might be sent into Ger-
13man-occupied areas in Russia. J
During November 19*1-1, the German offensive began to 
experience difficulties* Hitler’s plan of completing the
10 P*G,F*P*. Series D, XIII, 571-75.
11 von Hentig* German diplomatist. Official at the 
German Foreign Ministry who had been on temporary duty with 
the Eleventh Army in the area of the Crimea.
1 2x The High Command of the German Armed Forces,
13 DoG qF.P*, Series D, XIII, 707-08*
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Blitzkrieg against Russia by capturing Leningrad and Moscow 
and.occupying the Caucasian region was becoming the subject 
of a spring offensive. The Ftthrer demanded that Moscow be 
captured before the end of the year, and a final drive was 
launched by Army Group Center on November 16, The assault 
failed, and by December 6 the entire Army Group was under 
extreme pressure from the R u s s i a n s O n  December 7 the 
third member of the Axis, Japan, attacked Pearl Harbor,
Four days later Germany declared war on the United States 
and was soon followed by Italy, With the United States * 
declaration on the two remaining Axis powers, the sides 
were definitely drawn. However, the entry of the United
15States into the war did:not particularly bother the Ftthrer,
Of far more importance to Hitler was the condition of the
"1 ̂Wehrmacht in Russia,
With the entry of the United States, the Turkish gov­
ernment viewed the German-Russian war with greater concern. 
Previously, Turkey had thought it possible that a compromise 
could be reached between Great Britain and the Axis, but 
with the United States actively on the side of the Allies 
such ideas began to fade. The Turks believed that the only 
way their country could be kept intact would be by the
14 Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict,
19^1-19^5. (New York, 1965), 180, [Hereafter cited as Clark, 
Barbarossa,1
Ciano, Diaries, i|>05; and Bullock, Hitler, 66l-6^, 
Bullock, Hitler, 66^-65.
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reinstitution of the balance of power, especially in the
Mediterranean. In a communique to Berlin, Ambassador Papen
explained this situation and emphasized that now more than
ever the Turkish Republic desired a policy of neutrality.
But, he stated, there were two conditions which might
possibly force Turkey to abandon the role of a neutral:
first, if the Axis were successful in defeating Russia, in
the spring; second, if the Wehrmacht occupied the Caucasus
and threatened Britain*s oil supply in the Persian Gulf.
In both instances, Turkey would see that it was unlikely
that the Allies could win the European war and would perhaps
be ready to support the Axis militarily. But, Papen warned,
Berlin must not attempt prematurely to force Turkey to
assume an active status in the war, whether by ordering
the government to declare war or demanding transit rights.
Such actions would undoubtedly cause the Turks to join the
17other side on the basis of violation of sovereign rights.
Throughout the winter of 19^1-19^2 * the Wehrmacht re­
mained on the defensive in Russia. By February, it was 
evident that the German armies would pull through, but the
unusually cold winter was an ordeal that neither side would 
1 Rforget. Because of this undecided situation, Berlin was 
hesitant to push Ankara too far. Nor was Turkey prepared
^  GoF.O.D.. Turkey. ^9-51.
18 The special medal given to those who participated 
in this winter campaign was known as the Gefrierflelsch 
Orden, the Order of the Frozen Meat. Clark, Barbarossa. 181.
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to accept a German victory as a fait accompli, The coming 
German offensive could prove to be decisive.
While the Turkish government hesitated to commit it­
self to either warring block, an assassination attempt was 
made on the life of German Ambassador Papen. On February 2̂ , 
a man was killed by the premature explosion of the device 
with which he had planned to liquidate the Ambassador, 
who was only eighteen yards a,way. The Turkish authorities 
announced on March 5 that the dead man was Omar Tokat, a 
communist, and that his co-conspirators, also communists, 
had been taken into custody. On Information gained by in­
terrogation, the police raided the Russian non-diplomatic 
offices in Antera. and also requested the Russian Consul- 
General at Istanbul to surrender a suspect who was within 
the consulate. The Consul-General refused, but when the 
police surrounded the building and threatened forced entry, 
the man was soon given up. On April 1, four persons, two 
Russian and two Turks, were placed on trial in connection 
with the assassination attempt.1  ̂ The suspects stated that 
prior to gaining Turkish nationality they had been involved 
with communist activities in Macedonia, and after arriving 
in Turkey, they had become communist couriers between Tur­
key and Yugoslavia.. Sayman declared that both he and the
19 These people were: Georgi Pavlov, an official of
the Russian trade mission at Istanbul; Leonid Kornilov, also 
a member of the Russian trade mission at Istanbul and allegedly 
of the NKVD; Abd ur-Rahan Sayman, a Turkish medical student; 
a.nd Sulaiman Sav, a Turkish barber.
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dead man had been instructed by the Russians to assassinate 
Papen and thereby cause a war between Germany and Turkey,,
The Russians had told the assassin that by pressing a cer­
tain button of the device, he would produce a smoke-screen
behind which he could escape. Evidently, he had pushed the
20button before firing and had killed himself.
Because of the failure of the plot and the immediate 
efforts by the Turkish government to apprehend those in­
volved, Berlin hesitated to criticize Turkey, Hitler, 
in commenting on the event and political assassinations in
general, was very content to blame the entire incident on 
21the Russians, The event no doubt helped to increase 
Germany’s prestige within Turkey and conversely caused the 
Turks to view the Russians with considerable suspicion.
In June 1942, the Germans launched their summer offen­
sive, Germany’s success in the Crimea, and especially in 
the direction of the Caucasus, had a definite influence on 
the Turkish government’s views towards the Pan-Turanian 
movement. During late August, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu
20 Kirk, Middle East, 452-53<> I could not find exactly 
what type of device was used in the assassination attempt, 
nor did I discover what happened to the accused.
21 Adolph Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, (New 
York, 1961), 316-17® [Hereafter cited as Hitler, Secret 
Conversations.1 Interestingly the Ftthrer remarked that 
’For my part, I’ve never allowed anyone to resort to assas­
sination in our political struggles.” Propaganda Minister 
Goebbels believed that the British Secret Service was in­
volved in the plot on Papen’s life, Joseph Goebbels, The 
Goebbels Diaries. 1942-1943. (New York, 1948), 102-04.
22 Numan Menemencioglu was appointed Foreign Minister
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told Papen that contrary to the suspicions in Berlin that
Turkish troops had been withdrawn from the Russian-Turkish
border, Turkey did not sympathize with the Russians and
23would not enter into any negotiations with them* Menemen- 
cioglu siad that Turkey realized that Germany faced an im­
mense task in Russia, and the Turks were ready to assist 
the Third Reich in every way possible short of war. Speci­
fically, the Turkish government was interested in the 
cultural existence of the Turkish minorities in southern 
Russia and would be willing to cooperate with Germany in 
this area. However, when questioned as to the type of
cooperation Berlin could expect the Foreign Minister an-
24swered that he was not sure at that time.
The following day, the Ambassador met with Prime 
Minister Saracoglu who continued to elaborate on the future 
of the Turkish minorities within Russia, He felt that since 
the majority of the people in the minority regions belonged 
to the Turkish race, that Turkey had a legitimate interest
in August after the death of Prime Minister Refik Seydam on 
July 7, Shukru Saracoglu replaced Seydam as Prime Minister, 
Germany had hoped that Ambassador Husrev Gerede would be 
appointed Foreign Minister, because of his pro-German out­
look, Hitler, Secret Conversations, 4*1-3, Gerede was re­
placed by Saffet Arlkan, the previous Minister of Defense, 
1940-1941, who remained Ambassador to Germany until the 
cessation of relations in August 1944,
23J Berlin was obviously refering to the Russo-Turkish 
negotiations during May 1942 which were actually no more 
than a renewal of the previous Russo-Turkish Non-Aggression 
Pact,
?4 Turkey. 82-84,
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In the solution to the question. He suggested that a. portion 
of the younger people be sent to universities within both 
Germany and Turkey which would have the advantage of orien­
ting the regions towards both countries. However, as Prime 
Minister, it was his duty to insure that for the present 
the Russians would not be given an excuse to slaughter the
Turkish minorities. This was the reason for Turkey's neu- 
2 *5tral position.
In his report to Berlin, Papen outlined the conversa­
tions with the Turkish officials, and then added his own 
opinions. The Ambassador agreed with the idea, that the 
only way to reach a lasting solution of the Russian ques­
tion would be to obtain the cooperation of the various min­
orities in the country by educating them to the idea of 
independence within the German framework. Then Germany 
could appoint one of these educated local inhabitants to 
appear outwardly as the head of the government though the 
actual power would be in the hands of a German director.
The Ambassador admitted that this completely differed from 
the German administration in the Ukraine and other regions 
in Russia. But he believed that in view of the Turkish 
question, and the fact of the common Mohammedan religion, 
the area would otherwise have to be administrated on a 
German police basis.
25 G.F.O-.D., Turkey. 87-90.
26 Ibid.. 91-93.
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On September 12, Foreign Minister Bibbentrop notified 
Papen that the German Foreign Ministry had no desire to 
enter into talks with Ankara concerning its future co­
operation in the administration of the Turkish minorities. 
Furthermore, he said that there was no reason at this time 
for Germany to extend assurances to Turkey that its wishes 
would be given any consideration in this matter. However, 
Berlin would reconsider its position if the Turkish gov­
ernment changed its political attitude toward the Third 
2?Reich.
The German offensive, which had been steadily moving 
through southern Russia since the previous June, received 
a serious blow in November with the Russian encirclement 
of Stalingrad. This was followed by a series of defeats 
and the fall of Stalingrad on February 2, 19^3. The ini- 
tiatlve seemed to have passed to the Russians. Berlin in­
structed Ambassador Papen to find what effect the Axis 
defeats in Russia, North Africa, and the South Pacific had 
©n Turkish neutrality. The Wilhelmstrasse was informed 
that since Turkey did not desire Russian ascendency in
Europe, it did not intend to renounce its neutrality and
28would defend it in all circumstances.
The Allied declaration at Casablanca of Unconditional 
Surrender, and its extension to Great Britain of a free
27 GoF.O.P., Turkey. 104-06.
28 rbid.. 118-19.
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hand In Turkey , was followed at the end of January 19^3 "by 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill meeting with President 
Infintl at Adana, Turkey. The Prime Minister was rebuffed, 
when he tried to enlist Turkish support, with the comment 
that Turkey would not enter the war until it was imperative 
because of post-war reasons. Papen reported to Berlin that 
Turkey's role in the war was the topic of conversation and 
suggested that Germany stabilize the situation through 
assurances of some sort. Several days later, Hitler tele­
graphed a message which stated that Germany had no aggres­
sive intentions toward the Turkish people. The President 
expressed his gratitude for Hitler's communique and added
that only in extreme circumstances wouldhis country declare
29war on Germany.
As a result of the Adana conference it was evident in
Berlin that no binding agreements had been concluded with
the British. For the present, Turkey would follow a neutral
policy. Turkish fear of German reprisals, if they joined
with the Allies, and Allied reprisals if they joined the
Germans would necessarily cause that country to align with
30the victor only at the last moment.
In March, the Germans recovered from the defeat at 
Stalingrad and launched a counter-attack. With a. dozen or
29 Survey, Neutrals, 356; and Papen, Memoirs, 495-96,
30 Frederick W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mus­
solini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism. {New York, 1962), 188. [Hereafter cited as Deakin, The Brutal Friendship.]
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so fresh divisions strengthening the southern front, the 
Wehrmacht advanced up to eighty miles in certain areas 
"before the spring weather halted further operations. The 
German High Command now began to plan for a new offensive 
to be launched during the summer.
In Ankara,9 the Turkish government was receiving pres- 
sure from both the Axis and the Allies, Great Britain was 
trying to obtain permission from Turkey to establish an 
advanced air base between Istanbul and Izmir. However, 
the Turks were proving very obstinate, largely because of 
the German military position. The Turkish negotiators 
argued that the German summer campaign might be directed 
against Turkey as well as Russia. Further, it was sus­
pected by the British that Berlin had intimated to the Turks
that their cities were very accessible to aerial bombard- 
31ment. In any case, Turkey remained neutral.
On July 5s 19^3» the German offensive in Russia surged 
forward. For eight days, the German forces hammered at the 
Russian defenses with only minor gains. Two days later, 
the Russians launched a counter-offensive and immediately 
penetrated the German lines. The Wehrmacht was not aware 
of the fact, but except for a few short-lived occasions it 
would never again regain the initiative.
The Italian surrender in September led to the British 
occupation of the Dodecanese islands of Samos, Cos, and
Survey, Neutrals, 356; and Knatchbull-Hugessen,
l6l
Leros. It appeared to Berlin that Britain was attempting
to demonstrate to Turkey that it could join the Allies
without fear of German reprisals. Against the advice of
the military to evacuate German outposts in the Aegean,
Hitler ordered an aerial bombardment of the islands to b©
followed by an invasion. The attack began on November 12,
and by the middle of November the successful German action
32had assured Turkish neutrality.
Throughout the remaining months of 19^3* the Allies 
met in a series of conferences held in Moscow, Cairo, and 
Teheran. One of the points agreed upon by both the Bussians 
and British at the Moscow conference was that Turkey should 
be brought into the war. This was presented to the Turks
at the Cairo conference in November. 33 But Turkey, pointing
3kto the close proximity of the Luftwaffe refused to budge. 
Again, at the Teheran conference, the Allies agreed to try 
persuading the Turkish government to declare war on Germany. 
This time, they set a target date, February 15, 19*Mk Ho w-
i
ever, at the second Cairo conference, they were met with a 
series of Turkish demands for military supplies which had to 
be delivered before the Turks would venture towards align­
ment with the Allies. Meanwhile, Papen had been informed 
of the British negotiations through Operation Cicero. He
32 Hinsley, Strategy. 231-32; and Papen, Memoirs, 503.
33 This was the first of two Cairo conferences; the 
second was held after the Teheran meeting.
3k Ismay, Memoirs. 330.
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immediately warned Ankara that compliance with the Allies' 
requests would undoubtedly lead to German reprisals. Con­
fronted with the lack of military materials and German
35threats, the Turkish government refused to commit itself.
As the Russian forces approached the Balkans in early 
1944, the position of both Germany and Turkey became very 
difficult. The Allies had agreed at the second Cairo con­
ference to end Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey, and this was 
put into effect during March 1944 on the grounds that the 
Turks had not lived up to the terms of the Tripartite Pact. 
The Turkish government strongly objected, but to no avail. 
More importantly, from Germany's point of view, its forces 
in Bulgaria were no longer able to perform their proper 
function. Thus, it became only a matter of time before 
Turkey would have no alternative but to join the Allies.
On May 1, the Turks, under Allied pressure, stopped the 
shipment of chromite to Germany. And three months later, 
with the Allies invading Europe in both the east and west, 
the Turkish Republic severed relations with the Third Reich.
Germany's successes in Russia during 1941-1942 did not
3-5 Survey, Neutrals, 359« The Allied Leaders decided 
that supplying Turkey with sufficient materials would create 
too large a drain on Operation Overlord.
Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 
1939-1945, (New York, 1964), 399, Specifically, the Ger­
man forces were prepared to launch an attack on European 
Turkey should the Turks join the Allies - Operation Gertrude,
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produce the results in Turkey that Berlin desired. It had 
hoped that the Turkish government would consider the conflict 
all hut over after the Wehrmacht captured Stalingrad and 
advanced towards the Caucasus, But the Turks, playing the 
game of neutrality and waiting until there was no alterna­
tive, refused to commit themselves, Turkey did not want 
to join the losing team.
In an effort to gain Turkish cooperation, the Germans 
hinted that they might be given a part in the future admin- 
istration of Turkish minorities in Russia, In Pan-Turanian 
circles, these proposals were very attractive, but the 
cautious policy of Turkey’s leaders repressed these ideas 
to a minimum, Germany was not pleased; however, there was 
little it could do besides threaten that if Turkey did not 
assume a more pro-Germa,n policy, it would not be consulted 
on these matters in the future.
As the events in Russia began to turn against Germany 
in 19^3* Berlin was not as demanding towards Ankara, The 
German Foreign Ministry now took the position that perhaps 
a neutral Turkey would better suit its purposes, at least 
for the time being. The Germans knew that the Allies were 
trying to gain Turkey's active support, and they were in a 
better position than the Reich, Therefore, whenever it 
appeared that the Turkish government was leaning too strongly 
towards the Allies, the Wilhelmstrasse threatened reprisals. 
This policy was effective only as long as Germany could 
carry it out.
16*}-
By the summer of 19^» the Third Reich was under attack 
from both the east and west. In these circumstances, the 
attitude of Turkey was of minor importance. When the Tur­
kish government broke relations In August, Nazi Germany was 
fighting for its existence and accepted the decision with­
out mentioning reprisals. Perhaps Berlin realized that if 
it attacked Turkey, it would provide Russia with an excuse 
to rush to that country's rescue, thus allowing a further 
extension of the hated.communist menace.
CONCLUSION
Germany and Turkey had conflicting objectives early 
in the formative years of the Third Reich* Berlin did not 
want a close understanding between the Balkan countries. 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1930’s the Turks pushed for 
the creation of a mutual security system within the Bal­
kans, and they were partially successful with the creation 
of the Balkan Entente* But with the Germans, Italians, 
and Russians all actively pursuing their own interests 
in the Peninsula, the Entente proved to be no more than a 
loose organization of states with largely divergent ideas. 
This was exactly what the Germans wanted, because it allowed 
for easier political and economic exploitation.
Economically, Turkey provided Germany with numerous 
resources. The Germans controlled the chromite exports 
until Berlin halted the delivery of heavy war materials in
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1939 s and. Turkey reciprocated by stopping the export of 
that vital alloy,, In the long run, this was the Third 
Belch's biggest mistake in its relations with Turkey,, But 
it was not evident at the beginning of the war* Germany 
was not on a full war economy in 1939, and its stockpile 
of chromite was considered sufficient for a short war*
If Hitler had known that Prance and Great Britain would 
declare war after the invasion of Poland and that the war 
was to last for an extended period, the Nazi economy would 
undoubtedly have been regeared* The Turkish chromite 
market would not have been lost* However, In other econ­
omic areas, Turkey continued to be both a large supplier 
and market for the Third Reich*
The Turkish Straits served a definite purpose in Nazi 
foreign policy. After originally expressing disinterest In 
that strategic waterway, Berlin used it with advantage in 
dealings with the Russians* A vague promise that Russia 
could eventually establish bases in the Straits was a part 
of the lure for the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non- 
Aggression Pact* But In 19̂ *0, when the Soviet demands for 
the bases became a threat to Germany's objectives, Berlin, 
in an effort to gain Turkey's good will, mentioned Russia's 
plans to the Turkish government* In addition, the Nazis 
stated that if Turkey would conclude a treaty with Germany 
along the lines of the Tripartite Pact, the Reich would 
guarantee the sovereignty of the Straits. But the Turkish
i6y
government refused„ Throughout the war, the Third Reich 
was never allowed to send its warships openly through the 
Straits, Germany did not force the issue, since it believed 
that the collapse of Russia would open the waterway to all 
Axis shipping.
The documents received in Operation Cicero clearly 
outlined the vast extent of the Allies’ war effort, Why 
it was disregarded by the Nazi leaders is largely left to 
supposition. Probably the documents informed Berlin of 
what it did not care to admit « that because of the huge 
Allied industrial complex and growing military strength, 
further resistance by the Axis would only prolong the out­
come of the war.
Turkey’s political position became important to Ger­
many in 1939 when the Wehrmacht prepared for the Polish in­
vasion, Formerly, the Turkish government took a neutral 
stand in international affairs, but during that summer the 
Turks made a definite move towards alignment with Great 
Britain and France. Berlin tried unsuccessfully to fore­
stall any agreement by requesting Rome and Moscow to give 
Ankara assurances that they had no designs on Turkish ter­
ritory. Though the Tripartite Pact was signed, it was not 
directed towards Germany, and Berlin felt that a potentially 
hostile Russia would keep Turkey neutral,
The Wehrmacht1s smashing victory in France and Italy's 
declaration of war impressed on the Turks what their future 
might hold if they assumed a belligerent status. Berlin
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used this opportunity to begin negotiations for a German- 
Turkish Pact, Turkey was hesitant either to join the Axis 
or to conclude a treaty which would be viewed unfavorably 
by Britain. However, the Italian attack on Greece and the 
consequent German invasion of the Balkans demonstrated to 
Turkey the need to negotiate some type of agreement with 
the Third Reich or it might be next. The German-Turkish 
Friendship Agreement signed in June 19^1 was not all that 
Germany wanted, but it did assure Turkish neutrality during 
the forthcoming Russian campaign, And Berlin believed that 
after Russia was crushed, Turkey could be easily drawn into 
the New Order.
During the military successes of 19^1-19^2, Berlin 
tried to entice the Turks into active cooperation by 
offering them promises of political control over the Turkish 
minorities in Russia, There was a definite interest in Tur­
key especially among the Pan-Turanians, but the Turkish gov­
ernment refused to commit itself until the Russian defeat 
was a certainty. In 19^3 * the Wehrmacht was stopped by the 
Red Army. Germany now wanted to be assured that Turkey would 
remain neutral. Therefore, whenever it appeared as though 
Ankara was drifting too close to the Allies, the Reich would 
threaten reprisals. In this manner, Turkey was kept a neu­
tral until pressured by the Allies into breaking relations 
in August 19^.
Germany was correct in not forcing Turkey to join the 
Axis powers. Prior to a Russian defeat, the Turkish govern­
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ment would never have accepted such an ultimatum unless 
the Nazis had invaded and defeated the Turkish Army, Had 
Berlin ordered an invasion before the Russian campaign, 
little would have been gained, A victory would not have 
been easy and undoubtedly would have necessitated post­
ponement of Operation Barbarossa, Admittedly, it might have 
opened the way to the Near East and allowed Germany to 
fully exploit the Turkish economy. But the Nazis would 
have had to consider at least one serious problem. In 
view of Russia's interests in the Straits and other parts 
of the Near East, would Moscow have allowed it? It was 
highly unlikely. Short of declaring war, the Russians 
would have demanded zones of influence both in the Straits 
and in other areas, Germany certainly would not have 
agreed to this. Therefore, until Russia had been defeated, 
a neutral Turkey was of far more benefit to the Third 
Reich than a hostile one.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliographical Essay
Throughout the wealth of documents covering the 
Second World War5 there were few which dealt with the pre­
cise problem of German-Turklsh relations* The multitude 
of document publications concerning the period prior to 
the outbreak of the war generally held nothing of impor­
tance „ the notable exception being the Documents on British 
Foreign Policy which contained an interesting account of 
negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact* The volumes 
dealing with the Ntlrnberg Trials provided many wasted hours 
of enjoyable readings, because the Allied tribunal was far 
more interested in hanging the accused than in providing 
an explanation of Nazi foreign policy* Hitler Directs His 
Wax* and Nazi-Soviet Relations were both useful and con-
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tained much-material used In this thesis, German Policy 
in Turkey, and' the Ftthrer Naval Conferences provided some 
Information, but the former was largely a tirade against 
the Pan-Turanians and the latter referred only occasionally 
to operations in the Black Sea.
Undoubtedlys the prime documentary collection for 
this topic proved to be the Documents on German Foreign 
Policy., Series C and D0 Series C was the less valuable of 
the two, because of the sparse number of documents con­
tained for the years 1933”1936<> Bu-k Series D, though it 
ended in December 19^1 (much to my regret), formed the 
basis of my thesis. If these volumes had not been available, 
this study could not have been written.
Memoirs and diaries made up the bulk of the other 
primary materials consulted. Actually, most had very little 
to say concerning Germany's relations with Turkey, Goebbels 
and Mussolini gave brief mention to the subject, as did 
WeizsScker, Kassel, and Keitel, Clano's Diplomatic Papers, 
Ciano * s Diaries, and Haider * s Private War Journal discussed 
Turkey's importance during the war, but generally and in 
a superficial manner. Hitler's Mein Kampf merely left the 
idea that Turkey was not worth worrying about. Perhaps, 
the greatest disappointment were the books by Schacht, He 
was so busy explaining why nobody understood him, that the 
treatment of the Third Reich’s economy was far from adequate, 
Bazma, Moyziseh, and Schellenberg all provided extremely
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interesting and valuable material for the chapter on 
Operation Cicero, Without these books, that chapter would 
have had to be omitted.
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull gave a good appraisal of 
Turkey’s Importance from the United States’ point of view 
but was of little value. Shotwell»s Turkey at the Straits 
explained much of the history of the Straits question, es­
pecially during the 19th century. However, it was pub- 
lished in 19^0 and of little use for the war period.
Knatchbul1-Hugessen devoted several chapters to his stay 
In Ankara. But he was too critical of the Germans and too 
laudatory toward the Turks; also his statements were far 
from enlightening. Papen’s Memoirs was another major dis­
appointment. While the Ambassador spent many pages explaining 
the situation in Turkey, he seemed too intent on building 
his role as peace-maker and international "good guy," But 
then, with his reputation as a pro-Nazi, perhaps he had 
every right.
Secondary sources were very important in the prepara­
tion of this thesis. Many of the books cited in the bib­
liography did not dwell at any length on the German-Turkish 
problem but did add information not found elsewhere. Chur­
chill’s volumes presented an excellent over-all picture of 
the situation in Turkey throughout the war, although he did 
not go into detail. In The Power of Small States the author 
provided an interesting analysis of Turkey’s neutrality
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and how it was able to remain in that position. Woodward’s 
British Foreign Policy occasionally referred to Turkey, but 
the lack of footnotes was a definite drawback* The series 
published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
included two volumes, The War and the Neutrals and The Middle 
East In the War* both contributed greatly to the study* 
Especially valuable were the multitude of footnotes. Several 
economic studies were investigated though most considered 
only the period prior to the war. Sweezy’s Structure of 
the Nazi Economy was very good in the description of Ger­
man foreign trade. Germany’s Economic Preparation for War 
barely mentioned Turkey; however, its value lay In the il­
luminating evaluation of the German economy at the out­
break of the war. The most thorough study of German econ­
omic designs in Turkey were the two volumes entitled 
The Economic Blocade. The author provided Insights not 
found in purely German sources. And although it was writ­
ten from the British viewpoint, the importance of German 
trade in Turkey was highlighted,
Kilic’s Turkey and the World was extensively used for 
background material. The author was often too pro-Turkish 
to be taken very seriously. Lord Kinross, while writing an 
excellent biography of Ataturk, said virtually nothing about 
the Turkish president’s opinion of Nazi Germany. One of 
the best of the secondary books was The Middle East in 
World Affairs. The roles of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq
17^
during the Second World War were all given close attention. 
And it included Germany’s intrigues within each country.
A more recent and exhaustive study in the same vein was 
The Third Reich and the Arab East, Colvin's Chief of In­
telligence was regrettably unfootnoted, but included an 
Informative chapter on diplomatic life in Ankara.
The vast majority of related articles contained 
nothing of any value to the topic. Most of them were writ­
ten during the war or shortly afterwards and consequently 
were extremely prejudiced and sympathetic toward Turkey.
The two most worthy of mention were written by Cramer and 
Edwards, and they provided nothing new, Kempner's article 
"The Highest Paid Spy in History" was a recital of informa­
tion found in Moyzisch's Operation Cicero.
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